

Aristotle and Ambedkar's Understanding of Happiness in Human Life

Nilamani Phukan: Research Scholar, Centre for Studies in Philosophy
Dibrugarh University (Assam), India-786004

Kirtinath Kalita: Research Scholar, Centre for Studies in Philosophy
Dibrugarh University, Dibrugarh (Assam), India-786004

Abstract: It is attempted, through this paper, to bring out the ideas of Aristotle and Ambedkar with reference to the highest end of human life. It will specifically consider the ethical views of them and attempt to find out the affinities between them regarding the good human life. Aristotle not only refuses that pleasure is the good, but also refuses that all pleasures are bad. He speaks about the desirable middle way between two extremes, one of excess and the other of deficiency. Ambedkar also supports the avoidance of extremes being agreed to the Buddha. They say that happiness must be an activity and that activity must be of reason or activity in accordance with reason. This is indeed an activity of virtue and this virtue is both intellectual and moral virtues. They have given importance to reason in moral life by which we can control our passions and appetites.

Keywords: Happiness-Human-Virtue-Reason-Activity etc.

1. Introduction

Aristotle (384-322 BC) is the philosopher who has had most influence on the development of western culture. He has written on different subjects, which include natural sciences as well as more specifically philosophical topics of logic, metaphysics and ethics. According to the poet Dante, Aristotle was simply 'the master of those who know'¹. B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956) was born into an untouchable family who was the acknowledged modern Indian leader of the struggle against social injustice. He overcame the stigma of untouchability and gradually rose to become a lawyer of international repute, a founder of a new order of Buddhism and a framer of India's Constitution. Aristotle and Ambedkar are divided by 2275 years. Aristotle is so ancient and Ambedkar is so modern. The comparison between them may be regarded for someone to be astonishing. But there need be no surprise in this, since both had deliberations about ethics which contain their views on what makes a good human life.

2. Objectives

The objective of this paper is to bring out the ideas concerning the highest end of human life with reference to Aristotle and Ambedkar. This paper will specifically consider the ethical views of them which will have the following objectives.

- i) To give an idea about ethical views deliberated by Aristotle and Ambedkar.
- ii) To find out the affinities between the views of them regarding the good human life.

3. Methodology

The method to be used for the paper will be historical and analytical. However, descriptive and comparative methods would also be used for the appreciation of this study. Both primary and secondary sources are used for attempting to meet the objectives set for this research work.

4. Discussion

4.1 Aristotle's Views on Happiness: The ethics of Aristotle is teleological. He is concerned with action, not as being right in itself irrespective of every other consideration, but with action as conducive to man's good. What conduces to the attainment of his good or end will be a 'right' action on man's part and the action that is opposed to the attainment of his true good will be a 'wrong' action.

Aristotle says that every art and every action seems to aim at some good, but the good has rightly been defined as that at which all things aim.² But there are different goods, corresponding to different arts or sciences. Thus the doctor's art aims at health and economy at wealth. Moreover, some ends are subordinate to other and more ultimate ends. The end of giving a certain medicine

¹ Durant, 2016, p. 120

² NE, 1094a1-25

might be to produce sleep, but this immediate end is subordinate to the end of health. Therefore, these ends have further ends or good in view. But if there is an end which we desire for its own sake and for the sake of which we desire all other subordinate ends or goods, then this ultimate good will be the best good.³

Aristotle is of the view that happiness is the end of life. His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama also said: I often believe that the basic goal or end of life is happiness, satisfaction. I believe our existence is very much based on hope.⁴ But different people understand very different things by happiness. Some people identify it with pleasure, others with wealth, and others with honour and so on. Even the same man may have different estimations about happiness at different times. Thus when he is ill he may regard health as happiness, and when he is in want he may regard wealth as happiness. But pleasure is rather an end for slaves than freeman, while honour cannot be the end of life since it depends on the giver and is not really our own. According to Aristotle, moral virtue is not the end of life since moral virtue can go with inactivity and misery; and happiness, which is the end of life, that at which all aim, must be an activity and excludes misery.⁵

Though happiness is an activity of man, it cannot be the activity of growth or reproduction or sensation since these are shared by other lower beings than man. It must be the activity of that which is peculiar to man among natural beings, namely, the activity of reason or activity in accordance with reason. This is indeed an activity of virtue as Aristotle distinguished the intellectual virtues. But it is not like the understanding of common man that happiness consists in being virtuous, because they generally thinking of moral virtues, such as justice, temperance, etc. For Aristotle, happiness as the ethical end could not consist simply in virtue as such: it consists rather in activity according to virtue or in virtuous activity, understanding by virtue both the intellectual and the moral virtues. Moreover, he says that virtuous activity or happiness must be manifested over a whole life and not merely for brief periods.⁶

According to Aristotle, a virtue is a trait of mind or character that helps us to achieve a good life, which Aristotle argues is a life in accordance with reason. There are two types of virtue – intellectual virtues and moral virtues. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle concentrates on moral virtues, traits of character. Aristotle thought that the list of virtues isn't a miscellaneous collection, but grounded in a general, reasoned account of what virtues are.

Aristotle says that anything that is part of the soul (the mind) is either a passion, a faculty or a state (trait) of character. So since virtues are part of the soul, they must be one of these.

- i. Passions: Aristotle's term 'passions' covers our bodily appetites (for food, drink, sex, etc.), our emotions, and any feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain. But these can't be virtues for three reasons.
 - a. Just having a particular passion – feeling hungry or angry – doesn't make you a good or bad person.
 - b. We don't choose our passions, but virtues are related to the choices we make. We cannot generally, just by an act of will, choose what we feel or want.
 - c. Virtues concern how we are *disposed* to feel and act; they are not desires that actually motivate us.
- ii. Faculties: faculties are things like sight or the ability to feel fear. Virtues can't be these, since we have these naturally but we have to *acquire* virtue.
- iii. So virtues must be states of character.

Aristotle defines states of character as 'the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions'. Character involves a person's *dispositions* that relate to what, in different circumstances, they feel, how they think, how they react, the sorts of choices they make, and the actions they perform. So someone is short-tempered if they are disposed to feel angry quickly and often; quick-witted if they can think on their feet; intemperate if they get drunk often and excessively. What we find pleasant also reveals our character.

When Aristotle says that happiness is essentially activity in accordance with virtue, he does not mean simply to exclude all the common notions about happiness. For instance, virtuous activity is necessarily accompanied by pleasure, since pleasure is the natural accompaniment of an unimpeded and free activity. Aristotle remarks that the truly happy man must be sufficiently equipped with external goods. Thus he rejects extreme Cynicism, but he warns us not to mistake indispensable conditions of happiness for essential elements of happiness.⁷ Therefore, the character of happiness as an activity of man is preserved without at the same time having to sacrifice or exclude pleasure and external prosperity.

Pleasure is the satisfaction of passion and appetites, but pleasure which man seeks to attain is not the highest end. Because, appetites and passion are the matter of ethical life and they have to be regulated by the form which is man's reason. Besides, form everywhere is the activity which actualizes matter towards its highest becoming or end. But appetites or passion are said to be passive potentiality or feeling. So, feeling cannot be the highest end of the rational man. Therefore, pleasure cannot be the end of

³ Copleston, 1994, p. 332

⁴ Dalai Lama, 2015, p. 66

⁵ Copleston, 1994, p. 334

⁶ Copleston, 1994, p. 334

⁷ E.E., 1214 b 25 f

man's moral life. That is why Aristotle rejects hedonism. But he does not reject the claim of appetites and passion. He rejects *asceticism*. Man is a living body and he must live with his appetites for food, mate, and fear etc. Hence, man has to include them in his rational activity. For Aristotle, feeling cannot be the guide of life, but it follows of necessity as a necessary consequence or accompaniment of man's rational life. So, pleasure comes in his moral pursuits. The pursuit of the highest rational end of man means the control of passion and appetites by reason.

Aristotle says that goodness of character has to be developed by doing virtuous acts. He tells us that we become virtuous by doing virtuous acts, but how can we do virtuous acts unless we are already virtuous? In this regard Aristotle says that we begin by doing acts which are objectively virtuous, without having a reflex knowledge of the acts and a deliberate choice of the acts as good, a choice resulting from a habitual disposition.⁸ For instance, a child may be told by its parents not to lie. It obeys without realising perhaps the inherent goodness of telling the truth and the acts of truth-telling gradually form the habit. Finally the child comes to realise that truth-telling is right in itself and to choose to tell the truth for its own sake. It is then virtuous in this respect. Aristotle says that virtue itself is a disposition which has been developed out of a capacity by the proper exercise of that capacity. Thus he insists that a completely right action must be not only 'externally' the right thing to do in the circumstances, but also done from a right motive, proceeding from a moral agent acting precisely as moral agent.⁹

According to Aristotle, virtue is a mean between two extremes, the extremes being vices, one being a vice through excess, the other being a vice through defect.¹⁰ It is through excess or defect of either in regard to a feeling or in regard to an action. Thus, in regard to the feeling of confidence, the excess of this feeling constitutes rashness when the feeling issues in human actions, while the defect is cowardice. Hence, the mean will be a mean between rashness on the hand and cowardice on the other hand. This mean is courage and is the virtue in respect to the feeling of confidence. Therefore, Aristotle defines or describes moral virtue as 'a disposition to choose, consisting essentially in a mean relatively to us determined by a rule, i.e. the rule by which a practically wise man would determine it'.¹¹ We can say that virtue is a disposition to choose according to a rule, namely, the rule by which a truly virtuous man possessed of moral insight would choose. Aristotle regarded the possession of practical wisdom, the ability to see what the right thing to do in the circumstances is as essential to the truly virtuous man. He attaches much more value to the moral judgements of the enlightened conscience than to any a priori and merely theoretical conclusions.

In reference to Socrates' view that all virtue is a form of prudence, Aristotle declares that Socrates was partly right and partly wrong.¹² "He was wrong in holding that all virtue is a form of prudence, but right in holding that no virtue can exist without prudence."¹³ Socrates held that all the virtues were forms of reason as being forms of knowledge, but Aristotle declares that the truth is rather that they are all reasonable.¹⁴ "Virtue is not only the right and reasonable attitude, but the attitude which leads to right and reasonable choice, and right and reasonable choice in these matters is what we mean by prudence."¹⁵ Therefore, prudence is necessary for the truly virtuous man with these two conditions- i) as being 'the excellence of an essential part of our nature' and ii) in as much as 'there can be no right choice without both prudence and virtue, seeing that the latter secures the choice of the right end, and the former the choice of the right means to its attainment.'¹⁶ But prudence or practical wisdom is not the same thing as cleverness. Cleverness is the faculty by which a man is enabled to find the right means to any particular end. Mere cleverness is different from prudence which presupposes virtues and is equivalent to moral insight. Prudence can not exist without cleverness, but it can not be reduced to cleverness, for it is a moral virtue. Aristotle says that it is possible for a man that to do what is right, what he ought to do, without being a good man. He is good only if his action proceeds from moral choice and is done because it is good.¹⁷ For this prudence is necessary.

According to Aristotle, it is possible to have natural virtues separately from one another such as a child might be naturally courageous, without being at the same time gentle. But in order to have a moral virtue in the true sense, as a reasonable disposition, prudence is necessary. Socrates, in this regard, was right in holding that no virtue can exist without prudence, though he was wrong in supposing that all virtues are forms of prudence. Aristotle says that it is necessary to distinguish between theoretical science and productive science. "We do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just." Similarly, he observes in the *Magna Moralia* that 'anyone who knows the essence of justice is not forthwith just', while in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he compares those who think they will become good by mere theoretical knowledge, to patients who listen attentively to what the doctor says, but carry out none of his orders.¹⁸

⁸ Copleston, 1994, p. 335

⁹ NE, 1105 b ff

¹⁰ NE, B, 6 ff

¹¹ NE, 1106 b 36-1107 a 2

¹² Copleston, 1994, p. 344

¹³ NE, 1144 b 19-21

¹⁴ Copleston, 1994, p. 344

¹⁵ NE, 1144 b 26-28

¹⁶ NE, 1145 a 2-6

¹⁷ NE, 1144 a 13 ff

¹⁸ Copleston, 1994, p. 345

Aristotle may be thought by some to over-emphasize the pleasures of theoretical and purely intellectual activity. But he sedulously avoids all extreme positions. He refuses to agree with Eudoxus on the one hand that pleasure is the good, on the other hand with Speusippus that all pleasures are bad. In this regard, we can refer to the idea pointed out by Dalai Lama- “One of Buddhism’s most relevant lessons is the avoidance of extremes. It teaches that freedom and happiness will not be found in the extremes of either sensual indulgence or mortification: a middle way must be found”.¹⁹

According to Aristotle, friendship is one of the virtues, or at any rate implies virtue. It is one of the prime necessities of life. He emphasizes our need for friends at different periods of our life, and suggests that in friendship a man loves himself. Dalai Lama also says that friendship is important for happiness. He speaks, “You should take good care of others, be concerned for their welfare, help them, serve them, make more friends, make more smiles. When you yourself need help, you find plenty of helpers! If, on the other hand, you neglect the happiness of others, in the long term you will be the loser”.²⁰ Aristotle attempts the reconciliation of egoism and altruism by pointing out that it is necessary to distinguish the uses of the term ‘self-loving’. Some men seek to get money, honour or the pleasures of the body as much as possible for themselves, and we call these ‘self-loving’ by way of reproach. On the other hand, good men are anxious to excel in virtue and noble actions; but we do not blame these as such though they were also ‘self-loving’. The good man will give away money in order that his friend may have more. Because the money goes to the friend and the noble deed comes to himself, and in this way he appropriates the greater good.²¹ For Aristotle, a happier thought is that a man’s relations to his friend are the same as his relations to himself, since the friend is a second self.²² The concept of the self is capable of extension and may grow to include friends, whose happiness or misery, success or failure, become as our own.

Aristotle is interested not in ‘morality’ but in what is good for human beings. It is hard to understand what a morally good action as opposed to a good action might be. This difficulty has been explained by some philosophers by arguing that in the absence of belief in a God who issues commandments to humanity, moral goodness makes no sense as a separate category from goodness.²³

According to Aristotle, “If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be that of the best thing in us”.²⁴ He says that the contemplative faculty means the faculty of intellectual or philosophic activity, the exercise of which constitutes perfect happiness. For him, man’s highest happiness consists in intellectual activity, because reason is the highest faculty of man, and theoretic contemplation is the highest activity of reason. Thus Aristotle shows the intellectualist standpoint regarding the true happiness of human being. The intellectualist attitude of Aristotle finds its echo in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas when he says that the essence of the Beatific Vision consists in the act of the intellect rather than in the will’s act. Because the intellect is the faculty by which we possess and the will is the faculty by which we enjoy the object already possessed by the intellect.²⁵

4.2 Ambedkar’s Views on Happiness: According to Ambedkar, the Buddhist ethics is not mere rules or guidelines for the individual purity and its sanctity. Buddhist ethics very much talk about the importance of minds to be cleansed. Buddhist ethics address society as a whole, which emphasizes with the social concerns and it has been made clear by Ambedkar who emphasizes the social-morality of Buddhism in *Buddha and His Dhamma*. He says that the purpose of religion for the Buddha is to reconstruct the world. Ambedkar says, “He did not tell people that their aim in life should be to reach some imaginary heaven. The kingdom of righteousness lies on earth and is to be reached by man by righteous conduct”.²⁶ For Ambedkar, Buddhism is not related to the concept of God but morality. We have seen that many religions talk about the earth of love, but only Buddhism talks about the earth of righteousness. According to him, virtue of Buddhism is defined in social aspects. It is this which distinguishes Buddhism from all other religions.²⁷

Buddhist ethics is not the denial of individual aspects of ethics, but it is critical engagement between individual aspect and social aspects. In Buddhism both guides each other and the possibility of interaction between them has been offered in Buddhism. It is evident that only righteousness can remove this inequality and the resultant misery. That’s why Ambedkar says that religion must not only preach but must inculcate upon the mind of man the supreme necessity of being righteousness in his conduct.²⁸

¹⁹ Dali Lama, 2015, p. 77

²⁰ Dalai Lama, 2015, p. 73

²¹ Copleston, 1994, p. 347

²² NE, 1166 a 30-2

²³ NE, p. xxii

²⁴ NE, 1177 a 12-13

²⁵ Copleston, 1994, p. 350

²⁶ Ambedkar, 1987, p. 283

²⁷ Ambedkar, 1987, p. 283

²⁸ Ambedkar, 1987, p. 284

According to Ambedkar, *Nibbana*, says the Buddha, is the highest happiness. Health is the greatest of gifts, contentedness is the best riches and trust is the best of relationships.²⁹ By *Nibbana* the Buddha means release from passion and the aim of it is to live a righteous life.³⁰ As an answer to the question: what pure action brings happiness? asked by the Yakkha Alavaka, the Buddha replied that faith is the noblest wealth for a man in this world and when Dhamma is well observed, it brings happiness. Truth is the sweetest of all tastes. The living endowed with wisdom is said to be the noblest thing.³¹ Right action in the Buddhist moral path is right only when it asserts action conducive to one's own and to others' interest and good, else it is wrong action.³²

There are three ideas which underlie the Buddha's conception of *Nibbana*. The first idea is the happiness of a sentient being as distinct from the salvation of the soul. The second idea is the happiness of the sentient being in *Samsara* while he is alive. The third idea which underlies his conception of *Nibbana* is the exercise of control over the flames of the passions which are always on fire. That the passions are like burning fire was the text of a sermon which the Buddha delivered to the Bhikkhus. He said: "All things, O Bhikkhus, are on fire".³³ The very first sermon of the Buddha begins with a reference to the avoidance of the two extremes such as on the one hand, avoidance of worldly yielding to the passions and sensuality, and on the other hand, avoidance of extreme and painful self-mortification. Hence, we should follow the Middle Way and that is Eightfold Path (*Astangikmarga*).

Ambedkar says that morality is *Dhamma* and *Dhamma* is morality. For him, though there is no God in *Dhamma*, morality takes the place of God in *Dhamma*. Morality is the essence of *Dhamma* without which there is no *Dhamma*. There is no place for prayers, pilgrimages, rituals, ceremonies and sacrifices in *Dhamma*. Morality in *Dhamma* arises from the direct necessity for man to love man.³⁴ Hence for Ambedkar, morality does not require the sanction of God and in order to be a moral person there is no need to please God. It is for his own good that man has to love man.

Ambedkar says that there are three factors which seem to play an important role in order to make morality sacred and these factors are the social need for protecting the best, common models and standards in society, and to safeguard the growth of the individual. According to Ambedkar, the rightness of making morality sacred lies imbedded in the struggle of existence and survival of the fittest. In this struggle only the fittest survive. He asks whether the fittest (the strongest) is the best. For him, if the weakest is protected then it would be ultimately the best for advancing the ends and aims of society which is also seemed to support by the prevailing state of society before the time of Ambedkar. He says that the way to protect the weak is to impose some restraints upon the fittest and in this respect there lies the origin and necessity for morality. As he writes- "This morality had to be sacred, because it was imposed originally on the fittest, i.e., the strongest."³⁵

For Ambedkar, there is morality among thieves, businessmen, fellow caste men and also a gang of robbers. But this morality is marked by isolation and exclusiveness which is a morality to protect 'group interest'. So, it is anti-social. In this regard he says, "If society continues to consist of anti-social groups, society will remain a disorganised and a factional society. The danger of a disorganised and factional state of society is that it sets up a number of different models and standards."³⁶ For him, society cannot be a harmonious whole without common models and standards. It is not possible for a man to attain consistency of his mind with different models and standards in society. We can quote in his words, "A society which rests upon the supremacy of one group over another, irrespective of its rational or proportionate claims, inevitably leads to conflict."³⁷

According to Ambedkar, in order to remove conflict among the society, we should have common rules of morality which are sacred to all. He says that safeguard for the growth of the individual requires morality to be made sacred and universal. For him, the struggle for existence or group rule prevents a man from acquiring consistency of his mind and leads to discrimination and denial of justice. As he says, "The group set-up leads to stratification of classes. Those who are masters remain masters and those who are born in slavery remain slaves. Owners remain owners and workers remain workers. The privileged remain privileged and the serfs remain serfs."³⁸ This means that there can be liberty and equality for some but not for all in the society. To enjoy liberty and equality by all, we have to make fraternity universally effective and this fraternity is nothing but another name for brotherhood of men, which is another name for morality. Therefore, Ambedkar says that the Buddha preached *Dhamma* which is morality and as *Dhamma* is sacred, so morality is also sacred.

Of all religions in the world, the religion of the Buddha is only based on the recognition of human suffering and the purpose of it is the removal of this misery. Dalit interpretation of the noble truths maintains that the Buddha's real noble truth is to realise the fact of the life that is: life is both happy and sorrow and sorrow cannot be removed totally from the life. What one can do is to

²⁹ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 317

³⁰ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 339

³¹ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 494

³² Naik, 2009, p. 350

³³ Samyutta Nikaya 43:87; Mahavagga I:3

³⁴ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 283

³⁵ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 285

³⁶ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 285

³⁷ Ambedkar, 2010, p. 285

³⁸ Ambedkar 2010, p. 286

minimise sorrow. The middle path helps man to minimise misery in life by maximising happiness. Buddha's middle path is nothing but an ethical pact between man and society and between society and nature.³⁹

In the *Mahaparinibbana Sutta*, the Buddha told Ananda that his religion was based on reason and experience and that his followers should not accept his teaching as correct and binding merely because it emanated from him. Being based on reason and experience they were free to modify or even abandon any of his teachings if it was found that at a given time and in given circumstances they did not apply.⁴⁰ It means that there is nothing infallible in Buddhism and it gives us freedom to modify or revise his teachings. Buddhist teachings encouraged thinking and discourse, rather than the unquestioning acceptance of tradition. The admonition of the Buddha to his disciples to 'be your own lamps, be your own refuges', and the whole atmosphere of dialogue and debate gave a striking emphasis to self-decision. The Buddhist follower was urged to think for himself, to judge for himself, to meditate for himself. Buddhism encouraged self-reliance and critical thinking.⁴¹ A famous verse indicates this self-reliance:

*By oneself, indeed, is evil done;
by oneself does injury come.
By oneself is evil left undone;
By oneself does purity come.
Purity and impurity belong to oneself.
No one purifies another.*⁴²

Ambedkar is also in agreement with the Buddha that the goal of happiness can be attained by man in this life and on this earth by righteousness born out of his own efforts.

5. Conclusion

From the above account considering Aristotle and Ambedkar's views on the highest end of human life, we can conclude with the following points.

- i) Aristotle is not interested in 'morality' but in what is good for human beings since for him, it is difficult to distinguish morally good action from good action. But Ambedkar made morality the soul of his moral philosophy since he equates morality with *Dhamma* which is nothing but the means to happiness of human life.
- ii) Both Aristotle and Ambedkar advocate that happiness is the end of life. They say that happiness must be an activity and that activity must be of reason or activity in accordance with reason. This is indeed an activity of virtue and this virtue is both intellectual and moral virtues. They have given importance to reason in moral life.
- iii) Both Aristotle and Ambedkar hold that we should avoid all extreme positions. Aristotle not only refuses that pleasure is the good, but also refuses that all pleasures are bad. He speaks of the *Golden Mean* which means the desirable middle way between two extremes, one of excess and the other of deficiency. Ambedkar also supports the avoidance of extremes being agreed to the Buddha's lesson that freedom and happiness will not be found in the extremes of either sensual indulgence or mortification. There is middle path and that is *Eightfold Path* of Buddhism which leads us to the state of happiness.
- iv) For Aristotle, the pursuit of the highest rational end of man means the control of passion and appetites by reason. For Ambedkar, *Nibbana* is the exercise of control over the flames of the passions which are always on fire. Hence, we can say that both Aristotle and Ambedkar advocate the control of passion and appetites by using our reason.
- v) According to Ambedkar, the highest happiness of a man's life is *Nibbana* of the Buddha whose aim is to live a righteous life. Aristotle also said that the life of the intellect is the happiest life. Thus it is clear that both of them speak of a righteous life of man in our society.

6. References

- [1] Ambedkar, B.R. *Buddha and the Future of His Religion*. (3rd ed.) Jullundur, 1980.
- [2] Ambedkar, B.R. *The Buddha and His Dhamma*. New Delhi: Samyak Prakashan, 2010.
- [3] Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1996.
- [4] Buddha. *The Dhammapada*. New Delhi: Timeless Books, 2015.

³⁹ Karunyakara, 2002, p. 73

⁴⁰ Ambedkar, 1980, p. 3

⁴¹ Omvedt, 2003, p. 139

⁴² *Dhammapada*, 12.9

- [5] Copleston, Frederick. *A History of Philosophy*. (Vol. I) New York: Doubleday, 1994.
- [6] Cummings, D. and Hellstrom, T. (ed.). *His Holiness The Dalai Lama*. New Delhi: AMARYLLIS, 2015.
- [7] Durant, Will. *The Story of Philosophy*. New York: Pocket Books, 2006.
- [8] Karunyakara, Lella. *Modernisation of Buddhism*. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2002.
- [9] Naik, C.D. *Ambedkar's Perspective on Buddhism and Other Religions*. Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2009.
- [10] Omvedt, Gail. *Buddhism in India*. New Delhi: SAGE, 2003.
- [11] Stace, W.T. *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*. New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd., 1982.
- [12] Thilly, Frank. *A History of Philosophy*. Allahabad: Central Publishing House, 1999.

