

Fig shows how black hole problem arises, here node "A" want to send data packets to node "D" and initiate the route discovery process. So if node "C" is a malicious node then it will claim that it has active route to the specified destination as soon as it receives RREQ packets. It will then send the response to node "A" before any other node.

In this way Node "A" will think that this is the active route and thus active route Discovery is complete. Node "A" will ignore all other replies and will starts siding data packets to node "C". In this way all the data packet will be lost consumed or lost.

III. BLACK HOLE ATTACK DETECTION METHOD

Watchdog Scheme- Patcha et al [5] proposed a method for black hole attack network to tackle collusion amongst nodes. In this algorithm, nodes in the network are classified into trusted, watchdog, and ordinary nodes. Every watchdog that is elected should observe the neighboring node and decide whether it is a trusted node or a malicious node.

In this scheme, when the source node forwards a packet, it waits for an acknowledgement packet from destination node. When the destination node receives a packet it sends back an acknowledgement back to source node through each node along the reverse route. The packet transmission is successful if source node receives an acknowledgement packet. Otherwise an alarm message is generated.

IV. BLACK HOLE ATTACK PREVENTION METHOD

Retrieve the first entry from RRT

If DSN is much greater than SSN then

discard entry from RRT as

Select Dest_Seq_No from table

If (DSN >>=Src_Seq_No)

{

MN=Node_Id

Discard entry from table

}

(Node Selection Process)

* Sort the contents of RRT entries according to the DSN

* Select the NID having highest DSN among RRT entries.

(Continue default process)

Call RREP method of default AODV Protocol.

This show malicious node is identified and removed.

(1) The malicious node is identified at the initial stage itself and immediately removed so that it cannot take part in further process.

(2) No delay = malicious node are easily identified

(3) No modification is made in other default operations of AODV Protocol.

(4) Better performance produced in little modification and

(5) Less memory overhead occurs because only few new things are added.

V. SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND TERMINOLOGIES

The following table shows the simulation parameters which we are using to implement the detection technique.

Table 1 Simulation Parameters

Parameter	Value
Simulator	NS-2.35
Area	750mx750m
Routing Protocol	AODV
Simulation time	300s
Application Traffic	CBR
Number of Nodes	20
Malicious Node	1-5
Packet Size	512 bytes
Transmission rate	2 packets/s

To evaluate the black hole attack we consider the following three metrics:

Packet Delivery Ratio

- It is the ratio of the packets that are successfully delivered to the destination.
- $\text{Packet Delivery Ratio} = \frac{\text{Number of packets received}}{\text{Number of packets send}}$

End-to-End Delay

- It is the average time taken by the packets to pass through the network.
- $\text{End-to-End Delay} = \text{received time} - \text{sent time}$

Throughput

- It is the amount of data transferred over the period of expressed in bits per second.
- $\text{Throughput (bits per second)} = \frac{(\text{No. of delivered packets} * \text{Packet size} * 8)}{(\text{Simulation time})}$

VI. SIMULATION RESULTS




Fig 2: Traffic Behaviors

In this scenario iterating the blackhole and finding the traffic behavior.




Fig 3: Monitor immediate neighboring node

In this scenario detecting the blackhole and also monitor its all immediate neighbors.




Fig 4: Xgraph for Performance before attack




Fig 5: Xgraph for Performance when attack happen




Fig 6: XGraph for Performance after preventing black hole

VII. CONCLUSION

Black Hole Attack is a main security attack that degrades the performance of the routing protocol in Mobile Ad-hoc Network. Its detection and prevention is the main matter of concern to improve network quality. In this paper, we have analyzed and describe various techniques for detection and prevention of black hole attack in the Mobile Ad-hoc Network. Methods that we have discussed to detect and prevent black hole attack in MANET give better results than other security mechanism.

VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In this paper, we are implemented detection and prevention technique of BlackHole Attack.

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