



Mutual Tolerance Approach as Modern Political Virtue: A Descriptive Study

Dr. Raj Kumar Singh

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Kalicharan PG College, Lucknow, India

rks14373@gmail.com

Abstract

As individuals relate to variety and plurality as a type of tolerance and compassion, the notion of toleration is widely contested in rhetoric as well as arguments. Nevertheless, this should not constitute an enhancement when working on situations that involve a diversity of values, ideas, and beliefs. Furthermore, while the notion of toleration was formed throughout the Reason, it currently appears to contribute to a misunderstanding of the phrase, with a perception of a quiet apathy to variety. As a result, the primary goal of this work is to examine the notion of toleration from an ethical standpoint, allowing it to be viewed as a civic virtue required to tackle the problems of variety within society. To demonstrate this, the content provides an assessment of various understandings of the phrase in attempt to illustrate the favourable assumption of toleration; following that, the message shifts on, evaluating the principle of toleration from an interpretive perception, as a shape to strengthen the favourable qualities of the phrase, and as a route to resolve the request among tolerance and intolerance. Finally, it emphasises that grasping the idea of toleration from a moral standpoint necessitates a praxis developed in everyday conditions.

Keywords: Mutual Tolerance, Political Virtue.

1. Introduction

Toleration, as a notion, has grown widespread in political discourse as one virtue required to establish political systems, particularly in communities afflicted by any sort of tyranny. Toleration emerged in social ideology throughout the Enlightened as a consequence to the religious battles that raged at the period. Some thinkers, like Locke and Voltaire, emphasised the necessity of toleration as a virtue required to underlie the Modern State's foundation as a political organisation that would be autonomous of either

religious organization or influence. Additionally, Mill's theory of freedom contributed an essential component to the definition of tolerance. His worldview is founded on the pursuit of reality via free and fair debate of the many viewpoints prevalent in community. Toleration, compassion, and freedom have been chosen as principles to be maintained in democratic liberal political structures. Moreover, in last few years, the principle of toleration was the focus of so many arguments, with some claiming that toleration became a tool for enforcing and bolstering particular political regimes that encourage particular financial, cultural, and policy positions, rather than enabling for discussion among distinct viewpoints and perceptions [1].

Most people in the nation agree that tolerance plays an important role in public life. However, what it means to be tolerant and the appropriate limits of what we should tolerate are a matter of serious debate. Some critics have gone so far as to argue that tolerance is not a virtue that we should be anxious to promote. In response to such critics, I will argue that tolerance is a virtue, and that it plays an indispensable role in public life for pluralist democracies. The virtue of tolerance helps us deal with a number of social problems. At the same time, we must be careful not to expect too much out of tolerance. It does not necessarily bring us to complete agreement or even mutual esteem. However, tolerance does enable us to live in a certain amount of harmony and agreement with each other, despite serious ongoing disagreements [2].

This point brings out both the promise and the limits of tolerance. Tolerance does not eliminate disagreement and opposition. It does not bring us to agree on the truth. Nor does it generally bring us to see our differences as something to cherish and affirm rather than as reasons for opposition. Rather, it allows us to engage in peaceful social cooperation despite our disagreements. These are the limits of the virtue of tolerance. At the same time, these limits point to its promise. This virtue does not bring us to agreement, but it does help us to find ways to grant each other a certain measure of peace and freedom while the disagreements continue [3].

This study explores the concept of toleration from an ethical perspective. The key issue which would lead the entire thought is whether it is feasible to establish a comprehension of the idea of toleration via an ethical viewpoint, because it involves a distinction from the idea of inactive ignorance. The paper continues by demonstrating that, although toleration has been regarded as a political virtue, an ethical interpretation of the phrase should be created in order to properly comprehend its consequences inside a current heterogeneous community, as majority of our cultures are. Lastly, this section demonstrates how we must not only comprehend the definition of the term, but also still in individuals a sense of toleration that requires a great lot of accountability in order to be regarded a virtue in modern national politics [4].

2. The Virtue of Tolerance

The virtue of tolerance is a practical understanding of when to tolerate coupled with a disposition to tolerate or not tolerate -when appropriate. Just as tolerating involves disapproval and restraint, the virtue of tolerance involves two components: a practical understanding of when one ought to disapprove and a practical understanding of when one ought to restrain that disapproval [5]. The first component of the virtue of tolerance involves a practical understanding of when one should disapprove coupled with a willingness to follow this understanding. A person does not count as tolerant if he does not have a reasonable sense of what he ought to disapprove [6]. This claim may sound surprising, given that merely disapproving of something does not count as refusing to tolerate it. After all, a person has to disapprove of something before he can tolerate it.




Figure 1: Theoretical framework of ethnic tolerance, political tolerance and making connection to voting behaviour

In support of the claim that excessive disapprovals count as a failure to fully cultivate the virtue of tolerance, John Horton presents a puzzle called the problem of the —ensorious tolerator. The censorious tolerator is someone who unreasonably disapproves of many behaviors that are clearly good or indifferent, yet restrains his desire to act against those behaviors [7]. Suppose that Walter vehemently opposes the interracial marriage, but on principle refuses to publically criticize people who enter into such marriages. Walter is a censorious tolerator. He is censorious because his disapprovals are excessive. At the same time,

he tolerates interracial marriage. Even though he does a lot of tolerating, it does not seem that Walter has completely attained the virtue of tolerance. It seems like Walter's bad judgment on this issue is a reason to ascribe to him some vice that stands opposed to tolerance, such as being prejudiced or judgmental [8]. In support of this claim, imagine that Walter's friends reason with him and convince him that there is nothing wrong with interracial marriages. We certainly should not say that Walter has gotten less tolerant. In fact, it seems natural to say that Walter has gotten more tolerant [9]. This example indicates that the virtue of tolerance involves a practical understanding regarding what one should and should not disapprove.

With respect to this first component, it is not enough that a person knows what he should disapprove and what he should not disapprove. He should also have a reasonable sense of how much he should disapprove of particular behaviors and in what way. A person's judgments of others' behavior could fail to be consistent with tolerance in at least three ways. First, the disapproval could be unreasonable. A person could disapprove of something that is clearly good or indifferent. Second, a person might disapprove of something more than the object of their disapproval deserves. Consider, for example, the citizens of River City in *The Music Man*. A con artist, Harold Hill, manipulates them into moral outrage over the introduction of a pool table in the local billiard hall. Suppose we grant the doubtful claim that the pool table could have a bad influence on the local children. Nevertheless, the citizens of River City certainly come to disapprove of the tables far more than they should [10]. Contrary to what Mr. Hill claims, pool tables are not a major threat to public morals. Third, a person might disapprove of someone's behavior that is not appropriate to the kind of failing in question. For example, consider Mr. Darcy in *Pride and Prejudice*. Several members of the Bennet family are pretentious and annoying, but Mr. Darcy's disapproval of their behavior seems more like the appropriate reaction to moral failures, not the Bennets' lack of manners [11].

The second component of the virtue of tolerance involves a practical understanding of when he should restrain the desire to act on his disapproval, and a disposition to act on that knowledge. Most obviously, when a person ought to restrain his desire to interfere with others, a perfectly tolerant person will restrain his desire to interfere. For example, a school district in Wisconsin set up its computers in a way that prevented students from accessing information on non-Christian religions [12]. Tolerance would require that the school district refrain from interfering with their students in this way. Less obviously, tolerance requires that a person should recognize when he ought not to restrain his disapproval. For example, suppose that Barry sees that his neighbor getting involved in more and more immediately self-destructive behavior. Moreover, Barry is the only person that the neighbor trusts. However, Barry believes in a very strong principle of noninterference and carries it to such extremes that he never even tries to talk to his friend about his behavior. Barry's actions may count as tolerating his friend. However, it is not at all clear that Barry's counts in favor of calling him tolerant. In fact, if Barry habitually carries toleration to such extremes, then we might see this behavior as a reason to say that Barry does not have the virtue of

tolerance. Rather, we might conclude that the fact that he habitually tolerates when he ought to interfere stems from a vice that just looks like tolerance [13].

3. The Need of Tolerance and Intolerance

Although tolerance is seen as a virtue required for the development as well as maintenance of a political community in which diverse perspectives and ideas are debated [14], this virtue may be perverted. Herbert Marcuse highlighted in 1968 as a dominant class might utilize tolerance to maintain its perspective as well as powerful stance [15]. This might lead to a certain breaches and crimes of inherent decency as aspect of supporting a greater standard in search of security; hence, the conception and practice of tolerance might be distorted, resulting in a misleading understanding of tolerance. Until there is damage committed to us or our family members, this fake tolerance promotes the attitude of apathy and obedience. Furthermore, it suggests a conformist mindset that is also dependent on how secure we think in our culture or group. The concern would be because in order to ensure a minimal level of protection, we may forego refraining from and ceasing certain mindsets and actions which may be called into doubt in different situations. If we identify the ability to live as our primary and fundamental value, we fear thinking it to be the only one at the end of the day [16]. Tolerance is viewed as an economic mindset that encourages totalitarian actions in this situation, rather than a moral virtue.

Tolerance is generally understood to have two boundaries: first, intolerance with the intolerant; and second, intolerance to damage others, regardless whether it entails bodily or moral injuring. Both boundaries are similar in as they all pertain to the sociological phenomenon of tolerance. Tolerating an intolerant person is impossible since he rejects that he considers valid for himself [17]. He demands tolerance from others while behaving authoritarian amongst them. Such focus on tolerance's social function brings us to the next boundary of tolerance, which is preventing injuring individuals. Authoritarian conduct tends to take precedence over people's freedom of conscience and speech. The absence of tolerance in order to prevent injuring individuals suggests a political stance since it necessitates keeping people in consideration. Evidently, the degree of significance ascribed to the existence of people is determined by the tolerance categories outlined above. Additionally, which connects these boundaries of tolerance is a lack of appreciation for the individual as well as recognition of person as a person capable of finding his unique shape and meaning of living, or, in other terms, his own philosophy.

Nonetheless, objections of this understanding of the limitations of tolerance begin if a political organization decides who is deemed intolerant, since by doing so, the administration in authority may reduce the participation of alternative ideas inside the political discussion. Specifically, this is the beginning point for Slavoj Zizek's criticism of tolerance. As per Zizek, today's tolerance that stimulates in liberal societies truly encompasses a certain lifestyle wherein the tolerance is respected until the diversity within a community suggests a risk to the previously existing paradigm of politics. If anything threatens this particular system,

the practise of this type of tolerance might be described as restrictive. To Zizek, tolerance encouraged as component of a political system serves to increase the notion of homogeneity underlying consuming ideals which will assist to perpetuate one pattern of idea: to only ensure the fulfilment of my requirements and a sense of safety [18].

This uniformity and consuming mindset is the target of Zizek's critiques since it characterizes political talks in commercial terms, eliminating any diversity that would jeopardise the financial framework that characterises neoliberal business [18]. False tolerance is depicted as a problem aspect, in the sense that it allows for the presence of diversity when significant political and financial concerns are not challenged. The problem would be because this form of tolerance might lead to violent conduct if the individuals in authority felt threatened; normally, when this occurs, governing authorities enable trespassing on the boundaries of that is tolerable in order to maintain their own prominent office. As a result of this false tolerance, autocratic mindsets and totalitarian governments are emerging. Protection would therefore be the primary component of national authority. This surrounds the concept of tolerance to the right to life, only with suggestion being it was the only value deserving of defending. Tolerance is promised under this respect only as a manner of living, not even as a societal practice of recognising and respecting diversity. Tolerance's position as a political virtue could thus be called into doubt, as to if it truly performs as intended, or if it is simply an excuse to maintain the existing system.

Zizek's approach sees the defence of intolerance as a chance to break free from fake tolerance and resurrect the principles of acknowledgment and society. In that view, the idea of tolerance's limitations begins to be represented as a boundary wherein tolerance and intolerance coexist, since tolerance requires the support of intolerant sentiments to avoid its ultimate degeneration [18].

4. The Strangeness of the Virtue of Tolerance

For the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that there are many good reasons to tolerate. These reasons include respect for rights, avoiding bad consequences, and possibly other reasons.⁸ The main question for this chapter is whether the trait of character that we call —tolerance is a virtue. Even if we grant that it make perfect sense to tolerate many kinds of behavior that we disapprove of, the claim that tolerance is a virtue might still be incoherent. As Bernard Williams says, —All toleration involves difficulties, but it is the virtue that especially threatens to involve conceptual impossibility [19].

Williams ultimately concludes that tolerance is a virtue, but he presents a particularly strong argument against that claim. To develop his argument, he starts with an historical observation that brings out some of the strangeness of the virtue of tolerance. Williams argues when religious toleration began to take hold in Early Modern Europe, the main reason for the change was not that the people came to restrain their disapproval [20].

Building on this point, Williams identifies a puzzling aspect of the claim that tolerance is a virtue. He points out that in the Early Modern period, people did not actually come tolerate each other more than before. Rather, they simply stopped disapproving of each other as much as they did before. A person only tolerates when he disapproves of the action in question. People who believe that it is perfectly acceptable to play baseball do not tolerate playing baseball. Consequently, a decrease in the number of things of which a person disapproves of actually implies a decrease in the number of things that a person tolerates [21].

This point raises a problem for the claim that tolerance is a virtue. There is something odd about praising a disposition to restrain one's action against things that are bad. It would seem at first glance that the natural reaction to bad things is to try to stop them. Imagine that you heard someone say, —I really admire Anna. When she discovers that something bad is happening, she rarely does anything about it. This statement would seem strange. Granted, if a person disapproved of many things that he ought not to disapprove of, then we would want him to restrain his desire to act on his disapprovals. However, in such cases what we would really want is that the person stop disapproving of such things. At most, a disposition to tolerate would be a second-best trait. However, virtues are supposed to be traits that we praise. So, it seems odd to claim that tolerance is a virtue.

At this point, it might seem that I could respond to Williams by arguing that he uses a mistaken definition of tolerance. His argument seems to treat tolerance simply as a disposition to tolerate. In contrast, I argued in my introduction that tolerance involves a sense of when tolerating is appropriate. Moreover, on my definition, if a person overcomes a habit of disapproving of things that he ought not to disapprove of, then the person becomes more tolerant. Consequently, it would seem that Williams's arguments do not apply to my argument. Williams is correct that there is something odd about praising a disposition to tolerate. However, the virtue of tolerance involves more than just a disposition to tolerate.

While I could make this argument, I do not think that it addresses Williams's main concern. Williams's concern seems to be that we do not find something good about the act of tolerating itself [22]. In this sense, it is not clear being tolerant somehow makes us better people. This argument applies both to a general disposition to tolerate and to the virtue of tolerance in my sense.

Examine a comparable reasoning by David Heyd to show the gravity of Williams' issue. Toleration, according to Heyd, is neither a virtue with in notion as it is a generally rooted characteristic of behavior [23]. Based on Aristotle, Heyd contends because a virtue, in the broadest meaning, should be anything which achieves certain intrinsic individual capacity. In numerous cases, suppressing the temptation to intervene over harmful behaviour is required [24]. Nonetheless, Heyd contends that toleration is difficult to see in terms of identity or the realisation of human achievement [25].

However someone believes of Heyd's thesis, it is important to note that he acknowledges that tolerating individuals is frequently beneficial. Furthermore, he sees a link among toleration and virtue. He clearly

states as tolerance and temperance frequently necessitate toleration [26]. Temperance should be included to the category. Therefore, such characteristics do not necessarily necessitate tolerance. Although several qualities sometimes require for tolerance in particular circumstances, Heyd does not think this to be enough to establish tolerance as a virtue [27]. Situations might need us to be abrupt with individuals or to conceal secrets, but we do not believe that an individual's existence is inherently superior since he is occasionally abrupt or furtive. There is little value in being hidden, neither is that any virtue in understanding how to be harsh [28].

For the sake of argument, I will grant Heyd and Williams the claim that tolerance does not actualize self-potential, nor does it involve an action that is intrinsically beneficial to the person who performs it. I would simply reply that not all virtues meet this criterion. As Philippa Foot points out, many virtues are virtues simply because it benefits society if people have them [29].

Along these lines, I would argue that tolerance benefits society because it helps people deal with a perennial human weakness. In the modern world, we often face situations that pull us in two directions. When we encounter something that we disapprove of, we can easily be tempted to make one of two mistakes. First, we often lose restraint and overstep the bounds of appropriate action. We may interfere more than we have a right to interfere, and even when we have the right we may do more than is wise. In short, we often move too quickly from disapproval to action. Second, we can easily slide from legitimate restraint to simply not caring, even when we ought to care. In general, the balance between disapproval and restraint is difficult to maintain. Moreover, human life regularly puts us in situations where we are tempted to lose that balance. Consequently, we need toleration, not to achieve some single internal or external good, but to fight normal human tendencies that prevent us from achieving other goods.

In fact, Heyd and Williams both acknowledge this point in portions of their writings. Heyd qualifies his claim that tolerance is not a virtue.

In the end, Williams and Heyd do not seem to be primarily interested in the question of whether or not tolerance is a virtue [30]. On Williams's view, we do not decide that the virtue of tolerance is good and consequently promote the action of toleration. Rather, we regard the trait of character as good because we have antecedent reasons for wanting people to learn how to tolerate others. Human beings have a natural weakness for both moral indifference and persecution. Consequently, it is good for society that they learn to control this weakness.

5. Tolerance and Modern Democracy

In a recent essay, David Heyd argues that once we accept the principles that underlie modern democracy, we can no longer consider tolerance a political virtue [31]. He even goes so far as to argue that modern states do not consider it legitimate to tolerate their subjects' behavior [32]. According to Heyd's own admission, this is an overly strong statement of the position [33]. Still, he does argue in these terms, and at

least one of his respondents has taken him at face value [34]. So, I begin by responding to the strongest form of this claim, namely the claim that the principles underlying the modern democratic state leave the state no room to tolerate its subjects' behaviors. After that, I will build on this response in order to draw out what I believe to be Heyd's main point.

The strong form of Heyd's thesis holds that the combination of disapproval and restraint constituting toleration was possible for pre-modern states, but also holds that is not a legitimate option for modern democratic states. According to Heyd, in pre-modern states the ruler often ruled in his own person and consequently had wide discretionary power to impose his moral beliefs on his subjects. In such states, the ruler also had discretionary power to withhold such an imposition if he saw fit [35]. Therefore, when the ruler disapproved of his subjects' behavior on moral or religious grounds, the ruler had the discretion to both treat his disapproval as politically relevant and restrain his disapproval. In effect, he had the discretion not only to tolerate his subjects' behavior, but also to tolerate their behavior in his capacity as head of state [36].

Building on this point about pre-modern states, the strong form of Heyd's thesis holds that a modern democratic state allows itself and its officials no such discretionary power [37]. In a modern state, the state and its officials are governed by laws, constitutions, and political principles underlying the law. Moreover, the position of an official in a modern state is not a personal right, but rather this position ultimately stems from the constitution and the principles underlying the constitution [38]. According to Heyd, these laws and principles leave no room for the state or its officials to practice toleration. That is, there is no occasion on which a modern democratic state may legitimately both disapprove of someone's behavior and restrain that disapproval [39]. So, it is never legitimate for the modern democratic state to tolerate a person's behavior.

To illustrate this point, consider the question of whether the laws or the constitution of a modern democratic state require that the state practice toleration. For example, it might seem that the United States is bound by the Constitution to tolerate religious differences. However, Heyd argues that this view is mistaken. The Constitution actually prevents the state from taking any stance on religious matters. Consequently, the Constitution does not allow the state to disapprove of religious behaviors, unless they violate some basic political principle [40]. More generally, the Constitution and the laws do not take any negative position on any person's behavior unless his behavior violates some law or political principle such that the state ought to restrain the person. So, in those cases in which the laws or the principles behind them preclude action against a person's behavior, they also preclude disapproval [41-42]. Consequently, the laws themselves never express both disapproval and restraint.

To further illustrate the point, consider an example involving city government officials. Suppose that Marvin is on the city council of a Chicago suburb. A local group has submitted an application for a permit

to build a Hindu temple. Marvin disapproves of Hinduism, but regards himself as bound by the Constitution to vote in favor of giving the group the permit. This might seem like a clear example of state toleration. Marvin is a government official, and he disapproves of Hinduism, and he restrains his disapproval. However, on Heyd's view, Marvin may not disapprove of Hinduism in his official capacity [43]. He is free to disapprove of Hinduism as an individual. However, unlike a premodern prince, Marvin may not make his personal disapproval a political matter. Rather, he must recognize a responsibility to refrain from disapproving in his capacity as a state official [44]. So, in his role as a state official Marvin should experience no tension between disapproval and restraint. In that capacity, Marvin may not disapprove of others' religious practices, and therefore may not legitimately tolerate them. More generally, officials and qua officials are only allowed to disapprove of those behaviors that they must restrict.

Heyd's thesis has a structure that should be familiar from the last chapter. Heyd's argument is a special case of approval optimism. Approval optimism holds that what a virtuous person disapproves of will coincide with what he cannot tolerate. In Heyd's case, approval optimism only extends to the laws, the constitution, and state officials in their capacity as state officials. In this respect, Heyd's argument is that toleration is inappropriate in politics, not in ordinary life. On this basis, Heyd concludes that state officials who tolerate in their official role show a lack of political virtue.

In making this point, I should stress that there is one sense in which Heyd's argument is consistent with the claim that tolerance is a political virtue. In Heyd's view, individuals must often recognize an obligation to refrain from treating their personal disapprovals as a political matter. In this sense, Heyd acknowledges that the virtue of tolerance is politically relevant [45]. However, he does not agree that this concession implies that tolerance is a political virtue. At one point, Heyd refers to the virtue of tolerance as a bridge between the personal and political [46]. Heyd is clear that good political behavior requires individuals to do a lot of tolerating. At the same time, he holds that it is not appropriate for the state to do so [47].

6. The Political Value of Toleration

Although if toleration is neither technically accurate a virtue and is neither fundamentally political, it is evident that it has profound political significance, as exhibited predominantly, but never solely, in liberal countries. Toleration is demonstrated by and against societies, as opposed to forgiveness, which is a personal attitude shared by people. Toleration, unlike forgiveness, can be exhibited anonymously, that is, against nameless persons who adhere to a certain organization. This gives toleration a distinct political importance. Toleration, as opposed to repentance, that attempts to restore a damaged individual connection such as companionship or romance, fosters communal cohesion, a sentiment of oneness between individuals who share a shared society despite until they do not understand one another individually. Toleration fosters human connections and relationships by demonstrating kind will, tolerance, and compassion for persons despite their actions and ideas. Repentance is ad hoc in character, meaning it is

offered to a particular user just once. Toleration, on the other hand, is provided to an individual or a community of people for a broad range of specific activities.

Moreover, while we had made an effort to differentiate among toleration on the one side with regard for freedom, harmony, and cohabitation on another, it should be emphasised that religious tolerance is crucial in advancing these clear political principles. Recognize for someone citizen's right, and besides, necessitates the same ability to detach the performer from her conduct and appreciation her choice to participate in unpleasant behaviour. True, this distinction is compulsory in the case of rights and supererogatory in the case of tolerance; yet, the two are strongly supporting. Societal solidarity promotes political security and improves the environment for community cooperation, which is critical in multi-cultural and pluralist society. Even though compassion doesn't really make social responsibilities and commitments obsolete, it does tend to lessen the amount of appeal to these standards in governing social relationships. Likewise, toleration cannot be anticipated to replace legal standards and a system of enforceable rights, but it can help to reduce political turmoil and the degree of lawsuit in community.

So, although if, as I have said, a tolerant community wasn't one with tolerant laws or organizations, it is one in which particular individuals and subgroups exercise a considerable amount of morally obligatory moderation in not pressing on their full privileges. Toleration is neither a political issue in the idea that this would not fall under the purview of democratic structures, the law and order, or organizational authority and power relationships. However, it may have significant political significance since, as an old Talmudic adage goes, "Jerusalem was really only demolished because verdicts had been rendered solely on biblical law and did not go beyond the necessities of the law."

7. Conclusion

My conclusion, then, is that forbearant tolerance is a virtue. Moreover, unless we attain perfect universal agreement on moral truth, tolerance is a virtue that we should not expect or want to move beyond. In particular, we should reject the view that when a person disapproves of others' tolerable behavior, then he must have failed to sympathetically engage with the others' point of view. Sometimes, we just disagree about things that really matter. Our great accomplishment is that we have enabled people to share a system of cooperation, despite the fact that they disagree on religious questions and believe that those disagreements really matter. According to John Rawls, our great task is to extend this accomplishment from religious questions to moral and cultural disagreements.⁴⁶ In her advocacy of engaged tolerance, Abrams helps us to see some possible obstacles to this goal. I only caution that we should see vigorous disapproval of others' behavior as consistent with public virtue. We should also view a limited amount of active opposition to others' behavior as consistent with public virtue. Disagreeing actively and vigorously with another person's religious or moral beliefs should not be treated as a failure to respect that person. If we make this move, then we take a step back from the great accomplishment of creating a tolerant society.

Contrary to Heyd's arguments, tolerance is a political virtue and it plays a central role in modern democratic politics. A commitment to complete neutrality does not extend to all states or even to all issues within any country. Even in liberal countries, the political principles that underlie the state leave a significant zone of legitimate contestation over what actions the government may take on certain matters. Within that zone, the government may legitimately disapprove of certain behaviors, even though the state has no definite position on the subject. At the same time, the principles that underlie the state will often allow or even require that the government restrain the extent to which it acts on that disapproval. In this sense, modern democratic principles allow people to use state power to pursue competing moral visions. At the same time, it sets limits that keep the extent to which they may use that power from going too far. In that respect, principles that require the government to practice toleration are a normal part of democratic politics. So, tolerance is a political virtue that still plays a central role in democratic politics.

8. References

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4. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), 59, 194–95.
5. Scanlon 1996: 228, Fotion and Elfstrom 1992: 6, Budziszewski 1992: 7-9. 238
6. In this section, I am drawing heavily on McDowell's idea that a virtue involves a sensitivity to a certain kind of reason for acting in a particular way. McDowell 2003: 141-4. See also Newey 1999: 5.
7. Horton 1996: 34-41.
8. Horton 1996: 32-5, Newey 1999: 109-11.
9. Horton 1996: 32-3, 7-8; Crick 1971: 164; Newey 1999: 22; Ryan 1971: 39. Cf.
10. Aristotle 1976, Book II, Chapter 4.
11. Horton 1996: 34-5.
12. Austen 1999, Volume II, Chapter 11.
13. Cohen 1994: 73-5. In this section, I draw on Hursthouse's observation that we often have many vice-terms that stand opposed to a single virtue. See Hursthouse 1999: 41-2, 2f.13. Cf. Aristotle 1976 Book II, Chapter 6.
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17. Thiebaut, C. (1999). *De la tolerancia*. Madrid: Visor.
18. Žižek, S. (2007). *En defensa de la intolerancia*. Madrid: Sequitur.

19. Williams 1996: 19.
20. Williams 1996: 19-21 See also Crick 1971: 150-1.
21. In the literature, some people call this issue the problem of the —ensorious tolerator. See, for example, Horton 1996: 32-3, 7-9, Newey 1999: 164, 8. I discuss this issue in the introduction to this dissertation.
22. I take this to be Williams' claim because of comments made at Williams 1996: 21-3. Moreover, his discussion of autonomy as a possible ground for toleration seems to require that we recognize some value that makes the act of tolerating itself valuable. See
23. Williams 2005: 130-8. Newey makes a similar point more explicitly, but later seems to reject it. See Newey 1999: 171-8.
24. Heyd 2008: 183-4.
25. Heyd 2008: 184.
26. Heyd 2008: 184.
27. Heyd 2008: 184.
28. Heyd 2008: 183-4. 240
29. See discussions of this issue at Newey 1999: 4; Cohen 1994: 81-2; Oberdiek 2001: 84, 108; Mendus 1989: 112.
30. Foot 1978a: 23. See also Sabl 2008: 221.
31. Heyd 2008: 171.
32. Heyd 2008: 175, 8-9. Heyd generally does not distinguish between actions of toleration and the —attitudel of toleration. However, his arguments imply that the action is illegitimate, since it generally points to the inappropriateness of combining disapproval and restraint.
33. Heyd 2008: 171.
34. Sabl 2008: 221.
35. Heyd 2008: 173.
36. Heyd 2008: 173-4.
37. Newey makes a similar point. See Newey 2008: 361.
38. Heyd 2008: 174-6, 90-1.
39. Heyd 2008: 175-6, 8-9. 242
40. Heyd 2008: 175, 8.
41. Heyd 2008: 175-6, 9-80.
42. Heyd 2008: 178.
43. Heyd 2008: 179-80.
44. Heyd 2008: 179.
45. Heyd 2008: 181-3.
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