

APPRAISAL OF SYSTEM FOR DEALING WITH PROBLEM LOANS OF SELECTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS

***Dr Mohina,**

Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce, CMG GCW Bhodia Khera, Fatehabad - 125050

ABSTRACT : *In the present study, an attempt is made to analyze and compare the system for dealing with problem loans of selected public and private sector banks in India namely State Bank of India, Syndicate Bank, Punjab National Bank, Union Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, Andhra Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce, IDBI, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank Limited and HDFC in the area of Haryana and Delhi (including NCR). The collected data is analysed with the help of various statistical techniques such as frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation. To validate the results, t-statistic and ANOVA technique has been used. The bank-wise ANOVA results of various public sector banks show that there is a significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to the remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents, confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document and policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities; whereas there is no significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment. There is also a significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks towards the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment; whereas there is no significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks towards the remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents, confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document and policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities. The results of t-test shows the bankers' viewpoint towards the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment, remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents, confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document and policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities; among public and private banks is not found significantly different.*

Index Term - Risk Rating Criteria, Remedial Management Process and Reappraisal of Collateral Securities.

In the post liberalization era, sea changes have been witnessed in the Indian banking sector. Expanding business arena, deregulation and globalization of financial activities emergence of new financial products and increased level of competition has necessitated a need for an effective and structured risk management in financial institutions. The risk management framework and sophistication of the process, and internal controls used to manage risks depends on the nature, size and complexity of institutions activities. In a bank's portfolio, losses stem from outright default due to inability or unwillingness of a customer or counterparty to meet commitments in relation to lending, trading, settlement and other financial transactions. The intensity of the need of risk management can be well understood by the depth and severity of the crisis which were amplified by weaknesses in the banking sector such as excessive leverage, inadequate and low-quality capital, and insufficient liquidity buffers. Risk management in banking sector seeks to improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spill over from the financial sector to the real economy. There is a need for comprehensive set of reforms measures to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management, and governance of the Indian banking sector, which in turn will improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress. In this backdrop, it is imperative that banks must have a robust system for dealing with problem loans which is sensitive and responsive to these factors. The effective system for dealing with problem loans is a critical component of comprehensive of credit risk management and is essential for the long term success of banking organisation.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Various articles on different aspects of credit risk management appeared in different journals and/or magazines, but they are restrictive in nature. *Singh (2013)* concluded that credit risk management policy of the bank dictates the credit risk strategy. These policies spell out the target markets, risk acceptance/avoidance levels, risk tolerance limits, prefer levels of diversification and concentration, credit risk measurement, monitoring and controlling mechanisms. The ever-improving risk management practices in the bank will result in bank emerging stronger, which in turn would confer competitive advantage in the market. *Nabil (2012)* intended to propose a new dynamic mechanism to the risk management industry for calculating probabilities of default (PD) and calculated the realized probability of defaults and Bayesian estimates in the initial phase and then using these estimates as inputs for the core model, it generated implied Probability of Default (PD) through actuarial estimation tools and different probability distributions. This mechanism was specialized to work best for Low Default Portfolios (LDPs). *Abadi et al (2011)* concluded that banks need to manage the credit risk inherent in the entire portfolio as well as the risk in individual credits or transactions. Banks should also consider the relationships between credit risk and other risks. This research also studied the relationship between credit risk indices and borrower's timely payback in the bank. Financial indexes that are used to study the borrower's situation are different in credit time and one can divide them in two sets i.e. short-run and long-run. *Fabio (2011)* found that risk premium on government debt will likely be higher and more volatile than in the past. In some countries, sovereign debt has already lost its risk-free status; it may do so in the future in others. It did not assess actual sovereign risk and its impact on bank stability in individual countries at the present juncture. *Srinvas et al (2011)* focused on the design and development of the credit rating model for public sector banks in India. The need to enhance the existing model and to realize the

impact of BASEL II Norms was the reason for the development of the models. It was concluded that the weighted average model can be used for predicting the credit worthiness of the clients because it has higher predictive power. *Salvador (2010)* discussed a methodology, the steps needed to design the model and the assessment and validation process that can be applied in the business area, in particular, to establish an interest rate policy with customers. How the model can be used to develop credit risk management under the Basel II IRB approaches was also explained.

The foregoing review reveals that most of these studies were conducted in the context of foreign banks, based on small sample with a limited number of variables and analyzed different forms of relationships without comparing their relative performance. The present study is an improvement over earlier studies. Firstly, it includes large number of banks for the purpose of investigation. Secondly, a comparison between leading public sector banks in India with good standing in the market and undertaking considerable business in the market is made.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Scope of Study

The present study covers some of the system for dealing with problem loans of selected public and private sector banks namely State Bank of India, Syndicate Bank, Punjab National Bank, Union Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, Andhra Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce, IDBI, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank Limited and HDFC in the area of Haryana and Delhi (including NCR).

Objectives of Study

The main objective of the study is to analyze the role of human resource credit risk measurement practices of selected public and private sector banks in India. In this broader framework, the following are the specific objectives of the study:

1. To examine the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment.
2. To analyze the remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents.
3. To study the policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities.
4. To appraise the confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document.

Research Hypotheses

To validate the results of the study, the following hypotheses have been formulated and tested:

- H_{01} There is no significant difference among the banker's viewpoint regarding the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment in selected banks.
- H_{02} There is no significant difference among the banker's viewpoint regarding the remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents in selected banks.
- H_{03} There is no significant difference among the banker's viewpoint in the policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities in selected banks.
- H_{04} There is no significant difference among the banker's viewpoint in the confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document in selected banks.

Sample Profile

The population for the present study is the Indian banking sector, which is divided into two categories i.e. public and private banks. Further, State Bank of India (SBI), Syndicate Bank (SYNDI), Punjab National Bank (PNB), Union Bank of India (UNION), Bank of Baroda (BARODA), Andhra Bank (ANDHRA), Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC) and IDBI were selected from the public sector banks, and ICICI Bank, Axis Bank Limited and HDFC were selected from the private sector banks. A sample of 50 respondents was selected from each bank on the basis of judgement sampling.

Data Collection and Data Analysis

The present study is of descriptive nature and therefore used both primary data as well as secondary data. The primary data were collected through pre-tested structured questionnaire on five point Likert scale i.e. strongly disagree (SD), disagree (D), neutral (N), agree (A), and strongly agree (SA) from the officials working at managerial level in credit risk management department in the selected banks. Though 550 questionnaires were distributed, but 502 questionnaires i.e. SBI (45), IDBI (42), OBC (47), ANDRA (45), PNB (42), UNION (47), BARODA (44), SYNDI (48), HDFC (48), AXIS (47) and ICICI (47) were found complete and considered for further analysis. Secondary data were collected from various Journals, Annual Reports and Performance Highlights of the selected banks, RBI publications, IBA Bulletins, etc. The collected data is analysed with the help of various statistical techniques such as frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation. To validate the results, t-statistic and ANOVA technique has been used.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The analysis of responses obtained from the bankers regarding the system for dealing with problem loans of the selected public and private sector banks is as follows:

1. Appropriateness of Risk Rating Criteria and Methodology for the Obligor's Risk Profile and Specific Risk in the Environment

The analysis of bankers' viewpoint with regard to the risk rating criteria and methodology being appropriate for the obligor's risk profile and specific risks in the environment is given in Table 1, which shows that most of the respondents in all the banks either agree or strongly agree with the risk rating criteria and methodology being appropriate for the obligor's risk profile and specific risks in the environment. Comparatively, PNB is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.30, S.D. = 0.56) in public sector banks, followed by BARODA (Mean = 4.25, S.D. = 0.65); UNION (Mean = 4.23, S.D. = 0.72); SBI (Mean = 4.13, S.D. = 0.66); ANDRA (Mean = 4.06, S.D. = 0.68); SYNDI (Mean = 4.06, S.D. = 0.80); IDBI (Mean = 4.04, S.D. = 0.73) and OBC (Mean = 3.85, S.D. = 1.04). On the other hand, ICICI is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.38, S.D. = 0.67) followed by AXIS (Mean = 4.27, S.D. = 0.74) and HDFC (Mean = 3.97, S.D. = 0.81) in private sector banks.

The sector-wise analysis of bankers' viewpoint exhibits that most of them either agree or strongly agree in both the categories of banks with the exception of 20.4 percent and 15.8 percent who fall under neutral category in private and public sector banks respectively. Comparatively, private sector is assigned the 1st rank (Mean = 4.21 and SD = 0.76) followed by public sector (Mean = 4.11 and SD = 0.75) in terms of the risk rating criteria and methodology being appropriate for the obligor's risk profile and specific risks in the environment.

Bank-wise ANOVA results show that there is no significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to the risk rating criteria and methodology being appropriate for the obligor's risk profile and specific risks in the environment in public sector banks as p -value is more than 0.05, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{01}) accepted. On the contrary, it is found that there is a significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks as p -value is less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H_{01}) is rejected and alternative hypothesis (H_{a1}) is accepted. Analytically, the results of t-test shows bankers' viewpoint towards the risk rating criteria and methodology being appropriate for the obligor's risk profile and specific risks in the environment among selected public and private banks, which is found significantly different, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{01}) is accepted at 0.05 level of significance (Sig. = 0.208, df = 1).

2. Remedial Management Process includes Review of Collateral and Security Documents

The analysis of bankers' viewpoint with regard to remedial management process that includes review of collateral and security documents is given in Table 2, which shows that most of the respondents in all the banks either agree or strongly agree with the existence of remedial management process. Comparatively, PNB is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.30, S.D. = 0.56) in public sector banks, followed by SBI (Mean = 4.22, S.D. = 0.55); IDBI (Mean = 4.07, S.D. = 0.71); ANDRA (Mean = 4.06, S.D. = 0.75); BARODA (Mean = 3.97, S.D. = 0.69); OBC (Mean = 3.95, S.D. = 0.62); SYNDI (Mean = 3.85, S.D. = 1.05) and UNION (Mean = 3.59, S.D. = 0.90). On the other hand, HDFC is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.12, S.D. = 0.67) followed by AXIS (Mean = 4.10, S.D. = 0.89) and ICICI (Mean = 4.02, S.D. = 0.73) in private sector banks.

The sector-wise analysis of bankers' viewpoint exhibits that most of them either agree or strongly agree in both the categories of banks with the exception of 21.1 percent and 20.0 percent who fall under neutral category in private and public sector banks respectively. Comparatively, private sector is assigned the 1st rank (Mean = 4.08 and SD = 0.76) followed by public sector (Mean = 4.00 and SD = 0.77) in terms of remedial management process.

Bank-wise ANOVA results show that there is a significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to existence of remedial management process in public sector banks as p -value is less than 0.05, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{02}) is rejected and alternative hypothesis (H_{a2}) is accepted. On the contrary, it is also found that there is no significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks as p -value is more than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H_{02}) is accepted. Analytically, the results of t-test shows bankers' viewpoint towards the remedial management process that includes review of collateral and security documents among selected public and private banks, which is not found significantly different, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{02}) is accepted at 0.05 level of significance (Sig. = 0.271, df = 1).

3. Policy for Periodic Reappraisal of Collateral Securities

The analysis of bankers' viewpoint with regard to existence of policy of periodic reappraisal of collateral securities is given in Table 3, which shows that most of the respondents in all the banks either agree or strongly agree with the existence of policy of periodic reappraisal of collateral securities. Comparatively, SBI is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.31, S.D. = 0.63) in public sector banks, followed by PNB (Mean = 4.23, S.D. = 0.61); ANDRA (Mean = 4.08, S.D. = 0.82); SYNDI (Mean = 3.95, S.D. = 0.74); IDBI (Mean = 3.95, S.D. = 0.88); OBC (Mean = 3.89, S.D. = 1.00); BARODA (Mean = 3.88, S.D. = 0.81) and UNION (Mean = 3.65, S.D. = 1.02). On the other hand, HDFC is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.06, S.D. = 0.69) followed by ICICI (Mean = 4.02, S.D. = 0.89) and AXIS (Mean = 3.76, S.D. = 0.86) in private sector banks.

The sector-wise analysis of bankers' viewpoint exhibits that most of them either agree or strongly agree in both the categories of banks with the exception of 23.9 percent and 16.9 percent who fall under neutral category in private and public sector banks respectively. Comparatively, public sector is assigned the 1st rank (Mean = 3.99 and SD = 0.84) followed by private sector (Mean = 3.95 and SD = 0.82) in terms of policy of periodic reappraisal of collateral securities.

Bank-wise ANOVA results show that there is a significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to existence of policy of periodic reappraisal of collateral securities in public sector banks as p -value is less than 0.05, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{03}) is rejected and alternative hypothesis (H_{a3}) is accepted. On the contrary, it is also found that there is no significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks as p -value is more than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H_{03}) is accepted. Analytically, the results of t-test shows bankers' viewpoint towards existence of policy of periodic reappraisal of collateral securities among selected public and private banks, which is not found significantly different, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{03}) is accepted at 0.05 level of significance (Sig. = 0.600, df = 1).

4. Confirmation of a Guarantor's Intention to Guarantee Loans with a Signed Document

The analysis of bankers' viewpoint with regard to confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document is given in Table 4, which shows that most of the respondents in all the banks either agree or strongly agree with regard to confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document. Comparatively, ANDRA is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.26, S.D. = 0.75) in public sector banks, followed by SBI (Mean = 4.20, S.D. = 0.84); OBC (Mean = 4.08, S.D. = 0.82); IDBI (Mean = 4.07, S.D. = 0.74); UNION (Mean = 3.97, S.D. = 0.84); BARODA (Mean = 3.95, S.D. = 0.74); SYNDI (Mean = 3.95, S.D. = 0.94) and PNB (Mean = 3.78, S.D. = 0.87). On the other hand, ICICI is put at the 1st place (Mean = 4.08, S.D. = 0.88) followed by HDFC (Mean = 4.04, S.D. = 0.84) and AXIS (Mean = 3.91, S.D. = 0.77) in private sector banks.

The sector-wise analysis of bankers' viewpoint exhibits that most of them either agree or strongly agree in both the categories of banks with the exception of 19.2 percent and 14.8 percent who fall under neutral category in public and private sector banks respectively. Comparatively, public sector is assigned the 1st rank (Mean = 4.03 and SD = 0.83) followed by private sector (Mean = 4.01 and SD = 0.83) in terms of confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document.

Bank-wise ANOVA results show that there is no significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to the confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document in public and private sector banks as p -value is more than 0.05, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{04}) is accepted. Analytically, the results of t-test shows bankers' viewpoint towards the confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document among selected public and private banks, which is not found significantly different, therefore the null hypothesis (H_{04}) is accepted at 0.05 level of significance (Sig. = 0.763, df = 1).

CONCLUSION

To sum up, bank-wise ANOVA results of various public sector banks show that there is a significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents, confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document and policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities; whereas there is no significant difference among the bankers' viewpoint with regard to the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment. There is also a significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks towards the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment; whereas there is no significant difference among the viewpoint of respondents of private sector banks towards the remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents, confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document and policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities. The results of t-test shows the bankers' viewpoint towards the appropriateness of risk rating criteria and methodology for the obligor's risk profile and specific risk in the environment, remedial management process includes review of collateral and security documents, confirmation of a guarantor's intention to guarantee loans with a signed document and policy for periodic reappraisal of collateral securities; among public and private banks is not found significantly different.

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Table - 1: Appropriateness of Risk Rating Criteria and Methodology for the Obligor's Risk Profile and Specific Risk in the Environment

SECTOR	BANK	N/%	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total	Mean	Ranks	S.D	ANOVA (Sig.)	t-test (Sig.)
PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS	SBI	N	0	0	7	25	13	45	4.13	4	0.66	0.104 (df= 7, 352)	0.208 (df = 1)
		%	0.0	0.0	15.6	55.6	28.9	100.0					
	IDBI	N	0	0	10	20	12	42	4.04	7	0.73		
		%	0.0	0.0	23.8	47.6	28.6	100.0					
	OBC	N	2	3	8	21	13	47	3.85	8	1.04		
		%	4.3	6.4	17.0	44.7	27.7	100.0					
	ANDRA	N	0	0	9	24	12	45	4.06	5	0.68		
		%	0.0	0.0	20.0	53.3	26.7	100.0					
	PNB	N	0	0	2	25	15	42	4.30	1	0.56		
		%	0.0	0.0	4.8	59.5	35.7	100.0					
	UNION	N	0	1	5	23	18	47	4.23	3	0.72		
		%	0.0	2.1	10.6	48.9	38.3	100.0					
BARODA	N	0	0	5	23	16	44	4.25	2	0.65			
	%	0.0	0.0	11.4	52.3	36.4	100.0						
SYNDI	N	0	1	11	20	16	48	4.06	6	0.80			
	%	0.0	2.1	22.9	41.7	33.3	100.0						
TOTAL		N	2	5	57	181	115	360	4.11	-	0.75		
		%	0.6	1.4	15.8	50.3	31.9	100.0					
PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS	HDFC	N	0	0	16	17	15	48	3.97	3	0.81	0.026 (df= 2, 139)	
		%	0.0	0.0	33.3	35.4	31.3	100.0					
	AXIS	N	0	0	8	18	21	47	4.27	2	0.74		
		%	0.0	0.0	17.0	38.3	44.7	100.0					

	ICICI	N	0	0	5	19	23	47	4.38	1	0.67		
		%	0.0	0.0	10.6	40.4	48.9	100.0					
TOTAL		N	0	0	29	54	59	142	4.21	-	0.76		
		%	0.0	0.0	20.4	38.0	41.5	100.0					

N= Number of Respondents, %= Percent, SD = Standard Deviation

Source: Survey (Processed and analyzed through IBM SPSS 19.0 version)

Table - 2: Remedial Management Process includes Review of Collateral and Security Documents

SECTOR	BANK	N/%	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total	Mean	Ranks	S.D	ANOVA (Sig.)	t Test (Sig.)
PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS	SBI	N	0	0	3	29	13	45	4.22	2	0.55	0.000 (df= 7, 352)	0.271 (df = 1)
		%	0.0	0.0	6.7	64.4	28.9	100.0					
	IDBI	N	0	1	6	24	11	42	4.07	3	0.71		
		%	0.0	2.4	14.3	57.1	26.2	100.0					
	OBC	N	0	1	7	32	7	47	3.95	6	0.62		
		%	0.0	2.1	14.9	68.1	14.9	100.0					
	ANDRA	N	0	0	11	20	14	45	4.06	4	0.75		
		%	0.0	0.0	24.4	44.4	31.1	100.0					
	PNB	N	0	0	2	25	15	42	4.30	1	0.56		
		%	0.0	0.0	4.8	59.5	35.7	100.0					
UNION	N	0	5	17	17	8	47	3.59	8	0.90			
	%	0.0	10.6	36.2	36.2	17.0	100.0						
BARODA	N	0	0	11	23	10	44	3.97	5	0.69			
	%	0.0	0.0	25.0	52.3	22.7	100.0						
SYNDI	N	0	5	15	10	18	48	3.85	7	1.05			
	%	0.0	10.4	31.3	20.8	37.5	100.0						
TOTAL		N	0	12	72	180	96	360	4.00	-	0.77		
		%	0.0	3.3	20.0	50.0	26.7	100.0					
PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS	HDFC	N	0	0	8	26	14	48	4.12	1	0.67	0.785 (df= 2, 139)	
		%	0.0	0.0	16.7	54.2	29.2	100.0					
	AXIS	N	0	2	10	16	19	47	4.10	2	0.89		
		%	0.0	4.3	21.3	34.0	40.4	100.0					
	ICICI	N	0	0	12	22	13	47	4.02	3	0.73		
		%	0.0	0.0	25.5	46.8	27.7	100.0					
TOTAL		N	0	2	30	64	46	142	4.08	-	0.76		
		%	0.0	1.4	21.1	45.1	32.4	100.0					

N= Number of Respondents, %= Percent, SD = Standard Deviation

Source: Survey (Processed and analyzed through IBM SPSS 19.0 version)

Table - 3: Policy for Periodic Reappraisal of Collateral Securities

SECTOR	BANK	N/%	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total	Mean	Ranks	S.D	ANOVA (Sig.)	t Test (Sig.)
PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS	SBI	N	0	0	4	23	18	45	4.31	1	0.63	0.007 (df= 7, 352)	0.600 (df = 1)
		%	0.0	0.0	8.9	51.1	40.0	100.0					
	IDBI	N	0	3	8	19	12	42	3.95	5	0.88		
		%	0.0	7.1	19.0	45.2	28.6	100.0					
	OBC	N	0	7	5	21	14	47	3.89	6	1.00		
		%	0.0	14.9	10.6	44.7	29.8	100.0					
	ANDRA	N	0	3	4	24	14	45	4.08	3	0.82		
		%	0.0	6.7	8.9	53.3	31.1	100.0					
	PNB	N	0	1	1	27	13	42	4.23	2	0.61		
		%	0.0	2.4	2.4	64.3	31.0	100.0					
UNION	N	0	7	14	14	12	47	3.65	8	1.02			
	%	0.0	14.9	29.8	29.8	25.5	100.0						
BARODA	N	0	1	14	18	11	44	3.88	7	0.81			
	%	0.0	2.3	31.8	40.9	25.0	100.0						
SYNDI	N	0	1	11	25	11	48	3.95	4	0.74			
	%	0.0	2.1	22.9	52.1	22.9	100.0						
TOTAL		N	0	23	61	171	105	360	3.99	-	0.84		
		%	0.0	6.4	16.9	47.5	29.2	100.0					
PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS	HDFC	N	0	0	10	25	13	48	4.06	1	0.69	0.169 (df= 2, 139)	
		%	0.0	0.0	20.8	52.1	27.1	100.0					
	AXIS	N	0	3	15	19	10	47	3.76	3	0.86		
		%	0.0	6.4	31.9	40.4	21.3	100.0					
	ICICI	N	0	3	9	19	16	47	4.02	2	0.89		
		%	0.0	6.4	19.1	40.4	34.0	100.0					

		%	0.0	6.4	19.1	40.4	34.0	100.0					
	TOTAL	N	0	6	34	63	39	142	3.95	-	0.82		
		%	0.0	4.2	23.9	44.4	27.5	100.0					

N= Number of Respondents, % = Percent, SD = Standard Deviation

Source: Survey (Processed and analyzed through IBM SPSS 19.0 version)

Table - 4: Confirmation of a Guarantor's Intention to Guarantee Loans with a Signed Document

SECTOR	BANK	N/%	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total	Mean	Ranks	S.D	ANOVA (Sig.)	t Test (Sig.)
PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS	SBI	N	0	2	6	18	19	45	4.20	2	0.84	0.169 (df= 7, 352)	0.763 (df = 1)
		%	0.0	4.4	13.3	40.0	42.2	100.0					
	IDBI	N	0	1	7	22	12	42	4.07	4	0.74		
		%	0.0	2.4	16.7	52.4	28.6	100.0					
	OBC	N	0	1	11	18	17	47	4.08	3	0.82		
		%	0.0	2.1	23.4	38.3	36.2	100.0					
	ANDRA	N	0	2	2	23	18	45	4.26	1	0.75		
		%	0.0	4.4	4.4	51.1	40.0	100.0					
	PNB	N	0	4	9	21	8	42	3.78	8	0.87		
		%	0.0	9.5	21.4	50.0	19.0	100.0					
	UNION	N	0	3	8	23	13	47	3.97	5	0.84		
		%	0.0	6.4	17.0	48.9	27.7	100.0					
BARODA	N	0	1	10	23	10	44	3.95	6	0.74			
	%	0.0	2.3	22.7	52.3	22.7	100.0						
SYNDI	N	1	0	16	14	17	48	3.95	7	0.94			
	%	2.1	0.0	33.3	29.2	35.4	100.0						
TOTAL	N	1	14	69	162	114	360	4.03	-	0.83			
	%	0.3	3.9	19.2	45.0	31.7	100.0						
PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS	HDFC	N	1	0	10	22	15	48	4.04	2	0.84	0.592 (df= 2, 139)	
		%	2.1	0.0	20.8	45.8	31.3	100.0					
	AXIS	N	0	3	7	28	9	47	3.91	3	0.77		
		%	0.0	6.4	14.9	59.6	19.1	100.0					
	ICICI	N	0	4	4	23	16	47	4.08	1	0.88		
		%	0.0	8.5	8.5	48.9	34.0	100.0					
TOTAL	N	1	7	21	73	40	142	4.01	-	0.83			
	%	0.7	4.9	14.8	51.4	28.2	100.0						

N= Number of Respondents, % = Percent, S.D = Standard Deviation

Source: Survey (Processed and analyzed through IBM SPSS 19.0 version)