India's Climate Change Politics: Fairy Tale and Benefits

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Abstract

In global climate politics, India is caught between two worlds: underdeveloped and developing economy with low per capita emissions, and developed economy with high per capita emission.
Indian climate politics are revolving around first viewpoint, but due to international pressure, it's pretend to be the second one. This study examined the first viewpoints of Indian climate and their roots in national climate politics. The study also examines the minor aspects in which climate politics have been revisited in domestic debates since 2007. The paper then moves on to a study of new prospects for Indian climate policy and its moorings in domestic climate politics after elucidating these issues.

INTRODUCTION

In global climate politics, India holds a fascinating dual position. India is anticipated to incur significant repercussions and has limited capacity to solve the problem as a developing economy with a significant poverty problem and low levels of historical and per capita emissions. India, as a major country with a rapidly developing economy, is being urged to play a more active role in addressing the global climate crisis. Indian climate politics has mostly been moulded by the first viewpoint, but it is increasingly being pushed to contend with the second due to international pressure. As a result of this shift, the conversation around climate change has evolved as well.

India has a dual status in global climatic politics. Developing economy having poverty issues and low per capital emissions, India is both likely to face considerable impacts and has limited capacity to address the problem. As a large country and one that has transitioned into a rapidly growing economy, India is called on to participate actively in addressing the global climate challenge. Indian climate politics has been majorly revolved around the first viewpoints, and increasingly, under international pressure, is being forced to grapple with the second. Climate change has shifted from a narrow subset of Indian foreign and diplomatic policy that was almost exclusively the preserve of negotiators and diplomats to a broader debate on whether and how development trajectories should internalize climate mitigation and adaptation goals as a result of this transition. A much broader slice of India society—business, media, state bureaucrats, environmentalists—has been brought into the climate discussion as a result of this transformation. While there has been discussion, there are no obvious answers. As a result, sprawling domestic climate policy machinery has yet to be completely implemented, let alone reviewed. The earliest crystallization of Indian climate attitudes and their roots in national climate politics are the subjects of this review of Indian climate politics. After that, it looks at how climate politics has been renewed in domestic debates since around 2007. The continuity of an equity frame for Indian climate politics, as well as the recent emergence of the concept of "co-benefits"-based policies that bring both development and climate advantages, are central issues. While the latter formulation guides internal policies, it has yet to serve as a foundation for rethinking India's international negotiating posture. A third segment looks at new climate policy directions in India.

DISCOVERING THE ARCH OF INDIAN CLIMATE POLICY: THE CENTER OF EQUTIY NARRATIVES

Indian environment governmental issues is, in huge section, an account of momentous coherence. The prevailing edge of 'environment value'— saw dominatingly in a North–South challenge around sharing a worldwide hall—was set up generally early. This edge has additionally molded environment legislative issues around commitment with the global exchange setting, protecting Indian homegrown political and strategy spaces from considering environment concerns. This segment inspects the crystallization of the value and environmental change story, the explanations behind its coherence over the long haul, and the incomplete manners by which that account has been adjusted and addressed lately.

Establishing the Frame

The Science and Environment Center (CSE) describes the phase for the first two decades of Indian climate policies as "global warming in a harsh world" from the opening rule: "The notion that India and China must blame the country for its rising temperatures. They warm them, and the weather stability should be warm. They are called environmental colonialism.
The response to the World Institute of the World Washington, Agriculture, outlines modern Indian concentrates on perspectives on water disputes and air discussion, participation in greenhouse gas reserves and greenhouse gas emissions is a useful measure for assessment. CSEs' voices were especially crucial in the

early days of the climate talks, when the Indian government and, in particular, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, were new to the issue. While per capita-based equity formulations were part of the government's thinking at the time, the CSE report 'encouraged' the government to adopt the idea, according to an early scholarly presentation of India's bargaining position. One of the main reasons for adopting this viewpoint was that it was widely accepted by others involved in the argument. Another important and powerful think tank, the (then) Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI), for example, adopted a less harsh and muddled tone. There was widespread agreement among those involved in the debate in India about the potential detrimental effects of climate change on India, the potential constraining effect of a climate treaty, and the necessity for India to insist that industrialized countries be held accountable for their emissions.

The possible negative effects of climate change on India, the potential constraining effect of a climate treaty, and the imperative for India to insist on industrialized countries being held accountable for their emissions were all widely agreed upon among those involved in the debate in India.

India had played a major role in designing of policy through coalition and ground realities and carefully examining all the policies in this respect. India articulated the IPCC's formulation with common responsibilities across nations but with differentiated responsibilities. It's indicating the seriousness of India towards this concern. India led by inviting new and additional funding for creation of Institutional Mechanism for climate funding.

For climate change, there was a movements started to use the grounds well water in optimum manner proposed by Montreal Protocol. Structural adjustment was started in 1980's on global environmental issues; economic cooperation was necessary to address the global environmental issues. Diminishing faith in the global system and separate global mechanism for developing countries is the problem to address the environmental issues. The environmental issues were majorly concerned with sustainable development; and environmental objectives only limited to the growth objectives of economy. The divide between North and South on the basis of financial burden was main constraints

Clean Development Mechanisms: India's perspectives:-

India's commitment to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) represents a relatively small change in the established framework of India's climate policy. But it also shows how India's climate policy is shaped in ongoing dialogue with global debates. In line with India's stated position to continue to pressure developed countries to take mitigation measures, India's first response to CDM (then "jointly implemented activities") was that developed countries I was skeptical that it was a way to develop developing countries. Work at the lowest cost. But over the years, the view has changed, driven by new players who have created a new understanding of the mechanics. The Confederation of Indian Industry (IIC), a major trade association, is calling for India's participation in the CDM and its institutional design. This promotion of the IIC is also reinforced by academic research on the subject conducted by influential non-governmental organizations such as TERI. Acceptance of the CDM, and even acceptance, has been made possible by reinterpreting the CDM in accordance with India's framework of contractual action. India has a mitigation obligation only with financial support. India soon became a leader in the generation of CDM projects, accounting for 53% of the projects generated worldwide in 2005, but recently India has been overtaken by China. In this way, CDM can create key components for direct involvement with Indian companies, one aspect of the world's climate system, and can influence national climate change policy. However, it is important not to exaggerate the problem. Indian companies remain surprisingly loose and fragmented in their commitment to climate policy.

Revisiting the Frame

The initial design of India's climate policy proved to be very long, leading to a consistent bargaining position for 20 years. This international stance also provided information on the country's climate policy. Climate change is a globally contested issue between the North and the South. India must use an international process to make developed countries accountable. Climate change issues are relatively unrelated to domestic politics. Ateliers believe that part of this coherence is due to its personality (the role of a few high-ranking bureaucrats who work relatively separately from other influences of foreign policy) and the superiority of the impartiality framework. Partially correct, this explanation alone is not sufficient to explain the coherence of India's climate policy. We also need to consider the ongoing basis for public support for the framework of impartiality (or at least there is no positive disagreement).

The adoption of the equity framework has become widespread during the 20 years of the UNFCCC process. This consensus included a significant number of technical and professional participants in the global climate debate, which are expected to better recognize the impacts of climate change. Interviews with these experts actually reported that participation in international assessments was considered a "waste of time" because political action was considered the responsibility of developed countries. Kandlikar and Sagar point out that the dominant definition of the problem is an innocent joint global problem of former responsibility, further alienating Southern researchers who see the problem through a fair lens. In addition to researchers, Indian environmental activists have historically been skeptical and tackled climate issues as a distraction from local environmental issues.

In addition to the importance of personality, the framework of climate equality and the arguments that support it have received a strong response from many parts of India's politics, especially those who are most legitimate in addressing this issue and those who are most enthusiastic about policy making is maintained. This relatively monolithic political stance has caused several conflicts in the last few years for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, the context of global climate negotiations has changed. Following the Conference of the Parties from Bali (2007) in preparation for the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, major developing countries should clarify the prescriptions and conditions that will accept responsibility for climate mitigation. India had to deal with this problem by force.

In addition, the geopolitical situation in the world has changed significantly since the early 1990s in a way that is closely related to India. India, along with other rapidly industrialized countries, has benefited from years of high economic growth over a period of time. And make more claims to the seats at the global main table. In climate negotiations, this claim was facilitated by the formation of "BASIC" blocks for countries (Brazil, India, South Africa, and China).

In terms of per capita indicators of economic development and greenhouse gas emissions, India has more in common with least developed countries than rapidly industrialized emerging economies, but through its own trading strategies and external awareness. India tends to more and more equate with the least developed countries. Not the former 17, which caused criticism from long-time allies of the G77, such as Bangladesh18. India's own foreign policy enforcement, such as negotiations on the US-India nuclear agreement, has led to pressure on climate change. As explained in the next section, these global changes interacted with India's internal changes and enhanced the nuances of clarification of the equity framework without compliance with the underlying changes principle.

Review of India's Climate Policy

During the period before and after the COP in Copenhagen in 2009, the government promised to limit India's per capita emissions to the average level of industrialized nations, a promise to pre-Copenhagen emission intensity, and a climate change state. We have made several statements and announcements, including plan Changes. Some commentators have noted and praised these measures in an attempt to interpret them as part of India's climate policy and broader changes in policy. India has launched several extensive national programs in step with the declaration of intentions by other developing countries, especially the compromise of Copenhagen, but now speculates on fundamental changes in India's domestic climate change policy. In part, the change in the global message was driven by politics. Moreover, domestic political history is a subtle, incomplete and controversial change in emphasis and framework. Let's examine this change here. This first appears in discussions between different sectors of India's political society and then refers to certain important issues that have surfaced in the discussion of India's climate.

Domestic Constituencies

Historically, climate change has not been a problem in India's organized politics. Given the urgent domestic concerns about poverty, basic service provision and economic governance, climate change is unlikely to change. Former Minister of Environment and Forestry said: "Climate change as a problem is not a voter's mover." At the same time, the issue of climate change is gaining more and more attention within the existing political system, but within the organized political system. Very informative are the two debates that took place before and after Congress in Copenhagen COP.22.

The discussions of Lok Sabha point to the acceptance of the seriousness of climate change as an issue, the debate on regional impacts, and the clear and recurring clarification of responsibility for the actions of developed countries. The post-Copenhagen debate in Raja Sabha focused almost exclusively on climate change as a foreign policy issue, with the government focusing on a "red line" aimed at ensuring that India was not bound by obligations. Limit growth and development with a focus on full compliance. In particular, none of the speakers considered whether the Copenhagen Agreement adequately addressed the challenges of climate change. India's interests are built entirely from the perspective of a national development space, rather than an effective global climate agreement. However, paying some attention to the local impact of elected parliamentarians shows, albeit a slight, tendency to be involved in the matter in a way that is directly related to local voters.

In another barometer of national affairs, media coverage of climate change gradually increased, but existing research was limited to English print media. Indian global climate policy dominated the press (57%), domestic politics and politics (including conspiracy on the composition of India's negotiating team) found to account for 21%. Climate science and business stories accounted for 10% and 5%, respectively. These data show the continued superiority of the international climate change negotiation process. However, some have pointed out that emissions from emerging economies can no longer be completely ignored in the world trade process, even if the minority argues that the problem is entirely caused by the country. The general view was that emerging economies needed to do more, but in the context of developed country leadership for action, and when supported by funding and capacity. In summary, this trend is a sign of the continued dominance of international processes in the media representation of climate change, the belief in the responsibility of

developed countries to lead action, and some indications of conditional consideration of national policy and action has shown.

These findings on climate change in the Indian media and formal politics are perhaps the most powerful polls on India's view of climate change (published in 2012) conducted by a research group at Yale University in 2011, in which most respondents reported observing climate change and recognizing significant vulnerabilities to potential impacts such as droughts and floods in terms of rainfall fluctuations and the frequency of hot days. In addition, 41% of respondents said the government "should do more" to deal with climate change, and 54% said it was large enough to do so, even if India had a large or moderate cost Or said that moderate efforts should be made. However, the interpretation of these results is somewhat confused by another finding that 41% had never heard of global warming and only 7% reported that they were "familiar" with global warming.

This latest result suggests that efforts to address climate change in question are still confined to a small part of the population. If more familiar with the internal debate, including the framework of equity, it is unclear whether previous findings regarding support for a particularly strong Indian mitigation policy continued.

One approach to better understanding the political trends in climate change is to explore the perspectives of key groups that may be opinion leaders on climate change. For example, Indian environmental researchers and activists seem to be a natural support group for national mitigation actions. However, India's environmentalist perspective was shaped primarily by the broader thinking of southern environmental awareness, which is closely linked to equity concerns. In addition, environmentalists were concerned that the country's environmental agenda would risk being compromised by the climate agenda, with problematic consequences such as climate-driven political prejudice against nuclear power and forest plantations. Both of these are controversial topics in the Indian environment.

In recent years, from this perspective, it has slowly evolved into one that emphasizes the integration of climate change into a wider environment in a way that takes justice, the local environment, and development agenda, and climate science at the same time.

Efforts to achieve such integration, combining an equity framework with one of India's regional mitigation actions, are becoming increasingly important. In one case, a wide coalition of self-proclaimed unions, popular organizations, social movements, and other progressive people sent a collective memorandum of understanding to the Prime Minister and the Environment Minister in preparation for Copenhagen. They called for a change in India's approach to climate change by declaring climate change as a global emergency and demanding significant reductions in emissions and payment of ecological debt by North Korea. Withdrawal actions by major developing countries, including, are high consumption and emission routes.

The Indian business community has only recently woken up to the issue of climate change, but in partial and fragmented ways. In 1998, one observer described industry as 'un-mobilized and uninvited'.

Another study suggests that cross-sectoral networks on climate change, such as networks of municipalities, national and international NGOs, and regional NGOs, are also beginning to work to integrate their work with climate goals. These networks typically work by linking preferred solutions to climate change to take advantage of the growing relevance of climate issues. However, in explaining the ongoing management of India's central framework for climate change, these networks are limited to maintaining consistency with the dominant national framework and of national and political policy.

As mentioned above, the business community had a limited interest in the CDM process. However, it seems that business commitment to this issue is on the rise. A 2008 survey of 70 business leaders reported that 42% had a fair understanding of the problem and were developing a corporate strategy for climate change, with 41% fully understanding it. , It turns out that we are already implementing the strategy. Copenhagen, Department Among the organized companies, the Confederation of Indian Industry has intervened in the public position in support of India's voluntary emission intensity target in Copenhagen and has become involved in the voluntary emission disclosure initiative. Yet another business segment, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce, has made targeted complaints, arguing that any action by India and the Indian industry should be related to funding. It should be noted that these two opinions are very biased and exclude the entire range of Indian SMEs.

National discussion: Debates and Goals:-

India's climate debate has become more complex and diverse in recent years. Engagement and participation is certainly increasing, as measured by parliamentary debates, media coverage, business perspectives, and civil society statements. However, much of this activity was stimulated by Copenhagen. In essence, the impartiality framework remains strong, but is increasingly complemented by the demands of national mitigation measures.

In addition, other aspects of the discussion led to increased nuance and complexity. The emphasis here is on the "hidden behind the poor" debate, the outlook for climate adaptation, and the importance of energy security as the dominant story of India's energy. In 2007, Greenpeace India published a report investigating differences in emission levels between Indian economic classes and accusing the Indian elite of being "hidden behind the poor." Self-proclaimed report sought to provoke debate about climate justice.

India confirmed by other more robust studies using larger datasets by highlighting high levels of inequality between higher and lower class emission levels and between rural and urban areas of India.

However, the report also undermined India's negotiating position as calls for India to accept exemptions due to increased consumption by the middle class doubled, as did just before the 2007 Bali COP. Counter reports

show that emissions of equivalent income classes are much higher in the United States than in India, suggesting that the striking framework for climate justice remains a national comparison. For example, in 2004, emissions from the top 10% of urban areas in India were 7 tonnes / year, compared to 20 tonnes / year in the United States and just over 10 tonnes of CO2 / year in Germany.

Some parts of India have suggested that internal inequality has questioned the legitimacy of India's per capita position, but at least it has nothing to do with care to correct internal inequality. As far as it goes, developed countries suggest that they are behind the rich. Like the rich Indians hiding behind the poor. Ultimately, hiding behind weak debates never replaced the broad acceptance of per capita norms as a way to approach climate justice, but highlighting the challenges of India's internal distribution. In doing so, it must pay some attention not only to external north-south inequality, but also to the inward climate.

The second important theme, both rhetoric and reality, is increased awareness of climate damage and increased attention to climate adaptation. Increasingly, studies are carefully documenting and publishing climate impacts and costs. For example, one study concludes that apple cultivation in the Himalayan belt is shifting to higher altitudes. This is confirmed by both quantitative data and farmers' perceptions. Other surveys Analyze the cost of sea level rise in coastal countries. The Government of India has also taken concrete steps to systematize data collection on climate impacts and encourage states to undertake systematic efforts to include climate issues in sector plans. These efforts are underpinned by a comprehensive and large-scale mapping of resources and the impact of climate change on resources in the water sector, for example.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that growing attention to and concern over climate adaptation necessarily translates into growing commitment to climate mitigation. As even India's environmentalists argue, unilateral mitigation by India will do little, given that India's emissions are about 1/20th of the global total.13 Indian mitigation action only helps to the extent that it could leverage more aggressive global action by others, notably developed countries. Concern with climate impacts and adaptation, therefore, reinforces rather than undermines concerns with equitable sharing of the mitigation burden.

India is being driven by a completely different goal, energy security. The two effects of increased demand due to rising growth in India over the last decade and pressure on supply due to increased global energy have created ongoing energy insecurity. Short-term domestic supply shortages are due to conflicts over coal and gas, poor management and access to resources, and downward revisions to coal resource estimates. Unlike climate mitigation, the pursuit of energy security is becoming increasingly difficult to access internal supplies from India, and / or in uncertain quantities, global demand, and therefore prices.

Many of the steps taken to address climate change, especially the promotion of energy efficiency and the pursuit of renewable energy supplies in end-use applications, are compatible with reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the words of the Minister of Finance of India, "We have adopted the National Action Plan on Climate Change because we are aware of the link between climate change and energy security." Climate change has been facilitated by a stated approach to climate change in India based on the pursuit of "fringe benefits"-"promoting measures". At the same time as development goals, it creates ancillary benefits for effectively addressing climate change. It's not just a matter of terminology or classification. Clarification of ancillary benefits reduces the sources of potentially significant dissonance in India's energy policy.

Prior to this approach being clarified, the risk of promoting clean energy and energy efficiency could be strategically damaging was recognized by politics. Also, India can develop with less carbon space allocation. Although the political priorities given to actions to address energy security, and the coordination of climate mitigation as a potential common benefit of such actions, have created the impetus for policies that have the effect of climate mitigation.

Narratives of Climate Change

In summary, the emergence of evidence and new disciplines in all areas of Indian politics raises questions about the role of Inn and internal politics, with climate change debates going beyond the exclusive focus in the context of international negotiations. It suggests that. NS. However, there is little consensus on what India's domestic position on climate change should be, whether this position should be integrated into the international climate system, and how it should be integrated. The range of possible political positions can be usefully explained according to three perspectives. The first perspective can be called a realistic growth-first perspective. It sees climate change as a geopolitical threat rather than the environment.

Therefore, the focus is on achieving rapid growth and avoiding international efforts that could threaten growth. Equity in climate outcomes is limited to national concerns that arise from a combination of fundamental and strategic concerns. A realistic second position for sustainable development focuses on following a co-benefit-based approach to sustainable development at home. However, persistent skepticism about the international negotiation process, which is rooted in the unlikely outcome of the international negotiation process, has led to calls for the separation of national affairs from the global process. The commitment to impartiality, including the issue of

national distribution is likely to be genuine, but it is assembled only as an internal argument.

This attitude can lead to a slightly schizophrenic attitude. Quarrel with domestic growth realists and create a common cause abroad. The third position, the internationalists of sustainable development, emphasizes the need and urgency of an internationally effective climate regime and is therefore more motivated to connect

actions based on India's ancillary interests. It differs only from the second position in that. Stocks based on collateral benefits. This is justified by the global regime from a development perspective. The second category of natural allies, based on a common commitment to sustainable development outcomes and fairness, did not actually realize this alliance, and realists of both trends were on the global politics of climate change.

Indian Climate depends on sustainable development. Interpretation of the Transition to the Third Perspective was not a radical transition of India's climate policy, but was very strongly promoted by the well-known and candid Minister of Environment and Forestry and did not last longer than his mission. .. India's climate policy supports national adaptation and mitigation measures in line with national development goals. But so far, it has not supported the active use of domestic politics as a tool in which international processes can participate and shape. This does not indicate that domestic and international climate policies occupy separate territories far from it. In fact, India's domestic politics is undoubtedly under the influence of global pressure to show its commitment to action. As a result, political activity has continued for many years since the Bali COP in 2007.

INDIAN CLIMATE POLICY: NEW INITIATIVES

Consistent with the emergence of the Co-Benefit Framework as a defining component of India's climate change policy, the Government of India has embarked on a series of policy and planning development processes driven by this approach. This process is recent, ongoing work, and relatively few analyzes available, making it difficult to summarize. In addition, the complete set of political efforts is widespread, including international commitments, national plans and policies, and state-level plans, all of which are inconsistent. It is difficult to identify the drivers of each of these processes, but increasing international pressure to Copenhagen, including discussions on climate change at the G20 meeting, may be one of the key factors. Perhaps the focus of this series of policy-making efforts is the National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC).

It is built around the establishment of eight national "missions" aimed at mitigating climate change and integrating adaptive aspects into national policies in different areas. Some of these missions had specific goals and objectives, including solar power missions aimed at achieving 20,000 MW of solar energy by 2022. Others, such as national water missions, have broader and more diffuse objectives, including saving water, creating databases, and promoting integrated water management in watersheds. Other missions focus on "Green India" missions focusing on energy efficiency, agriculture, Himalayan ecosystems, sustainable agriculture, sustainable habitats, forestry sector, and strategic awareness missions.

As this list shows, the scope of the plan is extensive and in itself has caused some criticism. One review calls it "not a vision or plan." Others point out that this position represents India's international position, but has no commitment to justice. Moreover, apart from the co-benefits approach, there is no consistent strategy for setting conceptual and general goals that connect missions. Some of these gaps are filled by individual missions, but performance between missions also varies significantly. Clearer missions, such as energy efficiency and solar energy, first made plans and began to implement them. Other missions, including a wide range of development policies such as water and agriculture, took time to approve and implement.

Individual missions, especially the mission of sun efficiency and energy, will significantly provide Indian politics and energy panorama. Using an innovative method of reverse auction that allows companies to pray through the minimum subsidy they will accept to provide solar power, the solar power caused the price of solar power to fall half during the three programs. While it is not clear whether it is a sustainable trend, there is little doubt that the mission trained the incentives for the development of renewable energy in India. Similarly, the energy efficiency mission set goals for energy efficiency improvements in a wide variety of industries, accompanied by a scheme for trade in energy efficiency certificates as a way to reduce the cost of improvements. The solar mission is criticized by emphasizing rural electrification and does not sufficiently consider the sustainability of the subsidy. The energy efficiency mission has been criticized for not sufficiently the simplest regulatory measures instead of the energy-saving certificate approach based on the relatively complex market.

But in at least these two cases, few doubt that missions stimulated both action and debate in ways that would not have happened without them. As of mid-2012, it was not possible to draw similar conclusions for many other missions. These missions are larger, more extensive, and have not yet been carried out.

Climate change must be integrated as a goal in the already plagued institutional landscape. At the macro level, towards Copenhagen, the Government of India has pledged to reduce the emission intensity of the economy by 20-25% from the level of 2005-2020. In particular, this promise continues. Over one year establishment of NAPCC to design the process for complying with this commitment, the government has also established a "Group of Experts on Low Carbon Comprehensive Growth Strategies" under the auspices of the Planning Commission. This group is tasked with making recommendations for inclusion in India's 12th Five-Year Low Carbon Growth Plan, which fulfills Copenhagen's promises. In particular, the group also has a clear challenge to consider how more comprehensive growth can be achieved. In anticipation of the final report, the Group submitted an interim report summarizing the general future directions of the various emission sectors under "decisive" and "aggressive" scenarios. This effort aims to build on NAPCC and subsequent missions, but there is no clear link between these processes.

Since 2010, the central government has also called on states to develop a state action plan (SAPCC) on climate change. SAPCC aims to achieve some degree of interstate consistency in the design and implementation of climate control, and also to recognize state jurisdiction over various areas within NAPCC, especially those related to adaptation. Is an ongoing work and indicates that these plans have important conceptual and implementation challenges. As in other countries, plans need to address the interrelationships between development issues and their climatic aspects. This is a well-known challenge for including climate change in development practices. From a practical point of view, issues related to India's federal structure and practical funding issues may raise implementation issues. For example, urban habitats are under the control of state and local governments, but there is already extensive central government plans aimed at directing future urban development.

While commenting on the effectiveness of all these approaches is tentative, it is becoming increasingly clear that the shift to action for low carbon development in India presents important governance challenges. So far, decentralization of national-to-state policies has progressed, but the trend has been primarily political effort from top to bottom. However, there are also independent state initiatives, such as Gujarat, that established climate change departments and initiated solar energy initiatives even before the state's action plan was developed. In addition, the surge in policy processes points to the need for coordination at various levels of government.

CONCLUSION

India's climate policy was a surprisingly coherent story. India has played an important role in shaping the framework of equity in global climate negotiations. This has evolved through criticism of global thinking led by non-governmental organizations. For nearly two decades, this construction has reduced India's climate policy to a matter of geopolitical position and strategy alone. Climate policy is separate from development policy. This framework is fairly valid, as suggested by the perspectives of various sectors of Indian society reported here. While there are increasing calls for India to play a more active role in global climate negotiations and take more active domestic action, the framework of equity is a broader concept referred to by these positions. However, internal discussions have expanded and deepened. It remains an elite debate, but concerns about national equality, climate adaptation, and the link between energy security and climate change have led to richer and more complex debates. In particular, the potential for a deeper commitment to climate change in a way that does not challenge the framework of equity, combined with energy security concerns, can clarify the approach to climate change. The pursuit of energy security has proven to be a particularly strong impetus for national action, leading to policies on energy efficiency and renewable energy, with the benefits of climate change. But so far, collateral benefits have been a clear expression governing national policy, and the impartiality framework still leads India's position in international negotiations. The emergence of the national climate policy sector could pose significant challenges to India's climate policy coordination and governance. India has begun to work on ways to incorporate climate adaptation into sector policies such as water and agriculture. However, this initial integration also introduces institutional complexity and new policies. Institutionally, climate policy must now be woven into the complex management devices of India's federal system. Increased complexity is inevitable and should really be welcomed as it shows the full extent of climate change concerns and their deeper involvement in impacts in India.

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