



# Politics of National Identity in Pakistan: From Muslim Identity to Islamic Identity<sup>1</sup>

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The question of identity in Pakistan is at the centre of his entire politics. There are two views about Pakistan which represent two different national identities. The first is the Muslim-secular view which according to Vali Nasr (2006, 179-181) is based on the Muslim communal discourse. The idea is to protect the cultural, economic, political rights and interests of Muslims. Under this view, Islam is only a symbol of Muslim identity and not a religion associated with pre-modern mentality. The use of Islam is limited to integrating Muslims only. Under this view, in the words of Faisal Devji (2013, 3), the Pakistani movement is a symbol of Muslim Zion. Zion is based on the acquisition of new land and the dismissal of the old land. The Muslim population wanted to move away from this large subcontinent so that it could not withstand the fear of oppression of the majority.

The second is the Islamic view which believes in a public space made up of Islamic values, Islamic institutions, and Islamic faith. In this view, Islam is a symbol of moral supremacy beyond the mark of identity and the imagery of the Islamic State is at its centre. This idea gives Venkat Dhulipala (2015, 4) the definition of a new medina. The rise of Islam and supremacy is the essence of this idea.

The Muslim-secular idea of Pakistan is associated with the Instrumentalist theory of nation-building introduced by Paul Brass (1979). According to this theory, Pakistan was created by Muslim upper-class people who were facing economic and political competition with Hindus. These Muslims made political use of Muslim identity symbols to protect their interests and organize Muslims. The Islamic idea of Pakistan is linked to the Primordialist theory of Francis Robinson (1979). According to this theory, Pakistan was created due to the special imperative of Islam and in the context of the deep religious differences between Hindus and Muslims.

The description and explanation of the Pakistani movement consist of both ideas. But after independence the Islamic identity established its hegemony and marginalized the Muslim identity. Along with the Islamic religious imperative in post-colonial Pakistan, the idea of a specific 'other' has also been created which helps to define the Islamic self. The 'national self' (identity), according to Homi Bhabha (1990, 1-7), is always constructed in relation to 'other or important outsiders' (others). This 'other' has been constructed in the context of India and Hindus. This paper will present a

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historical account of identity change, understanding the trajectory of Pakistan's national identity. What this paper calls the “politics of national identity.”

### **Pakistan Movement as Making of Muslim State and Identity**

Pakistan's freedom struggle is the site that symbolizes the Muslim identity of Pakistan. The Muslim identity was primarily based on the contemplation of the economic and political interests of the Muslims, which emerged as a reaction to the inimical impact of the colonial structure and the rise of the Hindu Majoritarian politics in the colonial period. The demand for a Muslim nation often consisted of the protection of the interests of the Muslims and the absence of Hindu supremacy.

According to Hamza Alavi (1988, 67), 'The Pakistan movement was a movement of Muslims ... where different Muslim ethnic groups representing different social conditions and interests from different provinces wanted to satisfy a material demand. The centre of the movement was the Muslim salariat class, who came together from different regions to fulfil the vision of a Muslim nation'. The Salariat class was the class that was ideologically modern, urbanized, educated and participated in colonial services. The Salariat class was present at the centre of the Muslim identity and the demand for a Muslim nation. For these Muslims, the future of Muslims lay only in modern values, institutions and ideas and only through modernity they could be empowered. According to Rasul Bakhsh Rais (2017, X-XI, 1-13), this class was at the centre of political modernity which was formed from the belief in inclusive politics, equality, constitutionalism and democratic pluralistic tradition. This class, due to its political needs, also recognized the Hindu-Muslim communal difference, which is called Muslim communal discourse.

The Muslim communities that were once at the centre of the power structure were rendered powerless by colonial rule. The colonial rule established the modern state structure in India, which introduced many radical changes which impacted different communities in different ways. For example, the Muslim judicial system was replaced by the modern judicial system, which was based on the rule of law. Persian was replaced by English and regional languages as the main language of finance and administration. Muslim educational institutions were replaced by a modern rational education system. One reaction to all these changes was the revolt of 1857 which was suppressed by the British military force, but this rebellion made the Muslim situation in India worse. The British rule in response destroyed the cities and institutions of the Muslims (Jaffrelot, 2015, 26-37). There are two main reasons behind the decline of Muslim power in India. The first reason for the decline of the Muslims was the replacement of the Muslim Mughal structure by the modern structure, and the second reason was the non-acceptance of the new modern reality by the Muslims. The Muslims adopted modern education and structure more slowly than the rest of the community, due to which they continued to decline in the colonial services. Where in 1857, 64 per cent of the Muslims were attached to the colonial services In, 1913 this figure had come down to 35 per cent (Alavi, 1988, 72).

The census process was part of a strategy to strengthen the colonial rule and divide the Indian population. The process of the census project was also quite adverse for the Muslim community. Census reports were the first to state that Muslims are a minority in India, and Hindus are the majority in India. To further deepen the roots of colonial rule, the people at the lower level were made part of the government so that the confidence of the people could be increased. Such democratic practices had set off anxiety and fear among the Muslims as the mainstay of democracy was considered to be the majority, now the Muslims had come to know that they were a minority and democracy was a threat to the Muslims by the Hindu majority, and who want to established Hindu supremacy. Democracy for Muslims was more a form of oppression than empowerment (Jaffrelot, 2015). Unlike the Muslim community, the Hindus quickly adopted the

modern structure and ideas. Gradually, the role of modern educated Hindus in the administration went on increasing. Business activities which were earlier in the hands of Muslims, now the occupation of Hindus was increasing there. The rise of the Congress became a symbol of the political unity of the Hindus for the Muslims. Hindu reformist movements and re-upliftment movements started calling India the motherland of Hindus, while mutual conflicts between Hindus and Muslims were also seen on many issues, for example, the Hindu-Urdu dispute and cow protection movement (Jaffrelot, 2015, 38-39). All these things gave place to fear and insecurity among Muslims. For this reason, the Muslim identity was associated with the decline of Muslims and the growing insecurity and fear. The demand for a Muslim nation was based on the idea of the recovery of Muslim power and secure political life in the name of the Muslim nation.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98) was the first modernist Muslim who understood the decline of Muslims and the fear and insecurity of Muslims. For Syed Ahmed Khan, there were two ways to achieve Muslim power and reduce fear and insecurity, the first was the idea of Hindu-Muslim communal equality and the second was the adoption of Western education (Shaikh, 2018, 23-24). The Muslim League was formed in 1906 in the context of protecting the political and economic interests of Muslims and securing their rights. The Muslim League was a political organization of Muslims that was heavily influenced by the ideological tradition of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. The Muslim League was formed in the context of certain Hindu-Muslim struggles, for example, the Hindi-Urdu controversy, the Hindu revivalist movement and the partition of Bengal, etc. According to Aparna Pande (2016, 3), the Muslim League had mainly three demands: (I) Separate electorate for Muslims. (II) Provision for reservation in the Legislative Assemblies of Muslim minority provinces. (III) Equal importance to the Muslim League in the future constitution-making process. These three demands of the Muslim League were, on the one hand, a way out of the web of the Muslim minority, and it was also a symbol of the idea of Hindu-Muslim equality.

Meanwhile, in the presidential address of Mohammad Iqbal in 1930 in the Muslim League, for the first time, the concept of one nation (Muslim nation) was presented. Which will be present in the federal structure of India. His Muslim nation was not a separate concept from the Indian nation but a part of it. Iqbal said in this address that 'I see Punjab, Afghan (NWFP), Sindh and Baluchistan turning into a single state ... North West Muslim (majority) states coming together ... It is the ultimate fate of Muslims'. Three years after Iqbal, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, studying at Cambridge University, and four others used the word Pakistan for the first time in a special essay on 'Now or Never'. Where P was connected to Punjab, A to Afghanistan, K to Kashmir, S of Sindh and Tan to Baluchistan. Rahmat Ali's idea was based on a state structure that would be independent, sovereign. Rahmat Ali's idea of a separate state of Pakistan was completely different from that of Mohammad Iqbal. Initially Muslim modernists, especially Muhammad Ali Jinnah, completely rejected this idea. According to him, it is just a fantasy and nothing else. After the election of 1937, Muslim politics turned from minority to nationalism, the centre of politics was no longer Muslim minority provinces (United Provinces, Bihar etc.) but Muslim majority provinces (Pande, 2018, 20-22).

The Muslim League suffered a crushing defeat in the 1937 elections and the Congress refused to ally with the League. The election of 1937 had made it clear in the minds of Muslims that the Congress would centralize India as a Hindu body and India would be dominated by Hindus only where Muslims would be only second class citizens. The entire discourse of Muslim politics, which wanted communal equality, now began to use communal differences as their means to achieve their goals, and the demand for a separate state made by Rahmat Ali was also recognized by the Muslim League.

The Lahore Resolution was a focal point of the idea of a separate state and the idea of the communal difference. It was during the Lahore resolution that Jinnah for the first time did not consider Muslims as a minority but a nation. This

demand was in no way connected with Islamic ideas. Muslims wanted their separate national home in the shape of autonomous states in north-western and north-eastern India, where they were in the majority. Muslim minorities in the rest of India were considered citizens of this Muslim homeland and their rights and privileges were protected in the same way as non-Muslims living in Muslim areas. What was unacceptable was a rare notion of democracy that allowed the Indian National Congress to use the brute majority of the Hindu community to impose its will on the Muslims. The problem in India was politics and not so it was perceived as a community. It was concerned with reciprocal arrangements on the part of minorities and facilitating mutual adjustment between Muslim India and Hindu India. The Lahore resolution gave birth to the two-nation theory. In this preface, Jinnah said that 'Hindu and Muslim are related to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They belong to two different civilizations based mainly on conflicting ideas and concepts. Bringing two nations together under a single state where one is a numerical minority and the other is the majority will only lead to discontent and destruction' (Jalal, 2014, 10-39).

According to Farzana Shaikh (1993, 85-97), the demand for a Muslim nation after 1940 was, on the one hand, associated with achieving political equality between the League and the Congress, on the other, communal equality between Hindus and Muslims. In the 1946 elections, the Muslim League used Islam as a form of political mobilization. Where the Muslim League had received four to five per cent of the vote share in the 1937 elections, it increased to 75 per cent in 1946 using Islam. After the 1946 elections, the League demanded that two separate constitutional structures be introduced for India and Pakistan and that the interests of Muslims and non-Muslims be fully protected. Congress rejected the idea, which resulted in the splitting of the South Asian subcontinent into two parts.

### **Pakistan Movement as Islamic State and Identity**

One interpretation of the Pakistan movement is based on the fact that the centre of the movement was the creation of a Muslim nation so that the interests of Muslims could be protected. A different interpretation of the Pakistan movement is offered by Islamic ideas, which holds that the demand for Pakistan was linked to the demand for an Islamic state. There were also several Islamic backlashes in the context of the decline and fear and insecurity of Muslims. The first Islamic response was associated with Shah Waliullah, who believed that the path to the recovery of Muslim power was to go to the true Islam, that Muslims would determine their lives according to the Qur'an and Sunnah only when Muslims would be empowered. The legacy of Shah Waliullah was further carried on by the Barelvi, Deoband and Ahl-e-Hadith traditions. The main goal of these Islamic traditions was: (I) to regain Muslim power (II) to implement Islam in its original form. Because they believed that the main reason for the decline of Muslims was not the British or Hindus but the increasing immorality in Islam (Zaman, 2018, 14-53).

At the same time, these Islamic traditions had an important role in the Pakistan movement because they mobilized the general Muslim population so that Indian Muslims could find their final destiny. According to Ishtiaq Ahmed (2011, 81-82), the Barelvi tradition served as a mobilization for the Muslim League in the last years, where the League ensured that the law of the new nation would be Sharia. At the same time, Venkat Dhulipala (2015) also tells how Deoband Ulemas of the United Provinces, together with the League, fabricated the idea of an Islamic nation in the structure of the modern state.

The 1946 election was fought in the name of Islam by the Muslim League more than the Muslims, showing people the dream of an Islamic future. In the 1946 elections, the ulemas, Sajjada Nashin and their supporters argued this while supporting the League, using Islam that those who vote for the league will get heaven and they are true Muslims, those who vote against the league are infidels, they will get a place in hell (Haqqani, 2016, 8-9). Without the power of Islam,

it is difficult to see Pakistan as a nation. The only reason the Islamic traditional groups supported the League was that after independence Pakistan would become an Islamic state with Sharia as its law and sovereignty attached to Allah and the country's direction would be drawn from the Qur'an and Sunnah.

### **Jinnah in Between Muslims State and Islamic State**

Mohammad Ali Jinnah considered himself the sole spokesman of not only the Muslim League but also of the entire Indian Muslims in the Pakistan movement. Jinnah is at the centre of both Islamic and Muslim-secular views, which makes it a little difficult to understand Jinnah. According to Stephen Cohen (2004, 42-45), Jinnah, who was a lawyer by profession, was democratic, socially progressive, a believer in Western logic, and also a constitutionalist. His imagination of the Muslim nation was based on these values. According to Rasul Rais (2017, 59), Jinnah's idea of the state was based on equal citizenship and fairness of the state in religious relations. According to Jinnah, the state should be inclusive so that it can adopt groups and minorities of other religions as other pluralistic states do. The prime example of his Muslim-secular view is found in the 14 August 1947 speech which he gives to newly independent Pakistan. Also, Jinnah's biographers like Ayesha Jalal (1985) and Stanley Wolpert (1984) have mentioned Jinnah's attachment to liberalism, Secularism and Individual Liberties.

The essence of Jinnah's Islamic interpretations is also present in his thoughts, sayings, speeches, which is associated with the creation of an Islamic state. In February 1943, Ismail Yusuf College in Bombay said, Pakistan will be a state-run on the principles of Islam. Its culture, politics and economic structure will be based on the principles of Islam. Jinnah reiterated the same point in the Council of the Muslim League on 15 December 1947 and Bengal in 1948. In October 1947, Jinnah said, If we take our inspiration from the Holy Quran, then victory will be ours. In the Karachi Bar Association, Jinnah said that Islam and its ideals have taught democracy a lot. Islam has taught equality, justice and fairness to all. Some people are spreading rumours that the constitution of Pakistan will not be based on Shariat. During the speech on August 14, 1947, Jinnah told Muhammad and Islam as the biggest symbol of tolerance (Bangosh, 2018, 73-74). The kind of things that Jinnah presented in the statements and speeches, all those things were opposite to his secular and Muslim nature. These speeches presented the framework of Jinnah's desire for one nation. If we accept these statements as it is, According to Jinnah, Pakistan became an Islamic state where sovereignty was tied to Allah and the centre of all authority was only the Quran and Sunnah.

### **Islamic Identity of Pakistan: After Independence**

Pakistan's Islamic identity has two bases; the first is the superiority of Islam in society and the state; the second is the 'other' image of India and Hindus (Pande 2016, 1-21). After independence, Islam has grown rapidly in Pakistan. He established his control over the state and politics. Islam in Pakistan was not only a means but also an end. The actual creation of Pakistan took place with some contradictions: (I) The idea of Pakistan originated in Muslim minority provinces such as Bombay, United Provinces and Bihar, where Muslims were in minority and Hindus were in majority. At the same time, the provinces from which Pakistan was formed were Muslim majority provinces where the roots of the Muslim League were negligible. For this reason, the Muslim League was unable to maintain a stable political system. (II) Pakistan was created as the final fate of the majority Muslims of South Asia, yet most of the Muslims remained present in India. Apart from this, all those things which represent Muslim power and sovereignty also remained in India. For example, the largest Muslim cities, great monuments made of Muslim architecture, etc. (III) The death of Jinnah and then Liaquat Ali Khan, the miraculous leadership of the creation of Pakistan, did not leave any option of leadership in Pakistan, nor could any leadership come to the fore who could run the new state, and the leadership that emerged in

power emerged, dividing Pakistan instead of unifying it. Due to the leadership crisis, the bureaucracy and the army in Pakistan established their control over the polity, which did not allow the structure of democracy to be established in Pakistan. (IV) Linguistic, ethnic and cultural identities dominated more than nationality in the Pakistan formation areas. Due to the rigidity of these identities, the idea of a common nationality could not be fully established. And the means to overcome these contradictions lay hidden only in Islam (Shaikh 2018, 81-115, Ali 2009, 25-48).

According to Hamza Alavi (1988, 70-73), the faction of the Muslim salariat class, which was leading the Muslim nation, broke up after the attainment of independence. These classes were divided into different ethnic groups. While Punjabi salarits and muhajirs together exercised their economic and political power to establish their control over the state structure such as the administration, army and education system, other ethnic groups remained marginalized. Punjabi and Muhajir classes used Islam to suppress the movement of ethnic groups demanding common interests; on the one hand, using the psychological sentiment of partition and the threat of India's expansion (anti-India sentiment) to maintain their power (Khan 2005, 63-66). Pakistan's Islamic identity was linked to internal as well as external aspects. According to Pande (2018, 16), Pakistan's Islamic identity internally maintains unity in Pakistan and keeps Pakistan closer to the Muslim world. Outwardly, Islamic Pakistan can differentiate itself from 'other' Hindu India (Alavi 1988, Pande 2018).

The understanding of the supremacy of Islamic identity in Pakistan is seen through the process of Islamization in Pakistan. The process of Islamization in Pakistan had started after a few years of independence. Under the process of Islamization, society and the state start bending towards Islam. The process of Islamization in Muslim society is mainly based on three things. First, the lack of political legitimacy, secondly, the presence of a weak multi-ethnic state and lastly, popular Islamic movements and parties (Saleem 2017, 5). All these three things were present in Pakistan due to which Islamization became an inevitable process. Pakistan began to lean towards Islam within a few years of its independence and in a few decades, it took the form of a kind of Islamic state. Islamization in Pakistan started with three events. The first was the Objective Resolution of 1949; the second, was the 1953 Anti-Ahmadiyya riots, and the third was the first Constitution of Pakistan 1956.

The Objective Resolution of 1949 initiated Islamization and defined Pakistan by linking it to Islam. In this Objective Resolution, it was stated that (I) the main basis of sovereignty is not the people or representation of the people but Allah (II) democracy, liberty, equality, tolerance, and social justice shall be established by Islam. (III) Muslims must determine their lives from the Islamic teachings and requirements of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. According to Hussain Haqqani (2018, 71), it was very difficult for Pakistan to retreat from an Islamic ideological state after the Objective Resolution.

The anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953 were the next step towards Islamization. The anti-Ahmadi riots were led by the Sunni tradition-linked organization Majlis-e-Ahrar. They demanded that the Ahmadi community be declared non-Muslim because this community does not consider Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet and considers 19th century Messiah Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the centre of its education. These riots presented for the first time the discourse between Muslims and non-Muslims at the state level. These riots offered a glimpse of the Islamic State as an Islamic State that distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims, and non-Muslims - always considered as second class citizens.

The Constitution of 1956 was a formal statement of the national identity of Pakistan. The Constitution was conceived primarily from the premise of an Islamic future. In this constitution, the objective resolution of 1949 was given the form of a preamble; the formal name of Pakistan was changed to the Islamic Republic, under Article 227 of the Constitution; it was said that no law should be against the Holy Quran and Sunna. Under the Constitution, the office of the President was limited to Muslims. John Esposito (1980, 142-145) believes that these events clarified the discovery of Islamic

identity in Pakistan, while Rais (2017, 15) believes that these events lost the ideals behind the creation of Pakistan, which was to create a geographically bordered nation-state where all individuals would be empowered, equal, and all would have equal civil rights.

The radical form of Islamization in Pakistan was seen under the rule of Bhutto. Bhutto proactively normalized and sunnized Islam in Pakistan. Bhutto came to power in Pakistan democratically with secular credentials. Despite his modernist character, Bhutto made Pakistan more Islamic. Pakistan was declared a theocratic state. Bhutto started using 'Islamic socialism' in the early days by connecting a large number of people. Apart from this, Bhutto used many religious phrases such as Musawat-e-Mohammedi (Equality of the followers of Mohammed) and Islamic Musawat (Islamic equality) etc. to assert the legitimacy of his policies. Bhutto introduced the third constitution in 1973, which was more Islamic and radical than the existing ones. Under Article 2 of this constitution, Islam has declared the state religion; the offices of the Prime Minister and President were restricted to Muslims, and the Islamic Ideological Council was made a stable body. The Ministry of Religious Affairs was established. On the Council of Islamic Ideology, two big faces of Jamaat-e-Islami which wanted to make Pakistan a fully Islamic state, Noorani and Maududi were made members. Islamic Conference was held in Pakistan in 1974, turning foreign policy towards Arab Islamic countries. Bhutto's biggest Islamic move was to declare the Ahmadi community non-Muslim under the Second Amendment to the Constitution in 1974. Apart from this, freedom of expression was also limited in the name of national security and Islam. In the context of Bhutto, the argument is justified that more than the Islamic class in Pakistan, the secular leadership has Islamized Pakistan (Jaffreot 2015, 463-478, Kukreja 2003, 166-167).

In 1977, the non-democratic Zia-ul-Haq came to power in Pakistan. Zia started the first act by calling the old regime un-Islamic and offered his interpretation of Pakistan. According to Zia, Pakistan was created in the name of Islam; further, its sustenance rests on Islam; so establishing an Islamic system is the demand of this country. Zia-ul-Haq used Islam as a strategy of legitimacy to consolidate his autocratic military rule in an unprecedented way. Zia intended to derail democracy through a just interpretation of Islam. He consistently brushed aside the democratic process and denounced political parties and opposition popular participation and favoured the institution of 'Amir' or one-man governance for the country. Zia-ul-Haq formally implemented the policy of Islamization in Pakistan. Zia's religious family pursuits and the ideology of military discipline gave way to Islamization (Kukreja 2003, 168-173).

The policy of Islamization existed at three levels. The first was legal Islamization, beginning with the establishment of Shariat Courts in the High Court and Shariat Courts of Appeal in the Supreme Court. The main function of these courts was to see that no law should be against the Quran and Sunnah in any way. The Hadud Ordinance was passed which included specific Islamic punishments for different crimes such as amputation, stoning, whipping, etc. The provisions of the blasphemy law existing under the Penal Code were established. 295B The punishment of life imprisonment has been established for any person who defiles, destroys, makes, abusive, and unlawful use of the Quran. 295-C was associated with an insult to the Prophet, whose punishment was death, imprisonment for life, and fine. Before these reforms 295, 295-A applied to all religions. Zia declared this law only for Islam and made it more stringent by adding the death penalty. Under 298B and 298-C of the 1984 Anti-Ahmadi Bill, Ahmadis were stripped of the right to call themselves Muslims. In 1985, along with Ahmadis, all other religious groups were also declared non-Muslims. This was clear evidence of a predominantly Islamic state. Islamization of banking services was introduced which was based on a profit and loss system. In terms of zakat and usher laws, 2.5 per cent of the annual income will be put into the zakat fund which will be used to help the poor. More attention was paid to the Islamization of education, the expansion of the madrasa system. The main tool of Zia's rule was education because through this he was establishing the consensus of

Islamic identity in society. Islamization of Pakistan, according to Zia, was necessary therapy to resolve the long-standing crisis of identity. After the end of the Zia regime, other democratic regimes only carried on the Zia tradition throughout the 1990s and in the 21st century (Jaffrelot 2015, 468-478, Afzal 2018, 51-138).

The importance of Islam in Pakistan can also be understood from quantitative data. In PEW's 2011 poll, 84 percent of the people believed that Sharia should be made a law of Pakistan, 75 per cent believed that Islam in Pakistan can be saved only by the blasphemy law, while 92 per cent in PEW's 2013 survey People believed that Islam was the only true religion in the world, and 85 per cent of the people believed that other people should also become Muslims (Afzal 2018, 1-26).

The second characteristic of Islamic identity is the hostile image of India and the Hindus. According to Hussain Haqqani (2016, 15), Pakistan's national identity was modelled after Jinnah on two grounds: (I) Islam as a religious symbolism (II) converting the rivalry between Muslim League and Congress into the rivalry between India and Pakistan. All the leadership of Pakistan has always given place to anti-India in their political projects because anti-India sentiment on the one hand helps them to organize and maintain their power. Pakistan's anti-India sentiment consists of the two-nation theory, unequal distribution of resources during partition, India's major role in the creation of Bangladesh and the issue of Kashmir, etc. Pakistan in general terms according to Jean-Luc Racine (2002, 195-228) suffers from 'The Indian Syndrome'.

Pakistan's national identity with Islam and anti-India sentiment represents a negative identity. Due to the negative identity, Christophe Jaffrelot (2002, 7-8) considers Pakistan to be a case of "Nationalism without a Nation". Anti-India sentiments can also be understood through quantitative data. In a PEW 2014 survey, 75 percent of Pakistanis believed that India was their biggest enemy (before the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda). In PEW 2015 survey, 70 per cent of Pakistanis did not have very good views about India (Afzal 2018, 1-26).

## Conclusion

Politics of identity not only creates the politics of antagonism but also see the historical facts in their ways. Surprisingly, historical facts of the Pakistan Movement defined the identity discourses. Pakistan movement depicts two different and opposite identities and ideas of Pakistan. Muslim Identity of Pakistan represents Pakistan movement as the destiny of Muslim state, on the other hand, Islamic identity of Pakistan defined Pakistan movement as Making of Islamic State. Whoever wants to understand the idea of Pakistan has to understand that there is no single idea of Pakistan but is made up of two views that represent two different aspects of the history of Pakistan.

The fundamental reason for the prominence of Islamic identity in Pakistan is the rigid belief and imperative in Islam and the anti-India sentiment of both civil society and political society. Islam and anti-India sentiment has not only been used by the political leadership. but the administrative system and military power of Pakistan also consider Islam and anti-India sentiment as its source.

This paper seeks to show historically how the question of national identity has shifted from 'Muslim Zion' to 'New Medina'. Today the dominance of Islamic identity in Pakistan which no one can challenge. Where most Pakistanis feel that adopting Islamic identity is their last target. The same Farzana Shaikh (2018) believes that Islam based national identity has not integrated but divided the nation and completely rejects the idea of pluralistic culture of Pakistan. But today, despite democratic rule, Pakistan represents an Islamic identity, as opposed to Islam and India became an integral part of their psychological state. Islam and the anti-India sentiment is the genetic code of Pakistan.



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