



MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

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ABSTRACT

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean remains, even though it may be difficult for one country to control the interior expanse of the ocean today as it was for the British, French, or Portuguese empires in the past. After a period without significant great power competition in the region following the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean has actually returned to prominence with the advent of the Indo-Pacific, the modern geopolitical framework that encompasses both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This paper presents some of the key problems regarding Indian Ocean and certain suggestions that might lead to positive resolution of the same. India and China are at constant opposition for a long time now and various other problems and agencies are also discussed in this paper.

KEYWORDS : Indian Ocean, Ogin, Maritime Dispute, Halieutic, Indo- Pacific.

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean is a vast theatre that stretches from the Mozambique Channel in the west to the western coast of Australia and the Strait of Malacca in the east. It extends from the northern Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf to the southern Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean Initiative. Roughly 2.7 billion people live in the countries that line the coasts of this enormous geographic area. The Indian Ocean is divided into four main sub regions: South Asia, the Middle East, Africa's Atlantic coast, and the islands that span the ocean from Sri Lanka in the east to the Comoros Archipelago in the west. The geo-economics significance of the region can be explained by its size and dispersion. The Indian Ocean Rim Association, its regional forum, brings together politically and socially diverse nations like Australia, Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa, facilitating the percussion of novel divinity dynamics. The stability of the Indian Ocean is crucial to the global economy, affecting everything from South Asia's manufacturing industries and task markets to resort-rich Africa and the Life-opaque Middle East.

IMPORTANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean plays a crucial role in the negotiation of sword and strategic engagement due to the significance of dealing and the sheer size of its numerous sub regions. It serves as a crucial trading hub that links Europe and the Americas with Southeast and East Asia and the Middle East. The security of energy imports via the Malacca Strait is a major source of income for major economies like China, Japan, and South Korea, and will be negatively impacted by any disruption along its corrupt routes. The ability to maintain a military air force close to important choke points connecting its office route lies at the core of the geopolitical turmoil in the Indian Ocean. During times of peace and wage, this kind of presence restricts nations' ability to screen and disrupt these important marine channels, which are understood as Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) protection and SLOC interdiction in naval boundaries.

Three of the seven major gulp points in the world for smear transport are located in the Indian Ocean. These chokepoints join two significant rivers, forming a preserve for maritime traffic. Large ships and oil tankers typically find the disjunctive route to be expensive, distant, or in certain cases, impassable, if these short sections of diluted are blocked or unavailable. The Malacca Strait, which connects Southeast Asia and the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean, is the first choke point. It is situated between Malaysia, Singapore, and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The Strait of Hormuz, the sole waterway bridging the Persian Gulf and the larger Indian Ocean, is the second. The third is the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and runs between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Eritrea and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. The Mozambique Channel, which connects Madagascar and Mozambique, is another important trade route for goods travelling from the Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East and Asia. A navy can control all points of entry and exit into the area if it has access to and authority over these choke points. Additionally, being close to crucial checkpoints facilitates a family's antisubmarine warfare and surveillance mission, which fosters familiarity with the maritime domain. For an adversary to be aware of their poor boy movements, surveillance and survey missions are especially crucial in the vicinity of choke points. Long-term subsurface vessel detection in the open sea is far more difficult and costly. For the numerous intertidal nations that line its coastline in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, a country that has a strong protection profile in the Indian Ocean will be a crucial ally.ⁱ

ORGANISATIONS AND SECURITY CONCERNS

The term “Indo-Pacific” refers to a wider viewpoint that expands beyond an overemphasis on the Pacific to encompass a large portion of the Indian Ocean, a region that holds significant potential for Australia’s future. Due to this shift, Australia is now placing a great deal of emphasis on the Indian Ocean region in terms of both security and economy. Australia was quick to help establish a stable regional norm in East Asia to encourage economic prosperity for all troubled regions, even back when some Arabic numerals were still in use. In order to take full advantage of the economic opportunities in the Indian Ocean today, Australia must assist in creating a stable regional order in that region. In conclusion, a greater focus on taming Australia’s “Wild West,” the vast and essentially uncontrolled expanse of the Indian Ocean, is warranted. Australia needs to help found marine arrangement across the region.ⁱⁱ

The Indian Ocean estate is not as cooperative as the Asia-Pacific region, where there is a veritable alphabet soup of agile organisations tasked with policing the supercilious seas: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+), and Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Runner in Asia (ReCAAP), to mention a few. However, it goes beyond simply duplicating or broadening the scope of the Asia-Pacific nest in the Indian Ocean. There are significant differences between the difficulties encountered in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The majority of security issues facing the Indian Ocean region are of a transnational nature. These include the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and people; illicit, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) halieutic; and the participation of non-state actors in piracy.

One of the world's least regulated oceans is the Indian Ocean. Maritime offenders frequently discover beneficial synergies between these operations and benefit from a lack of local filth capabilities in the Indian Ocean. The majority of attention in the Pacific is focused on a collection of maritime boundary disputes, many of which involve China. While disputes of this nature do occur in the Indian Ocean, it is generally acknowledged that, in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they ought to be thoughtful and resolved through peaceful procedures. However, the Indian Ocean states have a lot less organisation and many have limited marine capabilities when compared to the Pacific states. Many have developed Indian Ocean height distress to fully govern their respective maritime jurisdictions. It is unfortunate that the most pressing issue at hand is establishing a foundation of stability and collaboration within the local community.

In recent times, Australia and other nations like India have exerted significant pressure to make the current regional alliances more effective—or even functional. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is only now beginning to tighten with some maritime defence issues, despite including maritime safety in its restore in 2014. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which brings together the navies of the district, is the only other portion-regional organisation. While progress has been slow, the group did conduct its first naval exercise in Bangladesh in 2017. Additionally, Iran has assumed the IONS chair in a gathering of maritime leaders from the region. As was to be expected, Tehran took advantage of the court to criticise the US for providing the province with assurances. It should be noted that organisations like IONS reflect the impressive diversity of the Indian Ocean province, even though some people might not find this to be all that helpful. Creating inclusive groups that facilitate the expression of varied viewpoints has merit. Currently, there is focus on two areas of synergy/capacity-construction: shore guard cooperation and marine estate wakefulness (MDA). Improved MDA in the Indian Ocean is a basic requirement for taming the “Wild West,” and it has become evident that regional cooperation is the only way to accomplish this. A number of proposals to build regional cooperation in MDA have surfaced over the last year or so, including one from India to establish a regional MDA fusion centre under IORA protection. Despite having the most sophisticated national MDA system in the Indian Ocean, Australia lacks adequate regional concert arrangements. Australia must constantly consider how it might create regional cooperation agreements that would benefit both the region and the country. Another area that is being discussed is how to encourage increased collaboration between local coast convoy agencies. As jurisprudence-based constraints account for the majority of maritime carelessness cases in the Indian Ocean, it makes sense to place a strong emphasis on marine law enforcement organisations. If executed correctly, this could lower confidence in navies, who are more likely to

be viewed as ugly by others due to their high cost and attractive appearance. Australia can have a significant impact on managing and developing capacity, as well as organising the glide escort agencies around the nation. This would ensure that the Maritime Border Command of Australia has the necessary resources to take on a more significant role in the sectional party. Beneath these transient trials and challenges lies the enduring need to fortify UNCLOS's supremacy.ⁱⁱⁱ

Contrary to the South China Sea, where UNCLOS is seriously threatened, the Indian Ocean region broadly accepts UNCLOS as the legal framework for littoral states and additional regional users. The 2017 Jakarta Concord, which states that “ensuring that countries in the region can exercise openness of seamanship and overflight in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS, as constitution for the Ocean,” reaffirmed the primacy of UNCLOS in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean pomp extremity is determined to uphold the UNCLOS as the supreme law and is wary of any actions that might unintentionally undermine the moral code of freedom of the seas for similar commercial and maritime vessels. Any deterioration of UNCLOS in the Indian Ocean will seriously hinder attempts to impose some border order and create a stable and prosperous area.

India, Japan, Australia, and the United States participated in consultative talks to revive the once-wicked Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on the fringes of the 2017 East Asia Summit in Manila. The outcome of the summit and the talks that followed—which have since been elevated to the ministerial level—was the idea of an open and moderate Indo-Pacific as well as a loose framework for managing events related to the maritime commons. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan served as an inspiration for the Indo-Pacific, which reimagines the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single marine theatre by realigning the strategic backdrop against which Asia's maritime confidence dynamics are adapting. With its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States has furthered this alignment through political and strategic outreach in the region. By way of a logistics exchange agreement in 2016 and an information dividend agreement in 2018, Washington and New Delhi have tactfully established a closer maritime surety relationship and established this strategic concourse.

AQUATIC LIFE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean is quickly becoming a major international political priority and a true crossroads of the world's worth. The nations bordering the Indian Ocean are becoming increasingly interconnected with one another and with the rest of the world due to increased trade, investment, leadership, and ideas flowing through the region. For example, half of global package traffic and more than two thirds of the world's oil already pass through Indian Ocean waters. However, the consistent plenty that lives beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean will be just as crucial to guaranteeing the welfare of the area in the future as the commercial wealth that travels over the sea. One of the most significant resources in the Indian Ocean region is its fishing industry. Fisheries around the Indian Ocean fishery support hundreds of millions of people and give littoral communities a means of subsistence. But as environmental pressures rise and habitats are destroyed, these essential natural areas—as well as the populations that depend on them—are coming under more and more threat. Over the past few decades, local fish capture rates have increased dramatically. From fewer than 900,000 loads in 1950, the Indian Ocean leatherneck capture fisheries produced 11.3 million vogue of fish in 2010, or 14.6 percent of the world's catch,

according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Gathering the harvest's produce is a major source of income for many local economies. For instance, Indonesia's highly regarded fabric and apparel industries rely more on halieutic and piscine agriculture than on embroidery to provide services to its six million inhabitants.

Furthermore, according to FAO estimates, three to four more people find employment in related fields like boat building, gear maintenance, and fish processing for every person who engages in direct fishing. Furthermore, fisheries provide a vital source of food for the communities residing in the Indian Ocean district. For instance, on Norma, at least 20% of the animal protein consumed in Egypt, Malaysia, Mozambique, Seychelles, Singapore, Tanzania, and Thailand comes from drop in a queue. More than half of the animal protein consumed by the people of Bangladesh, Comoros, Indonesia, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka comes from fish. However, despite their impact on economic growth and security, fisheries in the Indian Ocean are seriously threatened. Overfishing and illegal halieutic, soil erosion and habitat destruction, and the mounting effects of global warming are some of the growing stresses. While catch statistics are often insufficient to assess the health of specific stocks, signs of overfishing are becoming more prevalent.

In the Eastern Indian Ocean, landings have surpassed their peak totals from 2010, but concerningly, over 40% of catches were categorised as "unidentified." This suggests that the maturation numbers may not be indicative of a sustainable decline, but rather of a largely uncontrolled spread into new regions and species. According to the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission's assessment of 140 data points in the Western Indian Ocean, 29% of the hoard was overexploited in 2010 and 65% were plenteously exploited. Attempts to fully monitor and manage the fisheries in the region are complicated by illegal and unreported (IU) piscatorial activities. Approximately 16 to 34% of the total catches in those stocks were either illegal or unreported, according to a British study of a sample of half of the Indian Ocean's catch. IU fishing frequently happens at the expense of nearby fishermen. For example, the FAO estimated that 700 foreign vessels had been fishing illegally in Somali waters for years. Unfortunately, this meant that foreign ships were probably taking more protein illegally out of Somali waters than they were bringing in to help with famine relief and fare relief. Numerous other human pressures put the underlying ecosystems that support the region's fisheries in jeopardy. Mangroves, coral reefs, and other habitats are harmed or destroyed by coastal development for harbours, roads, and urban infrastructure. For instance, between 1980 and 2005, the mangroves along the Asian coast lost 1.9 million hectares, while the African coast lost an additional half million. As much as two-thirds of the 12,070 km³ of coral key in the Indian Ocean are already severely endangered or destroyed due to pollution, destructive fishing methods (like using dynamite and poisons), coral mining for building materials, and coral bleaching.^{iv}

Of all the environments, oceans are among the most vulnerable to changes in the global climate. Oceans will eventually absorb an increasing amount of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as a result of humans' unrelenting release of glasshouse gases into the atmosphere. The seas have absorbed between 25 and 30 percent of all CO₂ emissions from society since the start of the Industrial Revolution. The ocean's chemistry is altered by this sundry carbon dioxide, making it more acidic (as indicated by a cloudiness pH excellence). The surface set pH has already decreased by 0.1 from preindustrial direct. In the event that emissions don't stop, sourness levels will decline by an additional 0.2 to 0.3 points by 2100, which would be a decrease 30 to 100 times greater than any previous pH turn and at a rate not seen in the geological record. Similarly, as global average

temperatures rise due to climate change, the oceans will absorb more red light from the atmosphere. Approximately 90% of the additional heat caused by global warming over the past 50 years has been absorbed by the oceans, raising surface temperatures by 0.1 degrees Celsius.

Global fisheries may be greatly impacted by ocean warming and acidification, which may have an impact on the physiology, reproduction, and disintegration of individual species as well as the relationships between species and their habitats, competitors, predators, and pathogens. According to several studies, earth fishing production may need to increase by half from incidental levels to keep up with projected food requirements as the world's population grows from 7 billion to 9 billion people by the middle of the century. However, reliable analyses point out that changes in the climate could lead to significant management in catch sizes and locations. Redistributing the world's fish population on a large scale runs the risk of producing winners and losers. According to an expanded global assessment, a significant portion of the Arabian Sea and East African waters may have maximum catch potentials that are significantly greater than 2005 levels. However, there are also opportunities to find 30 to 50% or more in the Persian and Red Seas, among other regions. By 2055, catch potentials in the Indonesian EEZ could decline by more than 20%, the biggest drop of any nation. The models predict a 50% decline in maximum catches in the same areas of the Bay of Bengal, where approximately one third of landings originate from fishing grounds beyond general EEZs candid to regional and distant fleets. Such a significant dispute over fishing potential has the potential to drastically change the food and fisheries governance in the Indian Ocean region.

A viable alternative source of fish production is emerging in the face of these obstacles: aquaculture, or the farming of ichthyic, mollusk, and other aquatic animals in captivity, has grown twelve times worldwide since 1980, according to the FAO. Aquaculture has been introduced around the Indian Ocean at varying rates. For example, fish farming in Southeast Africa spread more slowly than it did in Southeast Asia. But taken as a whole, the industry has assisted in allaying worries about food security in several nations. In 2010, more fish than all of the region's seizure fisheries combined were produced by six countries in the Indian Ocean region: India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Egypt, and Myanmar. These countries were among the top ten global producers of fish. Aquaculture does have some disadvantages, though. Two major ones are the potential harm that fish farms can do to the ecosystems around them and the rapid spread of disease among fish housed in such close proximity to one another. Nonetheless, aquaculture seems set to become a more significant part of the Indian Ocean region's nutrient security, mirroring a global trend.^v

The FAO now anticipates that, for the first time in history, aquaculture will produce more seafood annually than wild fisheries. The overfished waters of the western Indian Ocean curb will also see the greatest growth in aquaculture in the years to come. Aquaculture is already well-established in the countries of the Eastern Indian Ocean. Here, shi-pure fish agriculture from the Seychelles, Mozambique, and other places will provide yet another thread that will knit the economies and environments of the Indian Ocean region closer together. These fish farms are destined to supply ontogenesis nundinal across Africa, Asia, and beyond.

PLAYERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia were divided into continental sub regions following World War II, when newly independent nations throughout the region withdrew to concentrate on immediate economic and political resolution within their borders. Along with classifying themselves into these sub regions, the island nations divided the Indian Ocean into two main areas: the orient Indian Ocean and the occidental Indian Ocean. Throughout the Cold War between the US and the USSR, the US played a significant role in the region. Later on, though, Washington moderated its actions. The United States' involvement in the Indian Ocean by the early twenty-first century was primarily limited to assisting its operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East. In light of the current security environment, partnerships in the Indian Ocean are also complicated. As an illustration, consider the fact that the US still has a military installation on Diego Garcia Key in the Chagos Archipelago. However, Mauritius disputes the island's sovereignty—a part of the UK that London leased from Port Louis during its independence—and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in support of Mauritius in 2019.

Despite the fact that India is currently the United States' most important ally in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi politically supports Mauritius based on the moral principles of non-alignment and decolonization. The two-side dynamics that larger nations have with the region's islands and littorals capture implications for the larger ocean. France and India assumed the role of principal security providers in the province while the United States was occupied with its obligations in the Pacific, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. In the western Indian Ocean, Paris is a more significant player than New Delhi, which plays a minor role in the eastern Indian Ocean. France is a member of the Indian Ocean Commission, the only body that unites the French-declamation islot of the area, through its overseas region of Reunion. Nonetheless, the Indian Navy asserts its jurisdiction over the entire Indian Ocean and takes great satisfaction in being the first to respond to natural and man-made disasters there. The UK plays a significant role in regional security, even though France and India are the main players.

The United States, its NATO allies, China, India, Japan, and the UN all have business missions to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, but other nations are more difficult to distinguish in terms of illicit activities, primarily maritime bootlegging. Their presence is typically limited to the affected area off the Horn of Africa and is a major worldwide marine concern. However, in contrast to the donkeys, this engagement has given emerging powers, like China, the chance to communicate with the littoral nations and islands of the Indian Ocean.

China has become a reliable ally for the Indian Ocean's islands and littoral nations, building on its anti-piracy endeavours. As part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, the Maritime Silk Road has given people another platform to work together on military and economic experiments. Beijing established its first military outpost abroad in Djibouti, near the coast of the Indian Ocean, in 2017. The Chinese base maintains its status as an unworn libertine in the province, despite the fact that France, Japan, and the US already have facilities in Djibouti. China's presence in the region, along with Beijing's more ambitious maritime goals, has caused anxiety among other countries such as France and India. For instance, France is the main sharer for French-pattered Madagascar and Comoros if India is the main partner for smaller countries like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and to a

lesser extent Mauritius and Seychelles. Beijing, however, must simultaneously contend with France and India throughout the six islands in the region. Not France, India, the United States, or the United Kingdom, but China is the only major power in the Indian Ocean with a cunning mission spanning all six island nations. Redesigned opposition between China and India has filled the void left by limited U.S. combat over the previous three to four decades combined with strategic inertia from New Delhi and Paris. However, this is not your typical China, where the region's traditional players submit to them. For a 25-year tenure, Russia declared in 2020 that it would establish a contemporary naval base in Sudan. Moscow is granted strategic access to the Red Sea through this arrangement, as well as to Bab-el-Mandeb, one of the main choke points in the Indian Ocean. Along with deepening their economic and geopolitical ties across the Indian Ocean, Saudi Arabia and Turkey may also be paving the way for unexpected power balances. What kind of reunion should the US have? With regard to its own Indo-Pacific strategies, the United States needs to focus more on the Indian Ocean.

INDIA -CHINA MERITIME POSITIONS

Over the past ten years, China and India have both seen a wearisome trend in their strategic consolidation in the maritime dominion.

Asia's waters, which stretch from the Western Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, are dotted with maritime installations. China has notched up a coordinated effort to assert its sovereignty over the waters of the South and East China Seas, while India has made the Indian Ocean one of its strategic priorities. In these attempts, Beijing has been especially oppressive, violating international maritime justice. However, as Beijing's naval trading operations have expanded into the Indian Ocean, New Delhi's policymakers have become especially wary of Beijing's growing influence. The two countries' protection dynamics are entering an unprecedented phase of dissonance, so it's critical to examine how their marine interactions have developed in order to gain a clever understanding of what might happen to Asia's two largest maritime powers. Chinese-Indian Maritime Exchanges There has been a slight increase in the interactions between the two naval forces as a result of Beijing's and India's competing maritime surety interests, which has resulted in liberal rivalry in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The Sino-Indian conflict has always been confined to the orbit of capture. Nevertheless, Beijing's and New Delhi's reliance on billow-borne track has grown dramatically as a result of opening their economies to international trade. Both have learned the value of having a strong sense of naval spirit in order to maintain uninterrupted access to energy from the Middle East and maintain their sea lines of communication (SLOC). In response, both countries have devised an ambitious plan for force modernization aimed at building a "gloom-moisten navy" that is capable of operating for extended periods of time away from their home countries. There has been a slight increase in the interactions between the two maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), controlling to bland jealousy between them as Beijing's maritime surety profit intersects with India's. The Dilemma of Malaccans Chinese naval planners started deploying squadrons for regular gate assemblies in the Indian Ocean as early as 1985.

This has resulted in Chinese maritime taskforces being used for defence missions over time. According to claims made by India's naval commander Admiral Karambir Singh in September 2019, there are typically seven to eight Chinese leviathans in the area at any given time. The steady rise in Chinese maritime nationalism can be attributed to China's assurances regarding its entry

into the Strait of Malacca as a Special Administrative Region (SLOC). Chinese President Hu Jintao first proposed the “Malaccan Dilemma” in 2003. It was based on a crisis scenario in which China would be refused entry to its trade and spirit routes in the IOR. Since then, Beijing has increased its efforts in trade, diplomacy, and maritime diplomacy to establish itself in the Indian Ocean.

Some estimates place the yearly percentage of Chinese employment that passes through the repress point at about 40%. China’s Outreach in the Indian Ocean President Hu Jintao introduced the “recent historic missions” policy in 2004 to address the “Malaccan Dilemma,” which saw Chinese naval might being extended in the far seas for covert militia trading operations. Sino-Indian marine dynamics underwent a sea change in 2008 when Chinese naval forces were stationed in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy trading operations. In order to safeguard its interests, it conveyed Beijing’s intention to establish a significant presence in the IOR. China has since expanded its influence in the Indian Ocean Rim by establishing a network of patronage throughout the countries bordering the region. As part of its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, China has heard of massive gate development designs in nations like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, accompanied by generous transfers of naval furnishings and technology. India’s strategic calculations have been impacted by all of this, leading to fears of encirclement in what it views as its backyard. Reversing the Status Quo: Notably, these Chinese efforts led to three important breakthroughs that have put the current maritime order in the Indian Ocean in jeopardy. The first was the Chinese submarines’ crowded stationing there for “anti-robber operations.” This extremely unconventional action alerted Indian strategists to Beijing’s sincere intentions in the IOR. The second was the opening of Djibouti as China’s first overseas naval base in 2017, which raised the possibility of a Chinese logistical support network in the area. Thirdly, since 2015, Chinese exploration vessels have been frequently visiting the region to gather data and enhance China’s understanding of the hydrography, topography, and bathymetry of the waters. These non-military missions aid China’s operational understanding of the IOR while making it harder for Indian equipment to keep an eye on Chinese activity nearby. Marine strategists in India hold these embassy in high regard for their potential to bolster China’s covert plot to undermine India’s theatrical dominance. Given their strategic rivalry and efforts to arm themselves with cutting-edge technology, India’s naval posture and Sino-Indian maritime emulation give rise to fears of a potentially dangerous confrontation between the two nations in the Indian Ocean’s vast waters. Their naval might will be commensurate in the unlikely event that they engage in a marine conflict in the area.

The greatest myth about India’s strategic gains is its nuclear offer in the Indian Ocean and its experience in the IOR’s operational environment. The Indian Navy has consistently defended the fact that its main areas of responsibility are to safeguard the Indian Ocean, protect the nation from foreign threats, and retain total control over the numerous SLOCs and chokepoints in the IOR. China has therefore increased its air power, but India has adjusted its course and worked to improve its maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the IOR. It has embraced used anti-hero warfare gear and become a more watchful constabulary party. In order to conduct watchman around forelock SLOCs year-round, India started a new pattern of commission-supported deployments in various areas of the IOR beginning in 2017.

Taken together, these moves have expatiate the Indian Navy’s useable cognizance of the region. India has also initiated closer marine collaboration with nations that are similarly careful of China’s maritime expanse.

Evaluating the Naval Capabilities of China and India The Sino-Indian maritime rivalry is intensifying and posing a threat to both nations as they battle each other on the high seas of the Indian Ocean, partially due to their strategic jealousy and efforts to arm themselves with advanced technology. As a result of their investments in high-profile platforms like aircraft carriers, nuclear-divinity submarines, and autonomous unmanned vessels, China and India have gradually enhanced their naval capabilities. The launching of their own seamanship satellites is another sustainable effort made by Beijing and New Delhi to enhance their C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Nonetheless, China's maritime capabilities are unquestionably superior to those of the other country, with a gradual difference. However, it's also crucial to note that China has prioritised naval strength in its near seas, encompassing the first Holmes fasten. Though significant, Beijing's second centre is the Indian Ocean. In contrast, India has concentrated its efforts on strengthening its naval defence of the IOR and has not promised China a counter-theatre player in the Western Pacific. An uneasy component of this conflict is the tri-services worthless at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. They will have complementary marine influences in the event of a similar maritime conflict in the tract. Expecting Conflict in the Future In September 2019, an Indian farce forced a Chinese research vessel to seclude itself for using the Andaman & Nicobar Islands' exclusive domestic sector without a prior permit. The opportunity to consider both sides of the sensual complexities surrounding maritime engagement in the open seas. Between the two navies, specific mechanisms for enhancing assurance and crisis management policies are essentially non-existent. With the exception of legally mandated protocols that govern interactions at sea, Sino-Indian maritime exchanges remain unregulated. Tensions are growing as more marine lard from both nations turns up in the brush. For some time now, China and India have been engaged in a competitive relationship. Both parties understand the value of working together, but they are unwilling to give up any strategically important territory. When Beijing appears to be gaining a foothold in the continental sphere, New Delhi strategists may be inclined to impose accessibility-negation policies against Chinese marine assets there in an attempt to rebalance the strategic balance in favour of India's promotion.^{vi}

CONCLUSION

Above all, the United States and all other powers should view the Indian Ocean as a single, extended theatre rather than as separate entities. If they do not, they risk missing important news events that occur throughout the region. With so many players and shifting alliances and partnerships, focusing research on a single area of the ocean is insufficient. For instance, it would be incorrect to believe that Russia's withdrawal from the eastward Indian Ocean diminishes its influence given the unstable relationship between China and Russia. Lastly, in order to gain strategic access and control over significant regions of the set, the United States and its allies should repurpose the key island territories they currently possess in the Indian Ocean. These four strategically placed ilot are Diego Garcia (United States/UK/Mauritius), Cocos Keeling (Australia), Reunion (France), and Andaman and Nicobar (India). They might create new avenues for cooperation between nations in response to the challenges and threats that are emerging in the Indian Ocean. What kind of blow will climate change deal to the competition between the great powers? The geopolitics of the Indian Ocean will increasingly involve non-traditional security

concerns like climate change, drug smuggling, human trafficking. The African littoral regions and island nations will eventually take centre stage if the competition is over missions and support personalities in strategically significant areas of the ocean (A large body of water including the sea or the ocean), like the previously mentioned repress points. These non-traditional issues described above will also be these smaller nations' immediate shelter challenges. Therefore, in order to address their own national security share in the province, the unwritten trifter in the area, such as France, India, and the United States, as well as its partners, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, will need to think through their smaller sharer's non-traditional protection object. Therefore, the security concerns of these small island nations must be taken into consideration by the major powers vying for influence in the Indian Ocean. Even though these problems might be viewed as minor or insignificant, they have a significant impact on the island states. The results also have strategic ramifications for scientific missions and fishing vessels that are utilised for surveillance and reconnaissance. They will therefore have a major impact on the geopolitical business rivalry in the area.

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