Review of Migration and Its Impact (Study Area Afghanistan)

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Migration is a continuous process that has been the subject of political debate worldwide. Migration has shown an unbroken upward trend, be it of people who have left their homelands voluntarily for economic or other reasons, or of those who have been forced to leave their homes (refugees, displaced persons, etc.).Human migration patterns are of interest to scientists representing many fields. Theories have been posited to explain modern human evolutionary expansion, the diversity of human culture, and the motivational factors underlying an individual or group decision to migrate. Although the research question and subsequent approach may vary between disciplines, one thread is ubiquitous throughout most migration studies: why do humans migrate and what is the result of such an event? While the determination of individual attributes such as age, sex, and ancestry is often integral to migration studies, the positive identification of human remains is usually irrelevant. However, the positive identification of a deceased is paramount to a forensic investigation in which human remains have been recovered and must be identified. What role, if any, might the study of human movement patterns play in the interpretation of evidence associated with unidentified human remains? Due to increasing global mobility in the world's populations, it is not inconceivable that an individual might die far away from his or her home. If positive identification cannot immediately be made, investigators may consider various theories as to how or why a deceased ended up in a particular geographic location. While scientific evidence influences the direction of forensic investigations, qualitative evaluation can be an important component of evidence interpretation

Managing human mobility is one of the greatest challenges for destination countries worldwide, in developed and developing countries. This is further exacerbated in cities where migrants typically seek a better quality of life. The causes and routes of migration flows for different types of migration are difficult to distinguish, posing difficulties for governments. With refugees protected by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and voluntary migrants admitted into destination labour markets through the sovereign decision of host countries, governments need to plan for different types of migrants accordingly.

Decades of conflict and the search for better economic opportunities have pushed millions of Afghans into neighboring Pakistan and Iran. While an estimated 2.5 million Afghans are registered refugees, a possibly equal number of Afghans live in Pakistan and Iran without legal refugee status. These undocumented Afghans face numerous protection challenges both in their host country and upon their return to Afghanistan either voluntarily ("spontaneous return") or through deportation.

Keywords— Afghanistan, Human Migration ,History, geography, Factors

Research Questions

1. What are the factors of migration in Afghanistan?
2. How do geographical factors affect the migration process?
3. How does population growth and poverty affect the increase in the migration process?

INTRODUCTION

Migration is an expression of the human aspiration for dignity, safety and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family(World Economic Forum 2017). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a migrant is 'any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/ her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is', a broad definition indeed. Under such definition, and strictly limiting our analysis to south-to-north migrants, two major broad categories may be identified: (a) Labour (or economic) migrants (and family reunification) and (b) Forced migrants (asylum seekers and refugees); whose reasons to migrate may differ, even if difference between the two categories are probably smaller that estimated once and the same migrating individual may fall in one or the other category at the same time.5 In this respect, it is useful to report below the synthetic definitions of asylum seekers and refugees from IOM(Adjami, M., 2018).

Migration is a truly global phenomenon, with movements both within nations and internationally across borders. The world has an estimated 244 million international migrants (UN DESA, 2016) and 763 million internal migrants (UN DESA, 2013). In other words, migrants make up more than 1 billion people, or one-seventh of the world's population. Population diversity in most developed countries can be attributed to international migration, whereas in developing nations it is mostly internal migration that contributes to this diversity. Migration to "global cities" – those that are advanced producers of services, have large economies, are international gateways, and are political and cultural hubs of international significance – is increasing, with migrants equalling over a third of the population in, for example, Sydney, London and New York, and more than half in Dubai and Brussels. Different

factors are at play for different cities. Dubai, for instance, has a transient population due to its restrictions on immigrants becoming citizens whereas, in Brussels, migration is more permanent, with its vast community of European nationals working for the European institutions. (Migration and Its Impact on Cities, 2016)

In most discussions on migration, the starting point is usually numbers. Understanding changes in scale, emerging trends and shifting demographics related to global social and economic transformations, such as migration, help us make sense of the changing world we live in and plan for the future. The current global estimate is that there were around 272 million international migrants in the world in 2019, which equates to 3.5 per cent of the global population.1 A first important point to note is that this is a very small minority of the world's population, meaning that staying within one's country of birth overwhelmingly remains the norm. The great majority of people do not migrate across borders; much larger numbers migrate within countries (an estimated 740 million internal migrants in 2009).2 That said, the increase in international migrants has been evident over time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a slightly faster rate than previously anticipated.3 The overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and study – involving migration processes that largely occur without fundamentally challenging either migrants or the countries they enter. In contrast, other people leave their homes and countries for a range of compelling and sometimes tragic reasons, such as conflict, persecution and disaster. While those who have been displaced, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), comprise a relatively small percentage of all migrants, they are often the most in need of assistance and support. This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview of information on migration and migrants. The chapter draws upon current statistical sources compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).4 The chapter provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and missing migrants – as well as of stateless persons and remittances.(Migration and migrants: A global overview 2018).

The World Migration Report series

The first World Migration Report was published 20 years ago, initially as a one-off report designed to increase the understanding of migration by policymakers and the general public. It was conceived at a time when the effects of globalization were being felt in many parts of the world and in a multitude of ways. Indeed, the first World Migration Report states that part of its genesis was due to the effects of globalization on migration patterns, and that the report therefore "looks at the increasingly global economy which has led to an unprecedented influx of newcomers in many countries…".29 The report highlighted the fact that, despite being an "age-old phenomenon", migration was accelerating as part of broader globalization transformations of economic and trade processes, which were enabling greater movement of labour as well as goods and capital. Table 1 below provides a summary of key statistics reported in the World Migration Report 2000, as compared to this current edition. It shows that while some aspects have stayed fairly constant – the proportion of female international migrants as well as the overall proportion of the world's population who were migrants – other aspects have changed dramatically. International remittances, for example, have grown from an estimated 126 billion in 2000 to 689 billion in 2020, underscoring the salience of international migration as a driver of development. This helps to partly explain the emergence of migration as a first-tier global issue that has seen United Nations Member States take a series of steps to strengthen global governance of migration, most notably since 2000 (see chapter 11 of this report for discussion). It is unsurprising then that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) itself has grown in size, with a significant increase in membership over the last two decades up from 76 to its current membership of 173 States. Also of note in table 1 is the rise in international migrants globally (up around 85%) as well as of refugees (up around 80%) and internally displaced (up around 97%); all the while remaining very small proportions of the world's population.

World Migration Report 2020

This edition, heralding the twentieth anniversary of the World Migration Report series, builds on the previous report, the 2018 edition, by providing updated migration statistics at the global and regional levels as well as descriptive analysis of complex migration issues. Part I, on "key data and information on migration and migrants", includes separate chapters on global migration trends and patterns; regional dimensions and developments; and a discussion of recent contributions to migration research and analysis by academia and a wide range of different organizations, including IOM. These three chapters have been produced institutionally by IOM, drawing primarily on analyses by IOM experts, practitioners and officials around the world based on data from a wide range of relevant organizations. The seven chapters in Part II are authored by applied and academic researchers working on migration. They cover a range of "complex and emerging migration issues" including: • migrants' contributions to societies; • migration, inclusion and social cohesion; • migration and health; • children and unsafe migration; • migration and adaptation to environmental change; • migrants caught in crises; and • recent developments in global migration governance. While the choice of these topics is necessarily selective and subjective, all the chapters in Part II of this report are directly relevant to some of the most prominent and important debates about migration in the world today. Many of these topics lie at the heart of the conundrums that face policymakers as they seek to formulate effective, proportionate and constructive responses to complex public policy issues related to migration. Accordingly, the chapters aim to inform current and future policy deliberations and discussions by providing a clear identification of the key issues, a critical overview of relevant research and analysis, and a discussion of the implications for future research and policymaking. The chapters are not meant to be prescriptive, in the sense of advocating particular policy "solutions" – especially as the immediate context is an important determinant of policy settings – but informative and helpful to what can be highly contested debates.

Part I Chapter 2 provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and stateless persons – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter refers to the existing body of IOM programmatic data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement, displacement tracking and human trafficking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant IOM programming and operations globally.

Reasons for Migrating

• Most people migrate for economic reasons.
 • Cultural and environmental factors also induce migration, although not as frequently as economic factors.

People decide to migrate because of push factors and pull factors. A push factor induces people to move out of their present location, whereas a pull factor induces people to move into a new location. As migration for most people is a major step not taken lightly, both push and pull factors typically play a role. To migrate, people view their current place of residence so negatively that they feel pushed away, and they view another place so attractively that they feel pulled toward it. We can identify three major kinds of push and pull factors: economic, cultural, and environmental. Usually, one of the three factors emerges as most important, although as will be discussed later in this chapter, ranking the relative importance of the three factors can be difficult and even controversial.

Economic Push and Pull Factors

Most people migrate for economic reasons. People think about emigrating from places that have few job opportunities, and they immigrate to places where jobs seem to be available. Because of economic restructuring, job prospects often vary from one country to another and within regions of the same country.

The United States and Canada have been especially prominent destinations for economic migrants (Figure 3-1). Many European immigrants to North America in the nineteenth century truly expected to find streets paved with gold. While not literally so gilded, the United States and Canada did offer Europeans prospects for economic advancement. This same perception of economic plenty now lures people to the United States and Canada from Latin America and Asia.

Cultural Push and Pull Factors

Cultural factors can be especially compelling push factors, forcing people to emigrate from a country. Forced international migration has historically occurred for two main cultural reasons: slavery and political instability. Millions of people were shipped to other countries as slaves or as prisoners, especially from Africa to the Western Hemisphere, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (see Chapter 7). Large groups of people are no longer forced to migrate as slaves, but forced international migration persists because of political instability resulting from cultural diversity. According to the United Nations, refugees are people who have been forced to migrate from their homes and cannot return for fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion. The U.S. Committee for Refugees, a nonprofit organization independent of the U.S. government (www.refugees.org), counted 14 million refugees in 2007 (Figure 3-2). Refugees have no home until another country agrees to allow them in, or improving conditions make possible a return to their former home. In the interim, they must camp out in tents, board in shelters, or lie down by the side of a road. Political conditions can also operate as pull factors. People may be attracted to democratic countries that encourage individual choice in education, career, and place of residence. After Communists gained control of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, many people in that region were pulled toward the democracies in Western Europe and North America. Communist governments in Eastern Europe clamped down on emigration for fear of losing their most able workers. The most dramatic symbol of restricted emigration was the Berlin Wall, which the Communists built to prevent emigration from Communist-controlled East Berlin into democratic West Berlin. With the election of democratic governments in Eastern Europe during the 1990s, Western Europe's political pull disappeared as a migration factor. Eastern Europeans now can visit where they wish, although few have the money to pay for travel-related expenses beyond a round-trip bus ticket. However, Western Europe pulls an increasing number of migrants from Eastern Europe for economic reasons, (Bauder, Harald,2006).

Environmental Push and Pull Factors

People also migrate for environmental reasons, pulled toward physically attractive regions and pushed from hazardous ones. In an age of improved communications and transportation systems, people can live in environmentally attractive areas that are relatively remote and still not feel too isolated from employment, shopping, and entertainment opportunities. Attractive environments for migrants include mountains, seasides, and warm climates. Proximity to the Rocky Mountains lures Americans to the state of Colorado, and the Alps pull French people to eastern France. Some migrants are shocked to find polluted air and congestion in these areas. The southern coast of England, the Mediterranean coast of France, and the coasts of Florida attract migrants, especially retirees, who enjoy swimming and lying on the beach. Of all elderly people who migrate from one U.S. state to another, one-third select Florida as their destination. Regions with warm winters, such as southern Spain and the southweste(The Cultural Landscape, 2018)

International migrants: numbers and trends

UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.6 The United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration defines an "international migrant" as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between "short-term migrants" (those who have changed their countries of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and "long-term migrants" (those who have done so for at least one year). However, not all countries use this definition in practice.7 Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants by, for example, applying different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions, as well as data collection methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants. Overall, the

estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past five decades. The total estimated 272 million people living in a country other than their countries of birth in 2019 was 119 million more than in 1990 (when it was 153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million; see table 1). While the proportion of international migrants globally has also increased over this period, it is evident that the vast majority of people continue to live in the countries in which they were born (world migration report 2020).

Year	Number of migrants	Migrants as a % of the world's population
1970	84,460,125	2.3%
1975	90,368,010	2.2%
1980	101,983,149	2.3%
1985	113,206,691	2.3%
1990	153,011,473	2.9%
1995	161,316,895	2.8%
2000	173,588,441	2.8%
2005	191,615,574	2.9%
2010	220,781,909	3.2%
2015	248,861,296	3.4%
2019	271,642,105	3.5%

Source: UN DESA, 2008, 2019a, 2019b.

Note: The number of entities (such as States, territories and administrative regions) for which data were made available in the 2019 UN DESA *Revision of International Migrant Stock* was 232. In 1970, the number of entities was 135.


Figure 1: International migration, working age, and increased of population of migration from 1995 -2019.

In 2019, Europe and Asia each hosted around 82 million and 84 million international migrants, respectively – comprising 61 per cent of the total global international migrant stock combined (see figure 1). These regions were followed by North America, with almost 59 million international migrants in 2019 or 22 per cent of the global migrant stock, Africa at 10 per cent, Latin America and the Caribbean at 4 per cent, and Oceania at 3 per cent. When compared with the size of the population in each region, shares of international migrants in 2019 were highest in Oceania, North America and Europe, where international migrants represented, respectively, 21 per cent, 16 per cent and 11 per cent of the total population.8 In comparison, the share of international migrants is relatively small in Asia and Africa (1.8% and 2%, respectively) and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8%). However, Asia experienced the most remarkable growth from 2000 to 2019, at 69 per cent (around 34 million people in absolute terms).9 Europe experienced the second largest growth during this period, with an increase of 25 million international migrants, followed by an increase of 18 million international migrants in North America and 11 million in Africa(world migration report 2020).

World Migrations

Figure 2: world migration, Historical map.

The increase in international migration in some regions over time has had an impact on population change. Figure 2 shows the proportional population change for each of the world's six regions from 2009 to 2019. While Europe has traditionally been one of the major destination regions for international migrants, it has had the slowest rate of proportional population change over this period, at slightly over 1 per cent. However, the rate would arguably be much lower without international migrants who have mitigated decreasing populations in some European countries due, for example, to declining birth rates.11 By comparison, Africa underwent the most significant change, with its population growing by nearly 30 per cent over this period, due to high fertility rates and increasing lifespans[1]. This growth has nevertheless been softened by emigration from Africa to other regions(CSIS, 2019)

Migrant workers

The latest available estimates indicate that there were roughly 164 million migrant workers around the world in 2017, accounting for nearly two thirds (64%) of the (then) 258 million global stock of international migrants.27 When compared with the global population of international migrants of working age – regarded as 15 years of age or older (234 million) – migrant workers account for 70 per cent. For a range of reasons, however, these global figures are likely to be underestimates.28 While earlier global estimates of migrant workers have been produced, ILO notes that these cannot be compared with 2017 figures, due to definitional differences and changes in methodology and data sources. In 2017, 68 per cent of migrant workers were residing in high-income level countries – an estimated 111 million people. An additional 47 million migrant workers (29%) were living in middle-income countries, and 5.6 million (3.4%) were in low-income countries. While we are unable to compare the numbers of migrant workers over time, it is useful to examine changes in proportional distribution. In 2017, for example, there was a noticeable change in destination country category; that is, from 2013 to 2017, high-income countries experienced a 7 percentage point drop in migrant workers (from 75% to 68%), while upper-middle-income countries observed a 7 percentage point increase (from 12% to 19%). This apparent shift may be influenced by economic growth in middle-income countries and/or changes to labour immigration regulations in high-income countries. The share of migrant workers in the total workforce across country income groups was quite small in low-income (1.9%), lower-income (1.4%) and upper-middle-income countries (2.2%), but much greater for high-income countries (18.5%).

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[1] : 12 UN DESA, 2019c. See chapter 3 of this report (figure 2) showing countries with the largest proportional population change in Africa.

Figure 3: Migrant workers by destination country income level, 2013 and 2017

Refugees and asylum seekers

UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2018, those under 18 years of age constituted roughly 52 per cent of the global refugee population. From 2003 to 2018, according to available disaggregated data, the proportion of children among stocks of refugees was very high, fluctuating between 41 and 52 per cent. The proportion of females has remained relatively stable, at 47 to 49 per cent, over the same period. Consistent with broader global dynamics, refugees continued to be primarily based in urban settings, with about 61 per cent of refugees located in urban areas at the end of 2018.

Unaccompanied and separated children lodged an estimated 27,600 individual asylum applications in at least 60 countries in 2018, marking a continued declining trend since the exceptionally high number of applications in 2015 (98,400) As in other years, unresolved or renewed conflict dynamics in key countries contributed significantly to current figures and trends. Of the refugees under UNHCR's mandate at the end of 2018, the top 10 countries of origin – the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Eritrea and Burundi – accounted for roughly 16.6 million, or 82 per cent of the total refugee population. Many of these countries have been among the top sources of refugees for at least seven years. The ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic saw the number of refugees from that country reach approximately 6.7 million. The instability and violence that have made Afghanistan a major source of refugees for over 30 years have continued, with the country being the second largest origin country in the world, with 2.7 million refugees; this is a slight increase from 2017 figures (2.6 million), largely due to births during that year. South Sudan remained the third largest origin country of refugees since large-scale violence erupted in the middle of 2016, with 2.3 million at the end of 2018. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia comprised over two thirds of the world refugee population. Figure 8 shows the trends in refugee numbers for the top five countries of origin from 2005 to 2018. The impact of the Syrian conflict is clearly illustrated in figure 8; in 2010, the Syrian Arab Republic was a source country for fewer than 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers, whereas it was the third largest host country in the world, with more than 1 million refugees mainly originating from Iraq[2].((IOM,2018)


Figure 4:Number of refugees by top 5 countries of origin as of 2018 (millions)

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[2] : UNHCR, 2010.

In 2018, for the fifth consecutive year, Turkey was the largest host country in the world, with 3.7 million refugees, mainly Syrians (over 3.6 million). Reflecting the significant share of Syrians in the global refugee population, two other bordering countries – Jordan and Lebanon – also featured among the top 10. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts of refugees from Afghanistan, the second largest origin country. Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Bangladesh and Ethiopia comprised the rest. The vast majority of refugees were hosted in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR, the least developed countries – such as Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen – hosted 33 per cent of the global total (6.7 million refugees). It is only when refugees are measured against national populations that high-income countries, such as Sweden (seventh) and Malta (ninth), rank among the top 10. Figure 9 shows trends in refugee numbers for the top five host countries from 2000 to 2018.

the world's top 20 countries with the largest number of IDPs displaced due to conflict and violence (stock) at the end of 2018. Most countries were either in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced due to conflict (6.1 million) by the end of 2018, followed by Colombia (5.8 million). The Democratic Republic of the Congo had the third largest number with 3.1 million, followed by Somalia (2.6 million) and Afghanistan (2.6 million). Over 30 million (nearly 75%) of the global total of 41.3 million people displaced live in just 10 countries In terms of proportion of national population, the Syrian Arab Republic, whose conflict has dragged on for several years, had over 30 per cent of its population displaced due to conflict and violence. Somalia had the second highest proportion (18%), followed by the Central African Republic and Colombia (with both over 10%). It is important to note, however, that especially for protracted displacement cases, such as in Colombia, some people who have returned to their places of origin and to their homes may still be counted as internally displaced. This is because, in some cases, a durable solution has not been achieved.45 Organizations such as IDMC follow the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's framework on "Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons", which stipulates eight criteria that constitute a durable solution in determining when people should no longer be considered internally displaced.


Figure 5: Top 20 countries with the largest stock of internally displaced persons

Internally displaced persons

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) compiles data on two types of internal displacement: new displacements during a given period, and the total stock of IDPs at a given point in time. This statistical information is categorized by two broad displacement causes: (a) disasters, and (b) conflict and violence. However, IDMC acknowledges the challenges associated with distinguishing between disasters and conflict as the immediate cause of displacement, and highlights the growing need to identify better ways to report on displacement in the context of multiple drivers With an estimated 41.3 million, the total global stock of people internally displaced by conflict and violence at the end of 2018 was the highest on record since IDMC began monitoring in 1998, and represents an increase from the 40 million reported in 2017. As with trends for refugees (discussed in the previous section), intractable and new conflicts have meant that the total number of persons internally displaced by conflict and violence has almost doubled since 2000, and has risen sharply since 2010.

Migration Before 1979

Mobility has been an essential part of Afghan history. Records show that Afghans have been migrating to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan for centuries. In the 1850s, thousands of Hazara households migrated to the Islamic Republic of Iran to flee natural disasters and other crises. Between 1880 and 1903, another 15,000 Afghan families are known to have settled in the area of Torbat-e Jam, in the east of Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005). Afghanistan has been a low-income country throughout the past century. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, industrialization remained negligible and the Afghan population faced insufficient employment opportunities. As a result, the oil boom in 1973 attracted many Afghan labour migrants to Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and other Middle Eastern countries (Kronenfeld, 2008). When increasing numbers of Pashtun workers from Pakistan migrated to the oil-rich Gulf States, this provided opportunities for Afghans to take up the jobs becoming available in Pakistan (International Crisis Group, 2009). In addition, relatively high wages in the Islamic Republic of Iran and rising government taxes in Afghanistan at that time were decisive factors for Afghans seeking work abroad. As a consequence of this several hundred thousand Afghan migrant labourers were present in the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Stigter, 2006). During the oil boom, Afghans migrated to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan legally and were welcomed by both governments who benefited from the cheap labour force. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghans worked in construction, in brick factories and on farms and received much lower wages than Iranians (Ashrafi and Moghissi, 2002).

First Migration Wave: Soviet Invasion (1979)

The first large wave of outmigration from Afghanistan was caused by the Soviet invasion in 1979. In the 10 years that followed, the resistant mujahedeen fought against the Soviet forces causing large-scale emigration flows throughout the decade (Stigter, 2006). Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were the main destination countries of these Afghan refugees due to their geographic proximity as well as similarities in language, culture and religion (Ashrafi and Moghissi, 2002). The majority of refugees originated from rural areas and tried to escape bombing and combat (Monsutti, 2006). Between 1979 and 1989, about 2.6 million Afghans crossed the border to the Islamic Republic of Iran. At that time, the Iranian government welcomed their Afghan neighbours and handed out "blue cards" which provided Afghan refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran access to education, healthcare and food. It also granted them permission to engage in low-wage labour. Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran at that time were called mohajerin, which means involuntary religious migrant. It was seen as the duty of Iranian citizens to provide help to their religious brothers and sisters. Of the 2.6 million Afghans that came to the Islamic Republic of Iran during the Soviet occupation, only 5 to 10 per cent lived in refugee camps, while most settled in rural and urban areas in the eastern part of the country (AbbasiShavazi et al., 2005). The Soviet occupation in 1979 also triggered a mass movement of Afghans across the border to Pakistan. Over 1.5 million Afghans are known to have crossed this border between 1979 and 1980 (Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, 2005). The large numbers can mainly be explained by the strong cross-border ties among Pashtun tribes in the south and east of Afghanistan that fled to their tribal kin across the border in Pakistan. Most Afghans in these areas were Sunni, as was a large share of the Pakistani population across the border. Shia Hazaras also crossed the border to Pakistani cities with large Shia populations via routes that had been used by labour migrants for decades (International Crisis Group, 2009). Between 1981 and 1985, the war in Afghanistan intensified and caused many to flee the country to Pakistan. Figure 1 shows that during the Soviet occupation between 1980 and 1985 the net migration rate of Afghanistan's population was -56.7/1000 persons. In contrast to the Islamic Republic of Iran, most Afghans in Pakistan lived in refugee camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. During this time radical Islamist parties used these camps as their bases for action against the Soviet troops. These camps were also the reason the Government of Pakistan received relatively high humanitarian aid by the international community. The United States of America, especially, wanted the Soviet position weakened and to establish an Islamic government in Kabul that could be controlled (Turton and Marsden, 2002). In 1989 the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, which was followed by intensified mujahedeen activity and another wave of migration from Afghanistan to Pakistan (Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, 2005). As a result, in 1990 more than 6 million Afghans were displaced as they fled bombing and combat, especially in rural areas. Afghans were the biggest group of displaced persons worldwide at that time, representing almost half of the total population of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Monsutti, 2006).

Second Migration Wave: Taliban Regime

The victory of the mujahedeen in 1992 caused the second migration wave out of Afghanistan. At this time, especially the urban and educated middle class fled Afghanistan towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan (Stigter, 2006). In contrast to the first migration, Afghans were no longer welcomed by the Governments of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Afghanistan also failed to receive as much attention from the international community, causing a significant decrease in financial support for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In 1990, the first voluntary repatriation programme in Pakistan was established (Turton and Marsden, 2002).

The Islamic Republic of Iran started its first repatriation programme in 1992 under a tripartite2 agreement between Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and UNHCR. From 1993 onwards, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran provided newly arrived and undocumented Afghans with a temporary registration card. They were then labelled as panahandegan which carried a negative connotation and granted them a much lower status than had been the case for refugees of the first migration wave in 1979 (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005). Between 1992 and 1995, over 1.3 million Afghans returned from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Afghanistan voluntarily, with net migration as high as 44.4/1000 persons between 1990 and 1995 (Figure 1).

However, with the rise of the oppressive Taliban regime from 1994 onwards, major movements of Afghans to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan began once again and continued until 2000 (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005). Between 1991 and 2000, over 300,000 Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan. These events help to explain the negative net migration of -6.5/1000 persons in Figure 1. At the same time, UNHCR changed its policy in Pakistan and discontinued the provision of food aid to Afghan refugees, driving many refugees into the cities to look for work (Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, 2005). In

1995, the Islamic Republic of Iran closed its border with Afghanistan, which was now ruled by the Taliban. The Islamic Republic of Iran issued laissez-passer3 documents to Afghans, which only permitted them to travel out of the country. The Iranian government also stopped providing education and healthcare supplies to Afghan refugees and 190,000 undocumented Afghans were deported between 1998 and 1999 (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005).

Third Migration Wave: End Of The Taliban Regime (2001)

The third and most recent large-scale migration wave was caused by the war and associated bombing campaigns between the Taliban and United Statesled coalition forces in 2001. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 caused increased attention from the international community towards Afghanistan (Turton and Marsden, 2002). The Governments of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran increasingly attempted to decrease the number of Afghans living in their respective countries despite the conditions in their homeland. The Islamic Republic of Iran increased the cost of living for Afghans and implemented policies that prohibited Iranian employers from hiring Afghan workers. Pakistan, on the other hand, closed many refugee camps that housed thousands of Afghans in border areas. Deportations from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan continue to take place, though in the Islamic Republic of Iran to a far greater extent than in Pakistan (Stigter, 2006). In 2002 (March/April), UNHCR started its assisted voluntary return programme for Afghan refugees living in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan (Lumpp et al., 2004). By the end of 2002, more than 1.5 million had returned from Pakistan and more than 250,000 from the Islamic Republic of Iran (UNHCR, 2012f). Of these, the numbers of returnees to urban areas (Kabul, Jalalabad and Kunduz) was much higher than anticipated (Lumpp et al., 2004). The official number of returnees, however, has limited explanatory power, as it refers only to those who received assistance from UNHCR. The provision of UNHCR assistance to returnees, especially the cash grant to cover transport costs, also resulted in an unknown number of "recyclers" signing up for repatriation and then returning to the country of asylum after having collected the assistance package. This was particularly prevalent among returnees from Pakistan, many of whom had relatively short distances to travel back to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the eastern and central provinces of Nangarhar and Kabul were the destination of 60 per cent of those documented to have returned by the end of August, though many returnees to these two provinces may actually have been seasonal migrants who had no intention of staying in Afghanistan beyond the summer. Consequently, the real figure of returnees may also be much lower than officially recorded by UNHCR (Turton and Marsden, 2002). Between 2002 and 2005, Afghanistan observed an unexpectedly large wave of repatriation. With the assistance of UNHCR, 2.7 million refugees returned from Pakistan and more than 800,000 from the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the same period (2002-2005), the number of spontaneous returns4 (known to UNHCR) amounted to almost 300,000 from Pakistan and about 570,000 from the Islamic Republic of Iran. This level of repatriation shows a degree of confidence in the renascent state, but also reflects expectations created by donor pledges to rebuild the country and the deterioration of living conditions in the places of refuge (Monsutti, 2006).

Today, some 1.6 million registered Afghans remain in Pakistan and about 840,000 in the Islamic Republic of Iran (UNHCR 2013b, 2013c). The profile of these Afghans is rather different from those refugees who have returned since the fall of the Taliban regime. The great majority of these individuals remaining in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been in exile for more than 20 years. Furthermore, almost half of the registered Afghan population in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan was born in exile. After two decades in these countries, the decision to return constitutes a major undertaking. Most returnees depend on their relatives and other social networks for their social and economic reintegration. However, many poorer families do not have these resources and thus depend on the assistance provided by local and international organizations, particularly with regard to water and shelter in their country of origin (UNHCR, 2008c).

Natural Disasters And Shocks In Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a land-locked country with a high incidence of natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, landslides and droughts (ANDMA, 2008). Depending on their impact such shocks potentially force people to leave their usual place of residence and lead to their displacement, either temporary or permanently.

Earthquakes Afghanistan is located in a zone of high seismic activity and hence the frequency of earthquakes is relatively high. Both northern Afghanistan and Pakistan are frequently hit by earthquakes, especially in the Hindu Kush area where the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates collide. Due to very low population density in the Hindu Kush region, hundreds of small earthquakes go unrecorded. However, sources indicate that at least twice a year, Afghanistan is hit by earthquakes of the magnitude 5 to 6 on the Richter scale. These earthquakes often force thousands of people to leave their homes and move elsewhere in the region. This was, for example, the case in 1996 in the west of the country when an earthquake caused damage to houses and mosques and forced over 500 families to leave their homes. Two years later, an earthquake in the region of Rustaq damaged over 50,000 homes and killed 5,000 individuals. In 1999, an earthquake affected almost 20,000 families, many of which had to leave their homes and seek shelter elsewhere. Two earthquakes of a significant magnitude were observed in the Hindu Kush region in 2002, leaving over 25 people dead and over 10,000 people homeless. In April 2004, a powerful earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter was recorded along Afghanistan's north-east border with Pakistan. The populations of Jurm District and Yangaan district in Badakhshan were affected. The earthquake was also felt in the city of Kabul and other areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Poppelwell, 2007). During 2006 and 2009 several earthquakes of magnitudes 5-6 occurred in the Hindu Kush region (CNN, 2008). In April 2009, two earthquakes of magnitudes 5.5 and 5.1 rocked Nangarhar province, 90 kilometres east of Kabul. At least 19 people were killed and 20 wounded (Aljazeera, 2009). In April 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 5.3 hit Samangan province, about halfway between Kabul and the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. The earthquake killed at least seven people and injured 30 (Fox News, 2010). In June 2012, landslides triggerd by two earthquakes killed more than 80 people in Baghlan province (Adjami, M., 2016).

Year	Refugee population end of year	Asylum applicants during the year
1993	1,467,876	-
1994	1,053,000	-
1995	1,200,000	-
1996	1,200,000	-
1997	1,200,000	-
1998	1,200,000	-
1999	1,200,000	-
2000	2,000,000	-
2001	2,197,821	-
2002	1,226,569	-
2003	1,123,647	4,992
2004	1,290,408	2,380
2005	1,084,208	1,450
2006	1,043,984	1,904
2007	886,666	1,929
2008	1,780,150	1,144
2009	1,739,935	1,178
2010	1,899,842	885
2011	1,701,945	948
2012	1,637,740	-

Source: UNHCR 2003b, 2007b, 2008d, 2009c, 2010c, 2011c, 2012g, 2013f.

Figure 6:Estimated stock of Afghan refugees and asylum applicants registered

Year	Refugee population end of year
1993	1,850,000
1994	1,623,331
1995	1,429,038
1996	1,414,659
1997	1,411,759
1998	1,400,722
1999	1,325,724
2000	1,482,000
2001	1,482,000
2002	1,104,909
2003	834,699
2004	952,802
2005	920,248
2006	914,260
2007	906,071
2008	935,595
2009	1,022,494
2010	1,027,577
2011	840,451
2012	824,087

Source: UNHCR, 2003b, 2013f.

Figure 7: Afghan refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993-2012

Floods and Landslides

Afghanistan has a long history of flooding that has caused displacement and damage to infrastructure. For example, flooding in the Hindu Kush area in 1992 caused deaths and led to displacement and the loss of household assets for many. A year later, mudslides in Kabul destroyed houses and left 1,000 people homeless. In 1995 and 1997, floods leading to landslides occurred in the mountains of Badakhshan in the northern region of Afghanistan. In the spring of 2002, the Western, Northern, North-Eastern and Central Highlands regions of Afghanistan experienced high levels of rain in a short period of time resulting in flash floods and mudslides affecting more than 2,000 households. The heavy rainfall caused crop damage, loss of housing and harm to livestock. As a consequence, many affected households moved to urban areas or sent a family member to seek employment. In March 2007, severe flooding occurred in various parts of the country, including Oruzgan, Badghis, Helmand, Nimruz, Daykundi and Herat provinces. An avalanche hit the province of Ghor, where 40 families were reported to be affected (Poppelwell, 2007). In 2010, major devastation by floods occurred in north-west Pakistan and Afghanistan. At least one million people were affected by these floods and up to 27,000 were stranded. This also caused many Afghans living in Pakistan to return to their home country since they had lost all of their property and livestock in Pakistan (Emergency Appeal, 2010). In 2011, IRIN reported that flash floods and heavy snowfall killed many people in Afghanistan and destroyed thousands of houses particularly in Parwan, Herat, Wardak and Daykundi (IRIN, 2011b). Between May and June 2012, Afghanistan witnessed severe flooding as a result of the harsh winter with a substantial accumulation of snow in the Northern region. An incident in the Sari Pul province in May had the biggest impact, when melting snow and heavy rainfall led to rising water levels in the Sari-Pul River, which subsequently flooded the city of Sari Pul. 19 people were killed and an estimated 10,000 displaced (Reliefweb, 2012).

Drought In the past decades, Afghanistan has experienced severe droughts. Some affected the whole country and others were restricted to certain areas. During the 1970s, the area of Ghor was affected by a drought that lasted for three years. However, due to government interventions, the affected population was not 52 Afghanistan Migration Profile displaced and was able to recover from the shock. About 30 years later, parts of Afghanistan – notably Herat, Farah, Balkh, Samangan and Faryab – experienced four years of severe drought. The drought severely affected 2 to 3 million people and a further 8 to 12 million were affected to a lesser extent. Due to the absence of governmental help and a lack of support from the international community, entire villages had to move to camps in the areas of Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kandahar. In 2000 and 2001, when the drought was most severe, over half a million people had been displaced from their homes and were known to be living in camps around Herat. Another severe drought in 2006 mainly affected people in the Northern, Western and Central regions of Afghanistan. Many farmers from the North-Western province Badghis tried to reach the Kunduz region where they hoped to get water from the Amu Darya River. By the end of 2006, most rain-fed crops (estimated to constitute 85 per cent of the cultivated land) had failed. Additionally, many water sources had dried up and livestock mortality had increased. According to some sources, the drought affected over 2 million Afghans in 2007 (Poppelwell, 2007). One year later, the United States Department of Agriculture reported that this year had suffered the worst drought conditions in the past decade (USDA, 2008). This, combined with high food prices, meant millions were without enough food (AlertNet, 2010). In 2011, a severe drought in 14 provinces in northern and eastern Afghanistan led to severe food shortages and affected more than 12 million people (UPI, 2011). Heavy snowfalls in January 2012 ended this drought (Reuters, 2012).

The economic importance of migration and environment

The issue of migration and environment is important since, although the occurrence of exogenous events is random, the impacts of natural disasters 4 and climate change are the largest in the poorest countries that have the least institutional capability to cope with natural disasters and that are located at low latitudes (Kahn, 2005; Tol et al., 2004; Mendelsohn et al., 2006). Some recent evidence points to the possibility that more frequent exposure to tropical cyclones reduces the marginal damage costs from an event (Hsiang and Narita, 2012), but such adaptation is costly and may only recover a small part of overall damage costs. Hsiang and Jina (2013) indeed show evidence of a long-lasting negative effect on economic growth of cyclones. Also, since the impacts on agricultural productivity from climate change are potentially large (Mendelsohn and Dinar, 2009), migration through its indirect effect on agricultural income may be more significant in developing countries with a high share of agriculture. On a larger social and political scale there is some evidence that droughts and floods are positively correlated with conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991), also historically (Bai and Kung, 2011). The link between conflict and distress migration caused by sudden environmental disasters has been criticized, though, since most such migrants tend to be poor and powerless (Raleigh et al., 2008). The link is thus an indirect one, working through the effect of climate variability on income and income growth (Miguel et al., 2004), an effect analyzed by Dell et al. (2009) and Barrios et al. (2010), amongst others. The literature on conflict and climate, in particular, has developed into a field of its own and was recently surveyed by Burke et al. (2014).

Conclusion

In order to remain an effective information tool for policymaking, Migration Profile reports need to be updated regularly and used for policy development. The Afghanistan Migration Profile should be updated every two years. In this regard, institutions and ministries involved in migration issues should collaborate on a regular basis to share information and make better use of data in the formulation of national development policies. Subsequent revisions of the Migration Profile should include data from a national migration survey (internal and international migration) and should constitute a panel data set where possible. This could be done by interviewing the same households over time to ascertain dynamics (Abbasi-Shavazi 2013).

The review has attempted to give a comprehensive overview of the existing literature on migration and environment, with particular emphasis on recent results in the economic literature. This obviously limits the review since a complete analysis of migration and environment would draw on many disciplines, such as climatology, geography, political sciences and social sciences such as anthropology. The focus was on the contribution of economic modelling to the debate, and the extensions of current models that could be done to yield further insights into the problem of environmental change and migration. In particular, spatial models of land use with mobility of labour offer some interesting directions for future research. The policy conclusions of much of the current modelling also need to be made more explicit, through the incorporation of explicit policy instruments in the models and an analysis of the links between environmental and migration policies. One important aspect of such an analysis would be to study in more detail the impact on equity of proposed policies to deal with the environment-migration nexus. Including heterogeneity among agents as regards adaptation capabilities and migration costs would be another useful direction for future research since indirect general equilibrium effects may cause migration by agents that have not been directly affected, whereas the directly affected populations may be too poor to incur the costs of migration. Finally, more explicit modelling of the expectations of agents seems important since the migration decision is made based on the agents' perceptions of the environmental change and their expectations on the duration of its impact. Some existing empirical research has shown that previous exposure to environmental shocks is significant in determining who migrates or not(Katrin Millock,2015).

Overall, it is clear from the existing theoretical and empirical research that migration is only one of several potential strategies used by households to cope with environmental change. Whether it is superior to others, such as increasing the off-farm labour market participation, can only be assessed in models that take market potential into account. This constitutes yet another challenge for empirical work based on new economic geography models. Current research also gives some indication that the use of migration as an adaptation strategy depends on the frequency of exposure to droughts, and the existence or not of public policy aimed at reducing the risk of a disaster (e.g., early warning systems) or providing assistance after the event. Such results clearly depend on the type of environmental change, however(Katrin Millock,2015)

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