A Secured Technique for Assuring the Access Privacy of Graph Data

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Abstract: There has been critical enthusiasm for the improvement of anonymization plans for distributing diagram information. We are proposing an authorization mechanism for ensuring integrated framework. Be that as it may, protection is a noteworthy worry in managing graph information. In this, an incorporated system for guaranteeing protection within the sight of an approval component is proposed. A privacy is necessary for social media it could be seen in face book which is most famous application in today's life .Access control components give extra shield against information breaks and guarantee that exclusive approved data is accessible to end-clients in light of their relegated parts. The coordinated structure features a tradeoff amongst protection and approved benefits. Maybe to accomplish a pre-determined security level, get to benefits ought to be casual. For the previous system, we discussed the k-mysterious Bi-target Graph Partitioning (k-BGP) issue and give its hardness comes about. Heuristics arrangements are produced to take care of the limitation issue. The system gives a mysterious view of the objective class of part based workloads for diagram information. The proposed heuristics are exactly assessed and a definite security investigation of the structure regarding hazard related with re-distinguishing proof assault is led.

Index Terms: Graph Data, Access Control, Privacy, K-Anonymity, Role Imprecision-Bound, Information Loss.

I. INTRODUCTION

Graph data has developed increasingly important in recent years because of its general use in countless applications.Some driving cases are Web, coordinated effort systems, informal communities, geo-interpersonal organizations, and correspondence systems. The hubs of a diagram speak to substances, while their associations catch different connections among them. The semantics appointed with hubs and connections in the chart information change essentially crosswise over application spaces. For instance, an interpersonal organization is typically spoken to by an arrangement of clients, where connections may catch fellowship connections; a co-initiation system can express logical productions and their cooperation joins. The analysis of published graph data is used extensively by researchers to extract useful knowledge and information. For instance, disease transmission experts examine sickness spread examples in light of clients' social contact data; sociologists and clinicians can check the social structure and human conduct design; mining calculations are utilized to find different examples in these diagrams; and promoters can precisely gather clients' inclination profiles for focused notices. This information is distributed to partners and approved clients. The delicate idea of information raises protection challenges as clients' private data might be uncovered in distributed chart information. Security safeguarding for delicate information involves the implementation of security approaches and the arrangement for adequate assurance against personality revelation. Essentially evacuating the hub identifiers in interpersonal organizations does not give assurance against structure-based re-recognizable proof assaults. Back storm exhibit a group of dynamic and uninvolved assaults that use the uniqueness of little arbitrary subgraphs inserted in a system. The foe may connect this unmistakable arbitrary subgraph to some arrangement of focused people. In the anonym zed distributed diagram, the enemy at that point follows the infused sub graph in the first chart. In the primary stage, some seed hubs are recognized between the anonymized and assistant diagrams. In the secondary stage, the recognized seed centers are used as a piece of an iterative DA inciting process in perspective of both the graphs' helper characteristics. A point to point connection of different security designs against de-Anonymization ambushes is given in. Also, the challenger may moreover have establishment getting the hang of containing trademark information for de-anonymization purposes.

Access control approaches give additional shields against data breaks are used to confirm that select endorsed disseminated information is available to end-customers is considered to their allotted parts. Parts are dynamic delineations of what customers are allowed to perform in a structure. We imagine a role based access control (RBAC) organization demonstrates for the arrangement authorization. RBAC relegates get to benefits to end-clients for considering their predefined parts. A main case is Facebook1, which gives security includes by enabling the clients to direct access to their private data by utilizing fine-grained get to control approaches. Since k-anonymization is a speculation approach, at the season of making k-mysterious segments, we signifies that entrance control benefits may should be casual to ensurek-obscurity security prerequisite with a generally more grounded ensure. The issue is recognize the end goal to suit imprecision limits, false-positive tuples should be diminished that outcome in expanded normal parcel sizes. Moreover, under strict strategy, the protection is moderately powerless contrasted with loose semantics as we endeavor to lessen false-negative tuples bringing about diminished normal parcel sizes. This shows an exchange off amongst security and access control. A key test is to guarantee k-obscurity protection assurance of people inside distributed chart data and save information utility while implementing an entrance control arrangement. For this, we propose the k-unknown Bi-target Graph Partitioning (k-BGP) problem and give hardness results. This is one kind of issue that has not viewed as before. The commitments of this project are as follows: We plan the k-BGP issue and present hardness results. Two heuristics TSH1 and TSH2 are produced to deal with the requirement issue.

- We direct an experimental assessment of the previous heuristics with a benchmark calculation from a design viewpoint as far as meeting the security and access control prerequisites with least data misfortune.
- Within the help of the k-BGP issue, we display a design structure, explaining how get to control and security can be incorporated.
- A definite security examination of the plan is performed and a probabilistic investigation is accommodated re-distinguishing proof hazard.

TABLE I: Generalization for k-Anonymity

(a) Sensitive table T

	QI_1	QI_2	S_1
ID	Age	Zip	Income
1	10	25	120,000
2	20	35	95,000
3	30	45	110,000
4	35	15	150,000
5	40	40	290,000
6	50	60	75,000
7	55	20	225,000
8	60	55	350,000
9	65	25	175,000

(b) 2-anonymous table $\overline{T}$

QI_1	QI_2	S_1
Age	Zip	Income
10-20	25-35	120,000
10-20	25-35	95,000
30-40	40-45	110,000
35-65	15-25	150,000
30-40	40-45	290,000
50-60	55-60	75,000
35-65	15-25	225,000
50-60	55-60	350,000
35-65	15-25	175,000

A. Existing System

In existing although a data is published to stockholders and authorized users it has a strong interconnection among social identifiers which has a major problem on data storage. It reveals private information of users in published graph Privacy-preservation for sensitive data entails the application of privacy policies and the provision for satisfactory protection against identity disclosure. In case if any sub graph is attached to original graph, the original graph is revealed when cloud user retrieve a sub graph during information of social networking knowledge.

Disadvantages:

- In order to accommodate imprecision bounds false-positive tuples need to be reduced that results in increased average partition sizes.
- A set of roles with their associated imprecision bounds and a k-anonymity requirement, the challenge is to anonymize datasets such that the maximum numbers of roles satisfy their imprecision bounds and minimum informationn loss is incurred.

B. Proposed System

- The present heuristics in terms of meeting the desired access control and privacy requirements with minimum information loss.
- It provides security analysis to the present framework from an attack perspective. We proposed a probabilistic analysis of the present framework with respect to re-identification attack.
- The present heuristics are experimentally evaluated and a detailed security analysis of the framework in terms of risk associated with re-identification attack is conducted.

Advantages:

- Maximize the number of roles for which their bounds can be satisfied. Minimize the total information loss. We show that finding such a graph partitioning is, in general, NP-hard.

C. System Architecture

This diagram shows a relationship between different components of system. It is very important to understand the overall behaviour of system. This is a graph of system, in which the essential parts or capacities are spoken to by pieces associated by lines that demonstrate the relationships of the blocks. They are very useful in the engineering world and process flow diagram (Fig.1).

D. Module Description

- Client Authentication
- Data Request
- Access control administrator
- Graph Data access
- Heuristic Analysis



Fig.1. Flow diagram.

II. PRELIMINARIES

A. The Data Model

We deliberate a basic undirected diagram information demonstrate, G=(V, E), where V is the arrangement of hubs and Eis the arrangement of edges. Every hub compares to a person in the basic gathering of individuals, while an edge that associates two hubs portrays a connection between two relating people. Notwithstanding the auxiliary information that is given by E, every hub is portrayed by an arrangement of qualities (distinct information) that can be ordered in the accompanying three classifications:

- **Identifier:** Properties, e.g., name and s son, that exceptionally distinguish a substance. These properties are completely ousted from an anonymized chart.
- **Quasi-identifier (QI):** Properties, e.g., birth date, postal district and sexual orientation that can be joined with outer data accessible to some foe to uncover the individual personality of a person.
- **Sensitive Property:** Traits,

They are accepted to cause a protection rupture if related with a remarkable person. The blend of QIs could be utilized for extraordinary distinguishing proof by methods for connecting assaults. Consequently, they ought to be summed up keeping in mind the end goal to impede such assaults.

Definition 1: Let $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_d$ be a collection of QIattributes. Then, a graph is defined as $G = (V, E, T)$. Where $E \subset \binom{V}{2}$ is the structural information (edges), describing relationships between V pairs, and T = $\{T_1, \ldots, T_N\}$ where $T_i \subset A_1 \times \ldots \times A_d, 1 \leq i \leq N$ are the descriptive data associated with nodes in V.

B. Graph Anonymization Definitions

Consider the Anonymization of a given graph G = (V, E, T) by partitioning as given. Let $V_P = P = \{P_1, \ldots, P_M\}$ be a partition of V into disjoint subsets or partitions, i.e., $V = \bigcup_{i=1}^{M} P_i$ and $P_i \cap P_j = \phi$ for all $1 \leq i \neq j \leq M$, and $E_P \subseteq \binom{V_P}{2}$ be a set of edges on VP, Where $\{P_i, P_j\} \in E_P$ if there exists $v_n \in P_i$ and $v_m \in P_j$ such that $\{v_n, v_m\} \in E$.



(a) Original partitioned graph $\mathcal{G}$ (b) Anonymized graph $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{P}}$

Fig.2. A graph and its corresponding published view.

Definition 2$(k-Anonymity Property$: A graph satisfies thek-anonymity property if each partition $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$ contains K$ or more nodes.

Definition3(Super-node): In the anonymized published graph (e.g., Fig. 2(b)), each partition is$ replaced $by a pair of items, where is the number of nodes in a particular partition(i.e., the number of original V -nodes as part of that partition), and is the number of edges in E that connect nodes within Partition $P_i, 1 \leq i \leq M$. This new published node is termed super-node.

Definition 4 (Super-edge): In the anonymized distributed chart (e.g., Fig. 2(b)), each edge, say is named by a weight , which remains for the quantity of edges in E that associate a hub in Pi to a hub in Pj . This new distributed edge is named a super-edge. We expect that all the QI characteristics have numerical esteems and utilize the various leveled free speculation that sums up the arrangement of tuples show in a parcel, say Pi, with the littlest Interim that incorporates all the underlying esteems, additionally called the insignificant covering tuples, for that parcel.

Definition 5 (Anonymized graph [16]): Let $\mathcal{G} = (V, E, T)$ be a graph with vertex attributes, and let A1; : : : ;Ad be the generalization taxonomies ford QI attributes A1; : : : ;Ad Then, given a partitioning VP of V , the anonymized graph is defined as GP $= (V_{\mathcal{P}}, E_{\mathcal{P}}, \overline{T})$, where:- $E_{\mathcal{P}} \subseteq \binom{V_{\mathcal{P}}}{2}$ is a set of edges on VP, where $\{P_i, P_j\} \in$ EP if there exists $v_n \in P_i$ and $v_m \in P_j$ such that $\{v_n, v_m\} \in E$;

- The partitions in VP are labelled by their sizes and the number of their intra-cluster edges $(|P_i|, |E_{P_i}|)$,while the edges in EP are labeledd by the$ corresponding number of inter-cluster edges, $|E_{P_i P_j}|$, in E where $1 \leq i \neq j \leq M$;
- $\overline{T} = \{\overline{T}_1, \ldots, \overline{T}_M\}$, where $\overline{T}_i$ is the minimal recordin $A_1 \times \ldots \times A_d$ that generalizes all QI tuples of individuals in $P_i, 1 \leq i \leq M$.

C. Access Control Model

In this area, we talk about the semantics of part/question $predicate assessment$ concerning access control. For the question predicate assessment over a chart, says G, a vertex is

TABLE II: Access Control Policy

Role	Permission	Authorized Query Predicate (View)
Role1	X	Age = 15-45 ∧ Zip = 20-30
Role2	Y	Age = 30-45 ∧ Zip = 25-45
Role3	Z	Age = 50-60 ∧ Zip = 55-60

Added to the yield result if all its property estimations fulfill the inquiry predicate. In addition, the edges between the outcome vertexes set are likewise returned as a yield. Each question speaks to the d-dimensional hyper-rectangle. The semantics for question assessment on an anonymized chart GP should be characterized. At the point when a segment, say P, is completely incorporated into the inquiry locale, all the segment hubs and their related edges are returned as a component of the question result. Notwithstanding, when a parcel and an inquiry somewhat cover, there is a vulnerability in the question assessment. For this state, there can be a few conceivable semantics. The accompanying three choices are by and large utilized:

Uniform: Assuming the uniform appropriation of hubs in the covering parcels, the outcome restores the hubs as indicated by the proportion of cover between the question and the segment, and the edges between these hubs. The vast majority of the writing utilizes the uniform dissemination semantics to look at obscurity procedures over determination undertakings .

Cover: This incorporates all hubs and their related edges in the segments that cover the part/inquiry. This choice will add false positives to the first part/inquiry result.

Encased: This disposes of all hubs and their related edges in every one of those parcels that incompletely cover the part/question area. This choice yields false negatives concerning the first part/inquiry result. For the rest of this paper, we accept Overlap semantics as characterized previously

D. Role-Based Access Control

As specified before, part based access control (RBAC) permits characterizing authorizations on objects in light of parts in an association A RBAC approach setup is made out of an arrangement of Users (U), an arrangement of Roles (R), and an arrangement of Permissions (P). For the chart show, we accept that the arrangement of consents for a part are the choice predicates on the QI traits that the part is approved to execute .Among the approved tuples subset, a client is allowed to set any determination condition on the delicate property. The client to part task (UA) is a client to-part (U R) mapping and the part to-consent task (PA) is a part to authorization (R P) mapping.

Definition 6 (RBAC Policy): An RBAC policy $\rho$is a tuples $\langle \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{P}, UA, PA \rangle$.In practice, when a client relegated to a role executes an query, the tuples that fulfill the conjunction of query predicate and the consent are returned. Consider for example Table 2 where Role1 has been assigned permission X with authorized query predicate Age = 15-45 ∧ Zip =20-30.

TABLE III: Published Graph View for Roles

Roles	Super Nodes	Generalized Tuples		SuperEdges
		Age	Zip	
Role1 → X	$P_1(2,1)$	10-20	25-35	$\lvert E_{P_1P_3}\rvert = 2$
	$P_3(3,0)$	35-65	15-25	
Role2 → Y	$P_2(2,1)$	30-40	40-45	$\lvert E_{P_2P_3}\rvert = 3$
	$P_3(2,1)$	35-65	15-25	
Role3 → Z	$P_4(2,1)$	50-60	55-60	NULL

III. ROLE IMPRECISION-BOUND AND INFORMATIONLOSS

In this segment, we give the explanations for role imprecisionbound and describe the information loss measure for the anonymize graph in this area, we give the descriptions for part imprecision bound and depict the data misfortune measure for the anonymized diagram. $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P} = \langle V_\mathcal{P}, E_\mathcal{P}, T \rangle$.

A. Role Imprecision-Bound

Let vn be a vertex in graph G with d QI attributes, $A_1, \ldots, A_d$ Vertex v_{an} can be expressed as a d-dimensional vector $\{v_n(1), \ldots, v_n(d)\}$, where $v_n(j)$is the value of the jth attribute. Let $D_A$be the domain of QI attribute QI_i, then $v_n \in D_{A_1} \times \ldots \times D_{A_d}$. Any d-dimensional partition Pi of the QI attribute domain space can be distinct as a d-dimensional vector of closed intervals $\{I_1^{P_i}, \ldots, I_d^{P_i}\}$. The closed interval $I_j^{P_i}$ is further defined as $[a_j^{P_i}, b_j^{P_i}]$, where $a_j^{P_i}$ is the start ofthe interval and $b_j^{P_i}$ is the end of interval. To publish a partition, each node vn in a Partition, says Pi, is replaced by the minimum bounding intervals $\{I_1^{P_i}, \ldots, I_d^{P_i}\}$of the partition to which the node belongs. A vertex, say vn, belongs to a Partition, say P_i, if $\forall v_n(i), v_n(i) \in I_i^{P_i} : a_i^{P_i} \leq v_n(i) \leq b_i^{P_i}$ .Consider a set of roles R, where $R_i \in \mathcal{R}$ R is defined by a Boolean function of predicates on the set of QI attributes $A_1, \ldots, A_d$. A role describes a space in the domain of QI attributes $D_{A_1} \times \ldots \times D_{A_d}$and can be signified by a d-dimensional rectangle or a set of non-overlapping ddimensional rectangles. To simplify the notation, we assume that a role says Rj, is a single d-dimensional rectangle represented by $\{I_1^{R_j}, \ldots, I_d^{R_j}\}$. A vertex, say vn, belongs to. R_j if $\forall v_n(i), v_n(i) \in I_i^{R_j} : a_i^{R_j} \leq v_n(i) \leq b_i^{R_j}$. Role Rj and partition p_i overlap if $\forall I_i^{R_j}, \forall I_i^{P_i}, a_i^{R_j} \in I_i^{P_i}$ or $a_i^{P_i} \in I_i^{R_j}$

Definition 7 (Role Imprecision) Part imprecision is characterized as the contrast between the quantity of hubs returned by a part/inquiry assessed on an anonymized chart GP and the quantity of hubs for a similar part/question on the unique diagram G. The imprecision for part/question Ri is signified by I^{R_i},

$$I^{R_i} = |R_i(\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P})| - |R_i(\mathcal{G})| \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

Where

$$|R_i(\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P})| = \sum_{\forall P_j \in \mathcal{P} \text{ overlaps } R_i} |P_j| \quad \textbf{(2)}$$

The Role Ri is evaluated over GP by including all the nodes in the P $\in$P that overlap the role region.

Definition 8 (Role Imprecision-Bound): the part imprecision-bound, meant by BRi, is the most extreme decent imprecision by a part Ri and is preset by the entrance control chairman.

B. Information Loss and Utility Measure for Anonymized Graph Data

Given a graph, say $\mathcal{G} = \langle V, E, T \rangle$, and a partitioning, say P, of G's nodes, the information loss IL(P) associated with replacing G by the corresponding partitioned network, $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P} = \langle V_\mathcal{P}, E_\mathcal{P}, \overline{T} \rangle$, is defined as the weighted sum of two metrics,

$$IL(\mathcal{P}) = w.IL_D(\mathcal{P}) + (1-w).IL_S(\mathcal{P}) \quad \textbf{(3)}$$

Where w $\in$ [0; 1] is a weighting parameter, IL_D (P) is the descriptive information loss that is caused by generalizing the exact QI tuples T to $\overline{T}$, while IL_S (P) is the structural. Information loss that is caused by collapsing all nodes of V In a given partition of VP to one super-node we use the same measure of information loss as proposed in [16]. For the descriptive information loss, we employ the Loss Metric (LM) measure. Assume that an original node, say $v_n \in V$, belongs to a partition, $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$,then van's QI tuples, $T_n = (T_n(1), \ldots, T_n(d))$, is generalized to $\overline{T}_i = (\overline{T}_i(1), \ldots, \overline{T}_i(d))$, and where d is the number of QI attributes. The LM allies the following loss of information with each of the nodes in a partition, say Pi,

$$IL_D(P_i) = \frac{1}{d}\sum_{j=1}^{d}\frac{|\overline{T}_i(j)|-1}{|A_j|-1}, \quad \textbf{(4)}$$

Where $|\overline{T}_i(j)|$is the size of the subset $\overline{T}_i(j)$that generalizesthe original value $T_n(j)$and $|A_d|$ is the number of values in the domain of attribute Ad?

Note, $IL_D(P_i)$ ranges between zero and one in particular, $IL_D(P_i)$ 0 if all tuples in Pi are identical; in that occasion, no generalization is applied. On the other hand, $IL_D(P_i) = 1$ All tuples in Pi are so far off from each other that all the attributes in the generalized tuples have to be totally suppressed. The overall LM information is the Result of averaging $IL_D(P_i)$ for all partitions in P, i.e.

$$IL_D(\mathcal{P}) = \frac{1}{N}.\sum_{i=1}^{M}|P_i| \times IL_D(P_i) \quad \textbf{(5)}$$

No generalization implies that the descriptive datautility $U_D(\mathcal{P})$is maximum. Accordingly, we can define $U_D(\mathcal{P}) = 1 - IL_D(\mathcal{P})$ .Structural information loss can be categorized into two types:

Intra-Partition Information Loss: Given a partition, say $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$, the structure of Pi in the original graph is lost, and is replaced by the number $|E_{P_i}|$ of edges in E that connect nodes in Pi. The equivalent information loss is calculated as the probability of wrongly identifying a pair of nodes in Pi as an edge or as a non-connected pair, and it is evaluated as follows:

$$IL_{S,1}(P_i) = 2|E_{P_i}|.\left(1 - \frac{2|E_{P_i}|}{|P_i|(|P_i|-1)}\right) \quad \textbf{(6)}$$

Inter-Partition Information Loss: Given two partitions, say $P_i, P_j \in \mathcal{P}$, the structure of edges that connect nodes from Pi to nodes in Pj is lost, and is replaced by the number $|E_{P_i,P_j}|$ of edges between nodes in these two partitions. The inter-partition information loss is measured as the probability of wrongly identifying a pair of nodes in Pi and Pj as an edge or as a non-connected pair, and is evaluated as follows:

$$IL_{S,2}(P_i, P_j) = 2|E_{P_i,P_j}|.\left(1 - \frac{|E_{P_i,P_j}|}{|P_i||P_j|}\right) \quad \textbf{(7)}$$

Then, the complete structural information loss for partitioning $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_M\}$ is evaluated as follows:

$$IL_S(\mathcal{P}) = \frac{4}{N(N-1)}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{M}IL_{S,1}(P_i) + \sum_{1\le i\ne j\le M}IL_{S,2}(P_i, P_j)\right] \quad \textbf{(8)}$$

Where the normalizing factor $\frac{4}{N(N-1)}$ guarantees that $IL_S(\mathcal{P})$ranges between zero and one. The maximal value of one occurs when all edge counters $(|E_{P_i}| \text{ and } |E_{P_i,P_j}|)$fall in the middle of the intervals where they range (i.e., $|E_{P_i}| = \binom{|P_i|}{2}/2$) and $|E_{P_i,P_j}| = |P_i||P_j|/2$ for all $1 \le i \ne j \le M$).In an anonymized Graph, say $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P} = \langle V_\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}, E_\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{T} \rangle$. The structural utility $U_S(\mathcal{P})$is defined as $U_S(\mathcal{P}) = 1 - IL_S(\mathcal{P})$ILS (P). A generalized graph summarizes the structure ofthe original graph. Let us

consider two extreme cases: One-to-one correspondence between nodes and super-nodes: This means each super-node contains only one node (i.e., no intra-edge) and a pair of super-nodes does not contain more than one inter-edge. The original graph structure is maintained as it is. According to the structural loss formulation, the intra-partition loss, $IL_{S,1}(P_i) = 0$ for each partition as there is no intra-edge present within super-nodes; similarly, the inter-partition loss, $IL_{S,2}(P_i, P_j) = 0$, for all super-node pairs as there is at most one inter-edge present between them. This results in $IL_S(\mathcal{P}) = 0$. Thus, the least value of the structural loss IL_S (P) yields the maximum value ofthe structural utility $U_S(\mathcal{P}) = 1 - IL_S(\mathcal{P})$.Generalized graph contains a single super-node: Under thiscase, the only information revealed about the input graph is shown in Fig.3



(a) $IL_S = 0.42$ (b) $IL_S = 0.51$

Fig.3. Satisfying role imprecision bounds with minimum structural information loss.

Its size (number of nodes) and density (number of edges). The user has absolutely no structural information available; Hence we have very low structural utility US value. In this Case, inter-partition loss component, $IL_{S,2}(P_i, P_j) = 0$as there are no inter-edges The overall structural loss will be determined by the single super-node, i.e., $IL_S(P) = IL_{S,1}(P) = 2e(1 - \frac{2e}{|\mathcal{P}|(|\mathcal{P}|-1)})$It can be noticed that a higher value of structural loss IL_S(P) corresponds to a lower valueof structural utility $U_S(\mathcal{P}) = 1 - IL_S(\mathcal{P})$and vice versa.

IV. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

A. The k-BGP Problem

As discussed previously, the k-BGP issue makes a k unsigned dividing a graph, which is controlled by a RBAC game plan. The objective of diagram allotting is to: I) enhance the amount of parts for which their points of confinement can be satisfied, and ii) restrain the total information disaster. We Exhibit that finding such a diagram separating is, generally speaking, NP-hard. To begin with, we describe the decision interpretation of the k-BGP issue. By then, we exhibit the hardness of the issue. To portray the decisional k-BGP issue, we show two constants: rn and lv. properly, the decision variation of the k-BGP issue is described underneath:

Definition 9 (Decisional k-anonymous Bi-objective Graph Partitioning)
Given a Graph, say $\mathcal{G} = (V, E, \mathcal{T})$, with the vertices in a d-dimensional space, a set of roles $R_i \in \mathcal{R}$ with their associated imprecision bounds B^{R_i}, and positive constants $rn, 1 \leq rn \leq |\mathcal{R}|$, and $lv \in [0, 1]$, does thereexist a k-anonymous graph partition of vertices such that: (i) the number of roles violating their bounds is lessthan rn, and (ii) the total in sequence loss, IL(P), is less than lv?

Theorem 1 (Decisional k-anonymous Bi-objective Graph Partitioning is NP-complete):

Proof: Refer to Appendix A.

Example 2 Consider the partition set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_4\}$and the role set $\mathcal{R} = \{R_1, R_2\}$in Fig.4. Both the partitions as given in Figs. 3(a) and 2(b) satisfy the vagueness limits of 3 and 0 for R1 and R2, respectively. We can work out the structural in sequence loss, ILS (P), of the partitions as follows: Partitions P1; P2, and P4 have two vertices and one linking edge



Fig.4. A framework for the proposed privacy-preserving access control mechanism for graph data.

between them; their intra structural information loss, $IL_{S,1}(P_i)$, is calculated as $IL_{S,1}(P_1) = IL_{S,1}(P_2) = IL_{S,1}(P_4) = 2 \times 1(1 - \frac{2\times1}{2\times1}) = 0$, while P_3 has three vertices with no connecting edges among them. Hence $IL_{S,1}$ is $IL_{S,1}(P_3) = 2 \times 0(1 - \frac{2\times0}{3\times2}) = 0$. There are two inter-edges between Partitions P_1 and P_2. The inter structural information loss, $IL_{S,2}(P_i, P_i)$, between Parti- tions P_1 and P_2 is calculated as follows: $IL_{S,2}(P_1, P_2) = 2 \times 2(1 - \frac{2}{2\times3}) = \frac{8}{3}$. Similarly, $IL_{S,2}(P_2, P_3) = 3$ and $IL_{S,2}(P_2, P_4) = 2$. Thus, the total structural information loss for the partitioning in Fig. 2(a) after being normalized is $IL_S(\mathcal{P}) = \frac{23}{3} \times \frac{1}{18} = 0.42$. For Fig. 2(b), the intra-structural information loss for all par- titions $IL_{S,1}(P_1) = IL_{S,1}(P_3) = IL_{S,1}(P_4) = 0$ while $IL_{S,1}(P_2) = \frac{4}{3}$. The inter-partition information loss for $IL_{S,2}(P_1, P2) = IL_{S,2}(P_2, P_3) = IL_{S,2}(P_2, P_4) = \frac{8}{3}$. The total structural information loss for the partitioning in Fig. 2(b) after being normalized is then $IL_S(\mathcal{P}) = \frac{28}{3} \times \frac{1}{18} = 0.51$. Thus, both partitions in Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) Satisfy an imprecision bound of 3 and 0 for roles R1 andR2, respectively. However, the overall global structural information loss of the partitioning in Fig. 3(a) is less than that of the partitioning in Fig. 3(b). Therefore, the partitioning in Fig. 3(a) is more preferable.

B. A Framework for Privacy-Enhanced Access Control

Fig. 4 shows a system for security improved access control component for chart information where the bolts speak to the course of data stream. The Privacy Protection Mechanism (PPM) guarantees that the security and part bound requirements are met while bringing about least information loss before the touchy information is made accessible to Access Control Mechanism (ACM). The Loss Reduction module further minimizes the data misfortune while keeping the number of parts with fulfilled limits settled. The authorizations in an access control arrangement hinge on choice predicates on the QI traits. The strategy executive indicates the permissions along with the imprecision limits for every consent/part, client to-part assignments, and part to-permission assignments. The detail of the imprecision bound ensures that the approved information has the coveted level of correctness. The imprecision bound data isn't shared with the clients since knowing the imprecision bound can result in injurious the security necessity. Access Control Enforcement previous to making the touchy information accessible to the access control module, both the engaging and basic data of the chart are anonym zed. In this manner, we have to name the get to control requirement over the anonym zed graph data. In this segment, we talk about the Relaxed and Strict access control authorization approaches (utilized by the Reference supervise in Fig. 4) over the anonym zed chart.

- **Relaxed:** Relaxed access control uses cover semantics. To empower access to all packages that covers a role/assent.
- **Strict.** Strict access control uses encased semantics to empower access to only those packages that are fully enclosed by the part/assent.

In this paper, the accentuation is on free usage. In particular, when portions including the normal data between overlapping parts, say, may contain some non shared data that is just advantaged to an individual role, say Ri. Everything considered, the degree of the advantage set Riis slightly extended, achieving free access control mechanism. We suggest for a point by point conversation of these practices.

V. HEURISTICS FOR k-BGP PROBLEM

In this portion, we display two counts based on greedy heuristics for chart anonymization with minimal information hardship under a given part/request workload with their related imprecision limits. In the essential stage, the vertices of the chart G are

partitioned recursively using akd-tree until the point when the moment that the consequent section sizes are between kand 2k. The leaf center points of the kd-tree are the portions that are mapped to super-center points in the allocated GP. The second period of the heuristics (Algorithm 3) furthermore tries to restrain the information setback by changing the vertices across P allocates the going with confinements: I) the number of part restricts satisfied in first stage isn't violated, and ii) each section satisfies the k-haziness necessity.

A. Two-Stage Heuristic 1 (TSH1)

Fig.1, Two-Stage Heuristic 1 (TSH1, for short) akes as data a graph G, an anonymity parameter k, and the set of parts R close by their related breaking points BRi and yields a distributed diagram GP. Line 1 incorporates the whole tuples space circumscribing the vertices to the candidate distribute. In Lines 3-4, we select a section having a base imprecision greater than zero and covering the confident partition. The while hover in Lines 5-8 checks for an achievable split (a split that produces divides satisfy the k-anonymity privacy need) of distributions along part between times and chooses an estimation where the imprecision of all parts is least. We select the accompanying part in the orchestrated once-over if no practicable cut is found satisfying the security essential. If none of the parts allow a package split, by then the partition is split along the center (Line 12) and is added to the applicant section set. The consequent portions are added to CP, when a feasible cut is found (Line 10). In Line a source vertex $v_a \in P_a$ is moved to an end panel $P_b \in \mathcal{P}_{kNN}(P_a)$only if the shift results in abridged information loss while preserve the k-anonymity. Constraint and the number or role bounds satisfied in the first stage. For each resource panel Pa the algorithm considers $|\mathcal{P}_{kNN}(P_a)| = 2d$different neighboring partitions as a possible destination partition Pb. A d-dimension hyper Rectangle has 2d number of (d - 1measurement faces, which is the number of adjacent neighbors. The algorithm restore the partition state to the unique state for partition Pa and its neighbors $\mathcal{P}_{kNN}(P_a)$if the new imprecision is more than the earlier partition state imprecision i.e., the new partitioning will result in extra role bound-violations. For each loop in Line 1 iterates over all the input partitions. In Lines 2-3, if the partition size is equal to k, we skip to the next partition as removing a vertex from this partition will violate the k-anonymity limitation. Line 4 compute $|\mathcal{P}_{kNN}(P_a)| = 2d$ nearest neighbors, since a hyper rectangle with dimension d has 2d adjacent neighbors. For each statement in 6-17 iterates over all $P_b \in \mathcal{P}_{kNN}(P_a)$and ovens vertices from $v_a \in P_a$ to P_b provided that results in further reduced information loss while preserving the privacy constraint. Lines 15-17 figure the new partition precision and return partition Pa and its neighbors $\mathcal{P}_{kNN}(P_a)$to their innovative state if new imprecision valuere new is more than old imprecision value RV old. Line 18updates the partition limitations of all partitions before rotating the result.

Lemma 1: The time complexity of TSH1 is $\mathcal{O}(d|\mathcal{R}|^2n^2)$.

Proof: The time complexity of the first stage of TSH1is derived by multiply the deepness of the kd-tree by theamount of work performed at each level. The height of the kd-tree in the worst case is $\frac{n}{k}$, when each division is Exactly of size k in the worst case, at each partition level, we may have to make sure all roles for a feasible cut, which leads to a $d|\mathcal{R}|^2n$complexity. Thus, the time complexity of the

Algorithm 1: TSH1

Input: $\mathcal{G} = \langle V, E, \mathcal{T} \rangle$, k, $\mathcal{R}$, and B^{R_j}
Output: $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P} = \langle V_\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}, E_\mathcal{P}, \overline{\mathcal{T}} \rangle$

$\mathcal{CP} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(V)$); /* Initialize the set of Candidate Partitions. */
foreach $CP_i \in \mathcal{CP}$ **do**
  Find the set RO of roles that overlap CP_i such that $I_{CP_i}^{RO_j} > 0$;
  Sort roles RO in increasing order of B^{R_j};
  while *the feasible cut is not found* **do**
    Select role from RO;
    Create role cuts in each dimension;
    Select dimension and cut having least overall imprecision for all roles in $\mathcal{R}$;
  if *Feasible cut found* **then**
    Create new partitions and add to $\mathcal{CP}$;
  else
    Split CP_i recursively along the median till the anonymity requirement is satisfied ;
    Compact new partitions and add to $\mathcal{P}$;
$\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P}$ = ConstraintRepartitioning($\mathcal{G}$, $\mathcal{P}$);
return $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P}$.

Algorithm 2: TSH2: A Scalable Approach

Input: $\mathcal{G} = \langle V, E, \mathcal{T} \rangle$, k, $\mathcal{R}$, B^{R_j}
Output: $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P} = \langle V_\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P}, E_\mathcal{P}, \overline{\mathcal{T}} \rangle$

$\mathcal{CP} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(V)$); /* Initialize the set of Candidate Partitions. */
foreach $CP_i \in \mathcal{CP}$ **do**
  // Depth-first (preorder) traversal
  Find the set of roles RO that overlap CP_i such that $I_{CP_i}^{RO_j} > 0$;
  Select role from RO with smallest B^{R_j};
  Create role cuts in each dimension;
  Reject cuts with skewed partitions;
  Select the dimension and the cut having the least overall imprecision for all roles in $\mathcal{R}$;
  if *Feasible cut found* **then**
    Create new partitions and add to $\mathcal{CP}$;
  else
    Split CP_i recursively along the median till anonymity requirement is satisfied ;
    Compact new partitions and add to $\mathcal{P}$;
    Update B^{R_j} according to $I^{R_j}, \forall R_j \in \mathcal{R}$
$\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P}$ = ConstraintRepartitioning($\mathcal{G}$, $\mathcal{P}$);
return $\mathcal{G}_\mathcal{P}$.

B. Two-Stage Heuristic 2 (TSH2): A Scalable Approach

In the Two-Stage Heuristic 2 algorithm (TSH2, for short), we modify TSH1 so that time complexity of $\mathcal{O}(d|\mathcal{R}|n \log n)$ can be achieved in contrast to the $\mathcal{O}(d|\mathcal{R}|^2 n^2)$ time complexity for TSH1. Because the complexity is sub quadratic inner work size n and digit of roles R, the TSH2 algorithm provide a scalable move toward. This heuristic only consider role with the lowest imprecision-bound to check the role cuts for a given Partition, say Pi, and updates the role limitations as the panels are added to the output. The update is passed out by subtracting the imprecision $I_{CP_i}^{RO_j} > 0$ from the indistinctness bound BRj of each role, for a Partition, sayPi. For example, if a partition of size k has imprecision and 15 for roles R1 and R2 with imprecision bound $B^{R1} = 70$ and $B^{R2} = 90$, then the limits are modernized to

Algorithm 3: ConstraintRepartitioning

Input: $\mathcal{G} = \langle V, E, \mathcal{T} \rangle, \mathcal{P}$
Output: $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{P}} = \langle V_{\mathcal{P}} = \mathcal{P}, E_{\mathcal{P}}, \overline{\mathcal{T}} \rangle$

```
foreach P_a ∈ P do
    if |P_a| = k then
        continue;
    Compute P_kNN(P_a); /* Determine k
        closest partitions.                    */
    rv_old = RoleBoundViolations(P_kNN(P_a), R);
        /* Compute the number of role
        bound-violations                       */
    foreach |P_b| ∈ P_kNN(P_a) do
        if |P_b| = k then
            continue;
        else
            ∀v_a ∈ P_a compute the difference between
              the information loss, Δ_IL(P)^{v_a:a→b}, if v_n would
              move from P_a to P_b;
            Let P_c be the partition for which Δ_IL(P)^{v_a:a→b} is
              minimal;
            /* Check privacy constraint.   */
            if |P_c| + 1 < 2k then
                Move v_n from P_a to P_c;
    rv_new = RoleBoundViolations(P_kNN(P_a), R);
    if rv_new > rv_old then
        Restore P_kNN(P_a);
Update the partition boundaries ∀P_a ∈ P;
return G_P.
```

Algorithm 4: RoleBoundViolations

Input: $\mathcal{P}_{kNN}, \mathcal{R}$
Output: I_{new}

```
I_new = 0;
foreach r ∈ R do
    foreach p ∈ P_kNN do
        I_new = I_new + I_p^r; /* Compute
            imprecision of overlapping roles
            and partitions.                    */
return I_new.
```

VI. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS

This segment assesses the proposed system (Fig. 4) for framework outline execution and security analysis perspective. Area 6.1 presents execution assessment for the proposed heuristics regarding meeting the desired access control and security necessities with minimum information misfortune. Segment 6.2 gives security investigation of the proposed system from an assault point of view.

A. Performance Evaluation

This segment exhibits a relative appraisal of the overall execution assessment of the proposed heuristicsTSH1 and TSH2 as far as fulfilling access control and privacy necessities and bringing about least information loss. Experiments have been directed on a 2:4 GHz Intel Core i5 with 8 GB of 1600 MHz DDR3 SDRAM running Mac OS X working framework. The sum total of what calculations has been executed utilizing Java 1:7.We present two unique arrangements of exploratory outcomes. In the primary set (Section 6.1.3), we think about the impact of namelessness parameter k on the quantity of part bound-infringement, which is an entrance control requirement. In the second arrangement of trial comes about (Section 6.1.4), we investigation the adjustments in data misfortune esteem due to parameter k.

Role Workload Generation: We generate 50, 80, and 500 roles as the workload/permissions for the ego-Facebook, p2p-Gnutella04, and com-YouTube datasets, in that order. The roles are generated according to the come near of [25], which selects two feature tuples. Haphazardly from the trait tuples space and structures a part by influencing a bouncing to box of two tuples. The created part workload might be covered. A profoundly covered workload implies all the more sharing between parts, which imply less information affectability and the other way around. We can further classify this workload into three classes: low-cover (LO), medium-cover (MO), and high-cover (HO) and study the impact of level of cover between workloads on the proposed

heuristics. On the off chance that the cover is between 10-20%, we think about this as LO; if the cover is between 40-half, we consider this as MO; and also, for a cover in the extend 80-90%, we characterize this as HO. The normal part estimate for the 50 parts under LO, MO, and HO is 81, 124, and 145, individually. Additionally, for 80 parts, the comparing parts sizes for LO, MO, and HO workload are 153, 201, and 263, individually.



Fig.5. Effect of BR on the % of role bound-violations fork = 5.



Fig.6. Effect of k on the # of role bound-violations for BR =20%.



Fig.7. Effect of k on role imprecision SD.



Fig.8. Effect of k on the # of role bound-violations for BR =20% and R = 500.

TSH1 for all different datasets and role workloads as Fig.5, Fig. 6, and Fig.7. In contrast to TSH1 (where we consider all role overlap given applicant partition to find a feasible cut TSH2 has a lower computational complexity compared to TSH1. More specially, only one single attribute, in its place of manifold attributes obtainable in QI set, is used to split a partition. This causes the rest of the attributes in QI set to retain their least specific values, and thus causes a high price for those values [27]. Secondly, according to reasoning in [16], Algorithm TSH1 (having the higher computational complexity) has the lower overall information

loss value due to anonymization between the two proposed heuristics.TSH1 considers all the roles overlapping a given partition to determine a feasible cut with the least imprecision bound; thus, the technique does not aim to obtain a uniform occupancy, incurring a low information loss, when the data is skewed as shown in Figs.8 and 10.



Fig.9. Effect of k on information loss for ego-Face book And jRj = 50.



Fig.10. Effect of k on information loss for P2PNutella and |R| = 80.

Secondly, as explained in Infringement and data misfortune. The execution hole between the two proposed heuristics, regarding information loss, is between 5-15% for various workloads with varying degrees of cover.



Fig.11. Effect of k on information loss for com-YouTubeand |R|= 500.



Fig.12. Effect of k on data utility.

Table 4 compresses the comparison between the proposed heuristics. In Fig.11, we plot the information utility outcomes as we vary the estimation of parameter k. The estimation of US is more noteworthy than 0:9 for all different cases. In addition, the estimation of UD is much lower than the value of US, which implies data misfortune because of attribute generalization is higher than structure speculation as shown in Fig.12.

TABLE IV: Comparison of Proposed Heuristics

Heuristic	Role violation	Complexity	Information Loss
TSH1	High	$\mathcal{O}(d\|\mathcal{R}\|^2n^2)$	Low
TSH2	Low	$\mathcal{O}(d\|\mathcal{R}\|n\log n)$	High

Guidelines To Set Bounds For Information Loss And Role Violations: For anonymized distributed information available to an individual part, a casual arrangement permits extra unapproved information accesses past a part benefit set. This extra data is called role imprecision. As an outline necessity, the part imprecision needs to be shortened by presenting imprecision-bounds for parts. In spite of the way that part imprecision isn't alluring, the major advantage is that casual approach achieves an expansion in the utility of anonymize information (i.e., decreased information loss).The diminished normal size of partitions subsequently prompts decrease in data misfortune. Inessence, for a given part, say Ri, expanding the imprecision bound increases information utility. In any case, the drawback of an increment in the imprecision-bound is to increment unauthorized accesses and essentially abrogate the objectives of the underlying approval instrument. Correspondingly, a huge k value guarantees solid k-namelessness protection, yet yields low data utility and the other way around. Consequently, an adjust between unauthorized gets to and information utility must be maintained. The challenge is whether information utility detail is compatible with the unapproved gets to, which is addressed in this paper.

B. Security Analysis

Let QS and QA be the adversary A's structure- and attribute-based queries that can be applied separately or In the following cascaded order: $Q_A(\hat{Q_S})/Q_S(\hat{Q_A})$.We assume that the adversary A's background attribute knowledge $\{B_1,\ldots,B_\ell\} \subseteq \{A_1,\ldots,A_d\}$ forms a subspace with volume $\prod_{i=1}^{\ell}|B_i^{max}-B_i^{min}|\times\prod_{j=1}^{(d-\ell)}|A_j^{max}-A_j^{min}|$ in the-dimensional data space with total volume $\prod_{j=1}^{d}|A_j^{max}-A_j^{min}|$.

De-anonymization Attack under an Access Control Policy: Our access control mechanism does not allow an adversary A with an assigned role, say RA, to access data beyond his authorized privilege set as specified by RBAC policy administrator. This is because the scope of adversary A's attack is assumed to be confined to an authorized dataset. The following theorem describes the chance of successful re-identification of a target node x, $Pr(\hat{\texttt{Re-id(x)}})$in the anonymized published graph GP, by applying cascaded queries $Q_A(Q_S)/Q_S(Q_A)$. Let $Pr_{Q_A(Q_S)}(y)$and $Pr_{Q_S(Q_A)}(y)$ be the probabilities of $y \in cand(x)$ being a feasible candidate partition for node x determined by applying the cascaded queries $Q_A(Q_S)$ and $Q_S(Q_A)$.

Theorem 2 (Re-identification risk): Assume that the adversary A has some graph structural and vertex attribute information as background knowledge for reidentification of a target node x in anonymized graph GP. Then, the probability of successfully re-identifying a target node x by applying the cascaded queries as shown in Figs.13 and 14.



Fig.13. (a) the effect of QA = {[0-32], [0-0], [0-2], [0-3], [0-333], [0-32], [0-4], [0-331]} **onPr (Re-id(x)). (b) The effect of % increase in query** $Q_A = \{A_1, A_6\}$ **dimension on Pr (Re-id(x).**



Fig.14. (a) $Pr(\texttt{Re-id(x)})$ vs query $Q_A(Q_S)$ for $k = 7$; (b) $Pr(\texttt{Re-id(x)})$ vs query $Q_S(Q_A)$ for $k = 7$; (c) $Pr(\texttt{Re-id(x)})$ vs query $Q_A(Q_S)$ for $k = 9$; (d) $Pr(\texttt{Re-id(x)})$ vs query $Q_S(Q_A)$ for $k = 9$.

$$Q_A(Q_S)/Q_S(Q_A) \tag{9}$$

Is given as:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\texttt{Re-id(x)}) &\leq Pr(x \in y) \times Pr(y \in cand(x)) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{k} \times \max\left\{Pr_{Q_A(Q_S)}(y), Pr_{Q_S(Q_A)}(y)\right\}, \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

Where $Pr_{Q_A(Q_S)}(y) = \frac{1}{|cand_{Q_S}(x)| \times \prod_{j=1}^{d} \min\left(1, \frac{S_j + B_j}{A_j}\right)}$ and $Pr_{Q_S(Q_A)}(y) = \frac{1}{|cand_{Q_S}(z)|}, z \in cand_{Q_A}(x)$.

VII. RELATED WORK

In spite of the fact that various chart anonymization plans have been proposed for securing clients' protection in published graph information they verifiably expect that there is no approval component set up for controlling access to shared diagram information by gatherings of clients. The focal point of this research is the advancement of a coordinated system for ensuring security within the sight of a concentrated authorization mechanism. XACCESS presents a mechanized RBAC arrangement specification mechanism to catch the certain protection preference of social site clients. Semantically interpretable functional "social parts" are removed from static system structure based on recognized social parts, secrecy setting of personal information,

and predefined client authorization assignments. The objective is to take a dataset and to distribute it one time in an anonymized way (i.e., safeguard security in some route) without making any presumption about potential users of that information. When information is distributed, anything can be done to it. DP, then again, is more appropriate for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) in light of the fact that the query that should be addressed must be known before the privacy-safeguarding process is connected. In information publishing, anonymized information is made freely accessible, while in differential privacy, database is • not made openly available and the information overseer answers the inquiries in a privacy preserving manner. DP is suitable for PPDM; however it is still an open question on the off chance that it can essentially bolster PPDP. Models of Syntactic Anonymity (SA, for example, k-anonymity are practical answers for PPDP.

Module Description: Access Control Administrator: The administrator verifies the received data from each client login and Converts each data into graph view data after graph view the administrator analysis and separates each data using k-anonymous Bi-objective Graph Partitioning technique. Where each graph data's are separated from other client graphs data.

Graph Data Access: The analyzed data`s are passed to the client for graph data access authentication where only authorized client can accessed their data. The client enables and disables the graph data which are further viewed in social interaction and also prevents adversary attack for client data.

Heuristic Analysis: The verified graph data are further send to social interaction site where Enabled data are displayed for further heuristic analysis of graph data.

VIII. RESULTS

Results of this paper is as sown in bellow Figs.15 to 26.

Fig.15. Homepage.

Fig.16. Registration page.

Fig.17. Login page.

Fig.18. User Details.



Fig.19. Previous data management.



Fig.20. Graph.

Fig.21. Update data management.



Fig.22. Original graph.

Fig.23. Admin.



Fig.24. Graph view.

Fig.25. User graph data.



Fig.26. Data shown.

IX. CONCLUSION

This paper presents an integrated framework for ensuring users' privacy in the presence of an authorization mechanism. Accesscontrolmechanismsdeliveradditionalsafeguardsagainst$databreaches and certify that merely authorized information is

existing to end-users based on their assigned roles. Heuristics solutions $ are settled to solve the constraint problem. The proposed heuristics are empirically evaluated with a benchmark algorithm from design perspective in terms of meeting the privacy and access control requirements with minimum information loss. An important observation in the analysis is that the probability of re-identification depends on the adversary A's attack sequence. In this, it will show the updated graph and the previous graph.

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