



JOURNAL OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATIVE RESEARCH (JETIR)

An International Scholarly Open Access, Peer-reviewed, Refereed Journal

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: India's Stance

*Dr.B.Saroja, Associate Professor of Political Science, SSA Govt. First Grade College (Autonomous), Ballari.

Abstract

This paper attempts to study **India's balanced stance on Russia-Ukraine Conflict** and the belief in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, and stressed the need for diplomacy and dialogue to resolve the crisis. India's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been distinctive among the major democracies and among U.S. strategic partners. Despite its discomfort with Moscow's war, New Delhi has adopted a studied public neutrality toward Russia. It has abstained from successive votes in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council that condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine and thus far has refused to openly call out Russia as the instigator of the crisis. For many in the United States, including in President Joe Biden's administration, India's neutrality has been disappointing because it signaled a sharp divergence between Washington and New Delhi on a fundamental issue of global order, namely, the legitimacy of using force to change borders and occupy another nation's territory through a blatant war of conquest. Whatever their views on the genesis and the precipitants of the Ukraine war, most Indian strategic elites would admit that their country's diplomatic neutrality ultimately signifies what one Indian scholar has called "a subtle pro-Moscow position." This seems particularly incongruous today because India stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States in opposing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific while at the same time appearing tolerant of the vastly more egregious Russian belligerence in Europe.

The oddity of this Indian position is explained by New Delhi's perceptions of its interests. These interests have led India to avoid condemning Russia publicly, even though its declared positions were intended to convey—perhaps a tad more subtly than is justified—its dismay with Russian actions. Thus, India urged "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states," called "for the immediate cessation of violence and hostilities," regretted "that the path of diplomacy was given up" and urged the concerned states to "return to it," and reiterated that "dialogue is the only answer to settling differences and disputes, however daunting that may appear at this moment." India's Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reinforced these themes during his intervention in the parliamentary debate on Ukraine when, in a coded critique of Russian actions, he reiterated India's position "that the global order is anchored on international law, [the] UN Charter and respect for [the] territorial integrity and sovereignty of states."

Keywords: Cold War, Soviet Union, NATO, Russia-Ukraine Crises, India, European Union.

Introduction

India's tightrope walk on the Ukraine war has been described as "strategic ambivalence." Far from it—it actually reflects New Delhi's deliberate choice, even if a constrained one. This decision to steer clear of publicly condemning Russia is shaped not by abstract concerns about the integrity of the world order but by purposeful Indian calculations about how alienating Russia might undermine its security.

In the first instance, India's public neutrality toward the Russian invasion is driven fundamentally by its concerns vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. New Delhi sees both of these states as immediate and enduring threats, and it believes that preserving its friendship with Moscow will help to prevent deepening Russian ties with China and to limit Russian temptations to build new strategic ties with Pakistan. Both China and Pakistan desire closer ties with Russia than India feels comfortable with. Consequently, New Delhi aims to minimize Moscow's proximity to both of its rivals. Toward that end, it has concluded that studiously avoiding any open criticism of Russia offers it a chance to arrest the tightening Sino-Russian embrace while preventing a new dalliance between Moscow and Islamabad, both of which undermine India's core interests.

Other considerations combine to reinforce this primary geopolitical calculation. Russia is viewed as having been a sturdy friend of India's going back to 1955, when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev publicly declared Moscow's support for Indian claims over Jammu and Kashmir (when the West was either ambivalent or opposed in comparison). And the Soviet Union wielded vetoes in the UN Security Council on India's behalf on six occasions (and Russia could be called upon to do so again in future crises). Keeping Russia on side through its veto-wielding prerogatives thus remains an important consideration that reinforces India's reticence to criticize Russia, even when its behaviors are judged to be deplorable and on occasion undermining India's vital interests. On this count, India's posture today remains fundamentally consistent with its past forbearance in the face of previous Russian aggression, for example, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Afghanistan in 1979. Despite this last crisis having subverted India's regional environment for forty years and counting, New Delhi has been excessively charitable when calling out Russian misdemeanors, a courtesy that historically has never been equally extended to the United States.

The underlying reason for this asymmetrical treatment is that India now has a durable view of Russia as a "dependable partner." The evidence often trotted out in justification is that Moscow, for example, did not ally with or arm Pakistan against India; it supported New Delhi against U.S. pressure during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war; and it has never criticized developments in Indian domestic politics, unlike the United States, which has done so on many occasions. The evidence undermining this unfair comparison with Washington—the substantial U.S. assistance (including food aid) to India early in its postindependence history, Washington's military and political support to New Delhi during the darkest moments of the 1962 Sino-Indian war (when the Soviet Union was either ambivalent or supported China), and the more recent, precedent-breaking U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement—unfortunately does not seem to count for much, in contrast. Consequently, between the nostalgia about Russia being "a very reliable [and] long term partner" and the suspicion that the United States could prove to be "a fickle and uncertain strategic partner," the threshold that must be crossed to provoke any Indian public criticism of Moscow is extremely high.

India's continuing dependence on Russia for military equipment only deepens its reluctance to alienate Moscow in any way. This aspect has received widespread attention since the beginning of the Ukraine war, but it is ultimately secondary to the larger calculations that center on preserving strong ties with Russia as part of India's efforts to both balance China while constraining Pakistan and realize a multipolar system where it cannot be hemmed in by any excessively powerful states. All the same, New Delhi's current dependence on Moscow for the spares and support necessary to maintain its large inventory of Russian-origin military equipment is real.

Although India has begun to diversify its arms purchases away from Russia during the last two decades, Russia still remains a critical—and, in fact, a highly desirable—source of weapons for India. This is because Russian weapons are usually cheaper in comparison to their Western counterparts, at least as far as their initial costs go, and they are often just as good, or at least good enough, for India's operational needs. Moreover, Russia alone, again in contrast to the West, is often willing to provide India with the high-leverage strategic technologies that others will not, has pursued the codevelopment and coproduction of advanced weapons systems to include their manufacturing in India, and does not burden India with excessive end-user constraints, thus making India's defense relationship with Moscow even more valuable for New Delhi. The bottom line, therefore, is that India would be unwilling to jettison the defense supply links with Russia, even if it could procure comparable weapons from alternative Western sources, because the tie with Moscow offers it important technological and political benefits.

Objective:

This paper intends to explore and analyze Indian response to Ukraine crisis; indeed, a watershed of many sorts, with seismic consequences for the international order. Also clarify need for India's UNSC abstention over the Ukraine invasion

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, much of the Indian debate on the issue has been focused around dissecting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) abstentions, issue of territorial sovereignty, need for diversification of defence imports, and the consequences for strategic autonomy due to this dependence.

As the war rages on, another question will soon emerge to become a more salient one—based on the kind of Russia that emerges from this war, which will play a role in determining the future of the bilateral strategic partnership. The unprecedented nature of sanctions imposed on Russia means that the world is in uncharted territory, as the impact of a nuclear-powered former superpower facing deep economic isolation is not a precedent one in the history of this globalised world. The worst case scenarios for the current sanctions trajectory predict enormous economic pain for Russia, rivalling the crisis of the 1990s, with a sharp drop in living standards, and rise in poverty and unemployment.

In less extreme scenarios, if sanctions are not further ramped up and some 'neutral countries' decide to carry on their relationship, it might not lead to an economic collapse; but will still result in a much weaker country. If

Russia orients towards China to decouple from the West, and the rising power is willing to devise mechanisms to bypass sanctions, then it would become the key to economic survival of Russia under the current sanctions regime. If this path is undertaken, given the pace and extent of shift, in the short to medium term, Moscow will exercise considerably less leverage in its relations with China, which can be especially damaging during an evolving international order. This outcome, of course, will depend on China being willing to come to the aid of Russia in a full-fledged manner.

The unprecedented nature of sanctions imposed on Russia means that the world is in uncharted territory, as the impact of a nuclear-powered former superpower facing deep economic isolation is not a precedent one in the history of this globalised world.

If Russia is unable to reach an agreement that leads to the worst of the sanctions being lifted, it would deal a body blow to its positioning as a reinvigorated post-Soviet state that is an independent pole in a multipolar world. In this scenario of a long-drawn out sanctions regime, it is unclear if all leading non-Western states would be willing to align themselves with Russia, if their national interests seem to be adversely impacted. In addition, as Russia would (at least in the medium term) see a decline in its own power projection capacities, it would not be able to escape the impact of its invasion on its interests in other regions of the world.

Already the war has exposed the extent of economic weakness of Russia, something that has often been pointed out as its greatest challenge, which cannot be overcome simply by looking towards China as its main trading partner instead of the European Union. For instance, Russia's policy positioning in a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific was facing challenges, not only due to a committed pushback by regional states against an increasingly aggressive China; but also due to its own weak capacities on the ground. A decade after its own pivot to the East, Moscow remains a minor economic player in Asia-Pacific driven by an inability to be part of the regional value chains, and with limited influence over the pace of regional changes.

Till now, these weaknesses were mitigated through building of independent relationships with regional powers like India and Vietnam; and steps to improve ties with other regional players including ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea. When taken alongside its domestic stability and ability to use available resources to steadily expand influence across Central Asia, Caucasus, West Asia, and even Afghanistan without over-stretching; it made Russia a 'good enough' power that exercised its influence across various regional geographies, and especially in Eurasia. This also ensured that despite the asymmetrical power vis-à-vis Beijing, Moscow still managed to exercise its own version of neutrality in China's territorial disputes involving other Asian countries, including India.

India's position:

However, given the current intensity of western sanctions and Russia looking to China for a bail-out, it is likely that this would lead to a decimation of Russian capacity to be an influential player in Eurasia, whilst further weakening its already faltering pivot to the East. This is an outcome that would deeply trouble India, whose foreign policy includes Russia as an important partner across the continental Eurasian space. Whether in Central Asia or Afghanistan or West Asia, Moscow's influence was seen in a positive light. India also has extensive multilateral linkages that include the former superpower.

Already the war has exposed the extent of economic weakness of Russia, something that has often been pointed out as its greatest challenge, which cannot be overcome simply by looking towards China as its main trading partner instead of the European Union.

Before the invasion, India was focusing on furthering its ties with Russia, including setting up a 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers' dialogue to exchange views on global and regional political-security developments. As a strategic partner, Russia's role in all of the above mentioned domains was considered both essential and valuable. The invasion of Ukraine now complicates these calculations for New Delhi, and raises important questions regarding the future of Russia in the emerging world order.

It is clear that India is not pleased with the Russian invasion and its disenchantment stems from the rise of factors that will not only directly impact Indo-Russia ties, but also the broader geopolitical environment where India will have fewer choices than it had before Russia decided to invade Ukraine. However, if the current trajectory is not reversed, is India ready to fundamentally recalibrate its foreign policy across Eurasia in a truncated timeframe, even as the regional system itself comes under stress?

The one outcome where India's choices are not starkly limited includes one in which Russia and Ukraine reach a deal that brings peace to Ukraine, addresses key concerns of the parties, and creates conditions for a gradual lifting of at least the worst of the sanctions. This would both prevent a shock to the regional order in Eurasia and give India the time and space it needs to decide the future trajectory of policy towards Russia in a way that does not cause immediate damage to its interests.

Some Indian commentators have raised the prospect of a mediation effort, to both stem an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe and also preserve its own national interests. It might not be enough on its own, but if combined with efforts of other countries friendly towards Russia, it might create an incentive for Russia to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine. It might also be relevant to discuss with the Western partners the use of leverage they hold through sanctions in modifying Russian behaviour. Are the sanctions a long-term means to weaken Russia in the hope of a regime change, or are they to be used to help strike a lasting deal and end the ongoing war? The Western role in how the war ends will be a crucial one, because the core issues of European security would not be addressed solely through any future Russia-Ukraine deal. While Moscow will inevitably have to come down from its maximalist positions, the US and the EU must also take the chance to establish a credible dialogue process. Although the instinct at the moment is to punish Russia for its actions, it is important for all the sides to avoid repeating the mistakes of the post-Cold War period in which compromise deals were seen as an anathema.

It is clear that India is not pleased with the Russian invasion and its disenchantment stems from the rise of factors that will not only directly impact Indo-Russia ties, but also the broader geopolitical environment where India will have fewer choices than it had before Russia decided to invade Ukraine.

It is clear that Russian security concerns about NATO expansion notwithstanding, its miscalculations and over-estimation of its own capacities have led it to launch a war that now threatens to undo decades of progress across domestic and foreign policy domains. In addition, several of its own myths ranging from being a fortress to disunity of the West to Ukraine's views about Russia have come crumbling down. If Russia learns to reckon with these realities while not being

an isolated, disgruntled nuclear power with a Security Council veto; the outcome would be far more beneficial for long-term stability in Europe.

If Russia cannot arrive at a negotiated deal and the war drags on alongside the sanctions pressure, India might well be forced to re-evaluate the contours of its long-standing partnership with Russia. However, if New Delhi chooses to reach this point without making efforts to actively influence the outcome in its favour and to persuade Russia towards a comprehensive deal with its adversaries and vice versa, it would be simply allowing its own foreign policy to be dictated by the uncontrolled ramifications of the Russian invasion and western response. As Russia-Ukraine talks continue, India should be looking to remind Russia of the benefits of not being an isolated entity and use its offices to prevent an outcome that takes control of its foreign policy out of its own hands.

Interests and Neutrality positions

Having said all this, Indian policymakers are aware of the risks accompanying their current public neutrality toward Russia. Neutrality positions India as allied to the despotic Russian state personified by Putin rather than to Russia the country. It exposes the inconsistency in India's commitment to protecting the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific over that in Europe, at a time when its biggest international partners—economic and strategic—are both united in their determination to penalize Russia and at odds with India's posture on Ukraine. It also leaves India in the company of strange bedfellows such as China and Pakistan, which happen to be India's adversaries and have behaved toward India as Russia has toward Ukraine.

Most importantly, however, it remains unclear whether India's current efforts at befriending Russia by refusing to condemn its invasion of Ukraine will actually arrest the continuing drift toward stronger Sino-Russian ties, even if the efforts further weaken what are already feeble Russian incentives to deepen ties with Pakistan. Above all, there is no assurance that India's current strategy of mollifying Russia by eschewing public criticism of the Kremlin's war, if successful in the near term, would pay off in the end—especially if Moscow is enervated as a result of cumulative Western sanctions and as a consequence is unable to support India in the manner that New Delhi hopes for. This outcome would be particularly problematic if the “no limits” Sino-Russian ties gave Beijing undue influence over Russia's future cooperation with India or if Russia proves unable to support India's military forces and their future modernization because of its own deteriorating industrial base at a time when India could also lose Ukraine as a critical supplier of components for the weapons that are now in the Indian military inventory.

There is little doubt, therefore, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has confronted India with difficult strategic choices. Consequently, its decision to avoid all public criticism of Moscow is, in the estimation of Indian policymakers, the best of the bad choices facing New Delhi. Any public opposition to Russian actions—as the United States had earlier hoped that India would mount, both because of its democratic credentials and its concerns about protecting the rules-based order—would end up angering Russia at a time when India is still not confident of the United States as a sturdy or substitute partner. A more cynical calculation takes India toward the same outcome: as one Indian scholar, Happymon Jacob, summarized it, “an aggressive Russia is a problem for the United States and the West, not for India. [The] North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion is Russia's problem, not India's. India's problem is China, and it needs both the United States/the West and Russia to deal with the 'China problem.'" Because New Delhi has concluded that the United States will assist India to balance China out of sheer self-interest, it has sought to ensure Russia's support for this aim by refraining from any public denunciations that might frustrate this objective.

Obviously, the Indian ambition to recruit Russia in its efforts to checkmate China may yet fail. That New Delhi persists, however, in placating Moscow can therefore only be read as reflecting an unstated confidence that Russia will not only survive its current confrontation with the West in reasonably good shape (irrespective of whether Putin himself ends up becoming a casualty) but that the Kremlin will also manage to avert a choking embrace by China over the long term that limits its choices where India is concerned. If both these outcomes were to materialize, the Indian gamble of tacitly supporting Russia could potentially pay off insofar as it would permit the current (or future) Russian leadership to repay India for its aloof public posture on Ukraine at a time when the larger international community, including India's partners in the Global South, was transparently opposed to Russian aggression. A further unspoken presumption underlying India's current posture on Ukraine is that, when all is said and done, the West will ultimately be far more forgiving of India's choices than Russia would be if the circumstances were reversed. At the very least, the Indian government now seems confident, especially after the recent bilateral 2+2 meeting, that it has been able to persuade the United States to accept its political constraints vis-à-vis Russia without harming the larger U.S.-Indian relationship.

In any event, India's struggle to find a pathway that avoids criticizing Russia despite its blatant aggression in Ukraine highlights a larger underlying reality: the unyielding importance accorded by New Delhi to protecting India's interests in its international decisionmaking. India's enduring goal remains ascending to the international stage as a great power but without committing to any entangling alliances along the way. This ascent is best assured under conditions of peace in the presence of multiple, competing power centers that can be leveraged by India to derive benefits for itself amid their mutual rivalries. Given this aim, neither unipolarity nor any bipolarity that involves a strong Indian antagonism toward one of the poles serves India's interests: the former creates few incentives for the dominant power to assist India's rise, and while the latter may induce one great power, such as the United States, to support India in its competition with a close rival such as China (which is also opposed to India), New Delhi fears that Washington's asking price may be too high and may involve forms of entrapment that India seeks to avoid to the extent possible. To be sure, India will partner with the United States in balancing China because Beijing currently represents the most significant threat to Indian interests, but New Delhi neither seeks an alliance with Washington toward that end nor is comfortable with the idea of the United States being its sole partner in realizing that objective.

Consequently, India prefers a multipolar international order that would allow it to maneuver between several and diverse poles, exploiting their differences depending on the issue areas, to secure gains for itself while avoiding permanent alignments with any. To the degree that the current Ukraine crisis fosters a deeper Sino-Russian partnership, it eliminates Russia as an independent pole and increases China's influence at just the time when Sino-Indian relations are terribly uneasy. The importance of preventing Russia from treating China as its only reliable partner has thus driven New Delhi

to implicitly support Moscow in the hope that this gambit will eventually pay off in ways that benefit India. Not even the benefits of the evolving U.S.-Indian partnership suffice to induce India to abandon Russia given its judgments about Moscow's significance for New Delhi's interests, especially at a time when many Indian strategic elites disturbingly believe that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, however distasteful, is an understandable response to the West's "predatory geopolitics."

Conclusion

The current Indian strategy of refusing to condemn Russian actions publicly could be undermined by several outcomes: the demise of Russian power or the congealing of a tight Sino-Russian relationship, either of which would deny India the beneficial partnership that it has sought to preserve with Moscow, or highly punitive actions by the United States against India, which would make the immediate costs of New Delhi's neutrality far more painful than the benefits that India might ultimately derive from its continuing ties with Russia. Given this reality, the inconsistency in India's attitude vis-à-vis Russia in comparison to China does not bother New Delhi one whit: because Beijing is a direct adversary, India will confront China resolutely, in partnership with other countries when necessary, while invoking the importance of the rules-based international order to legitimize its choices. Yet the imperatives of protecting this very order will be disregarded if they collide with New Delhi's more immediate concerns. In doing so, Indian policymakers do not concede—as U.S. leaders are wont to argue—that the struggle over the preservation of the liberal order, as it is manifested in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, pits democracies and autocracies on opposite sides.

References

1. Williams, Carol J. (18 June 2014). "U.N. warns pro-Russia separatists leading Ukrainians down 'dead end'". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
2. Ash, Lucy (29 January 2015). "How Russia outfoxes its enemies". BBC News. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
3. "Russian TV sparks outrage with Ukraine child 'crucifixion' claim". Yahoo News. Agence France-Presse. 14 July 2014. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
4. Crosbie, Jack (17 February 2022). "'Mass Graves' and Shelled Schools: A Dangerous New Phase of the Ukraine Crisis is Here". Rolling Stone. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
5. Fisher, Max (19 February 2022). "Putin's Baseless Claims of Genocide Hint at More Than War". The New York Times. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
6. "Eastern Ukraine conflict: Summary killings, misrecorded and misreported". Amnesty International. 20 October 2014. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
7. "Use Only Official Sources About Ukraine War, Russian Media Watchdog Tells Journalists". The Moscow Times. 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
8. "Do not call Ukraine invasion a 'war', Russia tells media, schools". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
9. "Even Russia's Kremlin-backed media is going off message and beginning to question Putin's war on Ukraine". Fortune. 11 March 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
10. "Putin Signs Law Introducing Jail Terms for 'Fake News' on Army". The Moscow Times. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2022.

11. "Channelling Goebbels: The obscenity of Russian state TV news, as it conceals war crimes for Putin". inews.co.uk. 6 April 2022.
12. "Navalny Calls for Sanctions Against Russian State Media 'Warmongers'". The Moscow Times. 6 March 2022.
13. "Attacking Ukraine, Putin calls for 'denazification' of country with a Jewish leader". Times of Israel. 24 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
14. Bulos, Nabih (17 February 2022). "Russian disinformation kicks into high gear as Ukraine crisis drags on". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 19 February 2022.
15. Team, ODS. "Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (PDF). documents-dds-ny.un.org.
16. Ljubicic, Milica (9 March 2022). "Ruska rezolucija u UN-u poslužila da se SAD i Ukrajina predstave kao nacističke države | Raskrikavanje". raskrikavanje.rs (in Serbian). Raskrikavanje. Retrieved 13 March 2022.
17. "Explanation of Vote at the Third Committee Adoption of the Combating Glorification of Nazism". United States Mission to the United Nations. 12 November 2021. Retrieved 13 March 2022.
18. "NATO jets scramble in response to Russian aircraft over Baltic and Black Sea". NATO. 29 April 2022.
19. Livingstone, Helen (26 April 2022). "Russia accuses Nato of 'proxy war' in Ukraine as US hosts crucial defence summit: Ukraine dismisses Sergei Lavrov's war comments as diplomats gather in Germany for US-hosted talks to navigate 'critical' phase". The Guardian.
20. "Russia doesn't consider itself to be at war with NATO, Lavrov says". Washington Post. 29 April 2022.
21. "Ukraine: Boris Johnson rejects 'NATO proxy war' allegations, as Russia cuts gas supplies". Euronews. 27 April 2022.
22. "Dam leaves Crimea population in chronic water shortage". Al-Jazeera. 4 January 2017.
23. "Turchynov: Russia starts aggression in Crimea". Kyiv Post. 28 February 2014. Retrieved 1 March 2014.
24. Henderson, Barney (1 March 2014). "Ukraine live: Prime Minister of Ukraine says Russian military invasion would lead to war". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 2 March 2014. Retrieved 1 March 2014.
25. Coker, Margaret; Kolyandr, Alexander (1 March 2014). "Ukraine Puts Military on Full Alert After Russian invasion Threat". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
26. (in Ukrainian) The Cabinet decided to create the Ministry of temporarily occupied territories and internally displaced persons, Ukrayinska Pravda (20 April 2016)
27. "U.S. pledges \$1 billion in aid to Ukraine". Los Angeles Times. Associated Press. 4 March 2014. Retrieved 30 December 2014.
28. Scisłowska; Pablo Gorondi; Karel Janicek; Jovana Gec; Corneliu Rusnac (12 March 2014). "Russian aggression unnerves other neighbours". The Chronicle Herald. Associated Press. Retrieved 14 March 2014.
29. "Russia's Neighbors Want Stronger Defenses After Ukraine Incursion". Global Security Newswire. 7 March 2014. Retrieved 14 March 2014.
30. Gearan, Anne (1 April 2014). "NATO chief recommits to defending Eastern European, Baltic nations". The Washington Post. Retrieved 1 April 2014.