Development and Growth of Indian Political System and International Relation - A Study

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Abstract

This paper attempts to study how in parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems, when there is the absence of clean majority during general elections, parties either form coalition cabinets under parliament majority or end up with minority cabinets which has one or more parties. Cabinets supported by parliament are more stable and efficient whereas minority cabinets are prone to internal struggles. Therefore, whether government with clear majority or minority government both is has to burn through the process of policy making for public welfare . Thus, the present study has been conducted to draw inferences from theories on coalition and concerned parties as to how public policy making impacts them and they impact policies process. The study aims to allow a conceptual starting point and to bring the research on public policy making in the coalition governments. the necessity to form coalition governments regularly subjects the translation of party platforms into government policy to the uncertainties of inter-party bargaining. This raises the question as to how parties in coalition governments arrive at a common policy agenda in the face of potentially divergent preferences. Coalition governments pose a challenge to the direct link between a party's electoral mandate and the policy output produced by a government. Divergent preferences between coalition parties and the intra-cabinet division of labour among ministerial jurisdictions increase the potential for agency loss in the parliamentary chain of delegation.

Key words: Coalition government; delegation; agents; challenges; identified solution; and political party

Introduction

The dominion of India was reborn on January 26, 1950, as a sovereign democratic republic and a union of states. With universal adult franchise, India's electorate was the world's largest, but the traditional feudal roots of most of its illiterate populace were deep, just as their religious caste beliefs were to remain far more powerful than more recent exotic ideas, such as secular statehood. Elections were to be held, however, at least every five years, and the major model of government followed by India's constitution was that of British parliamentary rule, with a lower House of the People (Lok Sabha), in which an elected prime minister and a cabinet sat, and an upper Council of States (Rajya Sabha). Nehru led his ruling Congress Party from New Delhi's Lok Sabha until his death in 1964. The nominal head of India's republic, however, was a president, who was indirectly elected. India's first two presidents were Hindu Brahmans, Rajendra Prasad and Sarvepalli

Radhakrishnan, the latter a distinguished Sanskrit scholar who had lectured at the University of Oxford. Presidential powers were mostly ceremonial, except for brief periods of "emergency" rule, when the nation's security was believed to be in great danger and normal constitutional procedures and civil rights were feared to be too cumbersome or threatening.

India's federation divided powers between the central government in New Delhi and a number of state governments (crafted from former British provinces and princely states), each of which also had a nominal governor at its head and an elected chief minister with a cabinet to rule its legislative assembly. One of the Congress Party's long-standing resolutions had called for the reorganization of British provincial borders into linguistic states, where each of India's major regional languages would find its administrative reflection, while English and Hindi would remain joint national languages for purposes of legislation, law, and service examinations. Pressure for such reorganization increased in 1953, after the former British province of Madras was divided into Tamil Nadu ("Land of the Tamils") and Andhra (from 1956 Andhra Pradesh), where Telugu, another Dravidian tongue, was spoken by the vast majority. (Andhra Pradesh itself was divided in 2014, with the northern, Telugu-speaking portion being split off to become the new state of Telangana. Hyderabad [in Telangana] served as the capital of each state.) Nehru thus appointed the States Reorganisation Commission to redesign India's internal map, which led to a major redrawing of administrative boundaries, especially in southern India, by the States Reorganization Act, passed in 1956. Four years later, in 1960, the enlarged state of Bombay was divided into Marathi-speaking Maharashtra and Gujarati-speaking Gujarat. Despite those changes, the difficult process of reorganization continued and demanded attention in many regions of the subcontinent, whose truly "continental" character was perhaps best seen in this ongoing linguistic agitation. Among the most difficult problems was a demand by Sikhs that their language, Punjabi, with its sacred Gurmukhi script, be made the official tongue of Punjab, but in that state many Hindus, fearing that they would find themselves disadvantaged, insisted that as Hindi speakers they too deserved a state of their own, if indeed the Sikhs were to be granted the Punjabi *suba* (state) for which so many Sikhs agitated. Nehru, however, refused to agree to a separate Sikh state, as he feared that such a concession to the Sikhs, who were both a religious and a linguistic group, might open the door to further "Pakistan-style" fragmentation.

Therefore, whether government with clear majority or minority government both is has to burn through the process of policy making for public welfare . Thus, the present study has been conducted to draw inferences from theories on coalition and concerned parties as to how public policy making impacts them and they impact policies process. The study aims to allow a conceptual starting point and to bring the research on public policy making in the coalition governments. Hence, this paper intends to identify the challenges and solution underlying in the formation of public policy in the coalition government. Curiously, the policy output of multiparty governments has not been examined even nearly as extensively as their formation (Axelrod 1970; de Swaan 1973; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Riker 1962; Sened 1996), the allocation of government portfolios

(Browne and Feste 1975; Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006), and their termination (Diermeier and Merlo 2000; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Laver 2003; Warwick 1994).

The most notable exceptions are extant studies of legislative output (Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Martin 2004; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011) that have stayed closer to the theoretical framework provided by coalition theory, and some studies on pledge fulfilment in multiparty governments that have come out of the party mandate literature (Costello and Thomson 2008; Kostadinova 2013; Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Moury 2011b; Thomson 2001). Gone are the days when regionalism used to be viewed as a negation of nationalism or nation building. The regional parties have provided a new dimension to the process of national integration and nation building. Regionalism has lost its aggressive from due to the positive role of regional political parties. The leaders of regional parties have started playing an active and even deterministic role in the organisation of the Central government. Since 1996, twenty three regional parties have been sharing power at the national level. Their outlook now appears to be changing from confrontationalist and conflictual orientation to a tendency of co-operative bargaining in respect of Centre-state relations.

Objective:

This paper intends to explore and analyze **challenges and prospects of coalition governments in Indian political process**. Also **complications of Coalition governments** criticized for sustaining a consensus on issues when disagreement and the consequent discussion

One is the preferences of the parties involved which is different from each other, and the other is the institutional limitations on the policy-making by such multi-party governments which compels the coalition government to come to unanimous decision. It was also found that the preferences of the parties are the cause of the problems arising in delegation and the institutional limitations on the policy-making aligns with solutions to the issues. Both the factors play a crucial role in the successful execution of the agenda considering the party as the principal and ministers as agents or secondary to the process of decision making. Due to the working of the above two factors policy disagreement arises among the political parties in Parliament, policy disagreements are an important consideration in politics of coalition governments. The condition of policymaking in the coalition is governed by the preferences of the actors or the agents involved. Also, the continuity of the governments in office is considerably influenced by the internal setting of preferences of the agents. The actions that are taken in the formulation of policy are highly influenced by the actions defined by each political agent in the Parliament. The policymaking decisions regarding enactment and passing of

legislation are often hindered by disagreement flowing from the participant's preferences . When all the partners commit themselves to agree on specific issues, it makes the implementation of the legislation easier and less of an obstacle race. The literature review reveals that the consensus among parties leads to better legislation.

Delegation problem of responsibilities, finance, policy action and other actions in Parliament give rises to Coalition among government . The participating parties in the coalition have their electorates, agenda, ideals and policy concerns for which they go through the whole hog of elections competing with parties who might become their partners in the times to come. Their record as a party in the government becomes more important than their record as a government in general because it determines their electoral fate in the future. It becomes the cause of problems in delegating important portfolios like finance . It stand true in Indian context when President R. Venkataraman was of the opinion that Chandra Shekhar was able to handle parliament competently but was under constant strain from the Congress party which led to his resignation.

This shows that it was the real government and Chandra Shekhar can be merely called a proxy. This problem is referred to as the agency problem in government political parties. Another challenge identified under agent issue by Kostova (2004) is differences in preferences which are the major cause of agency problems in the coalition governments. When parties with a divergent view of the functioning and condition of the world will join hands, there is bound to be areas where there will be the substantial differences in opinions on policymaking. In the case of H.D. Deve Gowda, the Congress revoked its support to him due to the rising discontent regarding communication over the coalition which led to the loss of a vote of confidence to the united front government. There can almost never be similarity of beliefs and opinions amongst a wide number of people and parties . Therefore, it is a challenge for the leader of a coalition government to make decisions and plan and execute various policies or obtain consensus from all sides.

However, this does not validate the withdrawing of support or compelling a minister to resign due to the difference in opinions . Hazlehurst on the same grounds found out that the participant parties not only have different views on specific issues, they also have a different take on the level of importance of various policies. In case of United Progressive Alliance (UPA 2) government, Trinamool Congress (TMC) Chief Mamta Bannerjee withdrew her support from the UPA because their demands of rolling back of reforms were not met. Their rollback of reforms included issues like FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) in retail, the rise in the price of diesel and limiting the number of subsidised gas cylinders for households.

Similarly, the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) also withdrew its support due to an issue of a draft resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council regarding violation of human rights to Sri Lankan Tamils. It shows that the difference of opinions amongst the different parties leads to withdrawal of support from the coalition. Care needs to be taken to ensure that important policies are handled properly despite the difference in opinions amongst the parties . A logical inference garnered from the study is that a specific

policy proposal to be implemented is more likely to get support if it is relevant to individual specific parties as well as in the case of UPA 2 government. Stressing certain policies will drive up the perceived competency or credibility of certain parties while the position of other parties remains unaffected. It drives the moves of various parties in the coalition. Further, with the formation of the coalition government, the agreements and the distribution of key areas and policy decisions are all settled through negotiation and mutual agreements. There have been various instances in the Indian politics where the regional parties like Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) have had to collaborate with BJP to avoid bifurcation of their votes against their common enemy, i.e. Congress party. Therefore, they were forced to support BJP to protect their electoral prospects .

A similar study conducted by Herd (2010) found out consensus to be the factor responsible for the agreements among the Coalition Government. But each government has to start with existing policies and regulations to the status quo. If the government desires to alter these, they again will need a consensus. In the absence of the agreement, the status quo remains. In coalition governments, each party tries to block policy changes which either may be adversely affect its quo . Thus, it can be stated that the power equation is more in favour of the party seeking changes to current policy rather than changing the status quo.

Conclusion

Finally, Hazlehurst (2007) suggested that coalition government may resort to controlling mechanism that will seek to help keep the differences at bay and prevent the ministers of different parties holding different portfolios from drifting away from the popular mandate. Gelder , argued that to restrict future policy actions from sliding away from common coalition ground, a potential solution can be to assign junior ministers from the majority party the job of being an overseer. As it was noted that there are differences in the preferences of individual actors and collective, the allocation of portfolios can be considered as a solution to ensure successful delegation and execution of legislative agenda in policymaking. Ministers are then more likely to implement and continue with tasks assigned to them as it aligns with their party's policies as opposed to the coalition collective. A coalition is likely to be more successful if the parties moderate their ideologies and programmes along with listening to the point of view of ministers of other political parties as well. It is not necessary that all parties shall have similar beliefs and ideologies which might lead to difficulty in achieving consensus on issues. A considerable literature review has pointed towards using this as a strategic move. ministerial discretion where the parties wanted to exercise the power of their ministries under their jurisdiction. Looking at the growth of the regional parties as a threat to national unity is illogical. Regional parties do not necessarily believe in secessionism; they only want to protect the interests of their regions. The DMK in Tamil Nadu at one stage wanted to separate from India but it soon realised that it would not be in the interests of the state

and, therefore, dropped the idea of separation. A regional party is formed only when it is felt that the interests of the region are neglected and ignored by the national party in power at the centre. Focus on the regional interests by the regional parties cannot and should not be considered anti-national.

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