

# INSURGENCY IN NORTH-EAST: AN ANALYSES

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## ABSTRACT

*In Assam and Tripura, refugees and illegal migrants from Bangladesh have been at the heart of the insurgency. Imports of labour into Islam began with the expansion of the railway network and the rise of the Guardians. The need for more workers to cultivate food for the labour population, as well as the British war effort, increased migration. With demands for religious partition, the process took on political undertones. The Naga and major tribes choosing for unification with India, as well as Gopinath Bordoloi's. Taking a holistic approach, the region's primary insurgent groups are gradually integrating in order to hinder the NSCN from attempting to bring the insurgencies of various ethnic groups together. Falstaff is promoting smaller militant organizations in previously unaffected areas as part of this approach. This is done in order to divert security forces' attention and expand the area of influence. Counterinsurgency activities must also be coordinated and integrated across the region. Negotiations in connected insurgencies should take place at the same time, but not necessarily in the same place.*

**Key-Words:** *Insurgency, Counter-insurgency. North Eastern States.*

India's insurgency may be traced back to the country's transition from colonial rule to independence. The first time a military reaction to insurgency was used was in 1956, when the **General Officer Commanding (GOC)** Assam was tasked with bringing the insurgent movement under control following the foundation of the rebel Naga Federal government of Angami Phizo. The army had brought the situation under control by mid. of 1957. Between then and now, India has had several insurgencies, with the exception of Mizoram and Punjab, where security forces have been successful in stabilizing the situation on multiple occasions. <sup>1</sup>

The wisdom of wearing out insurgencies is based on the strength of time and resources, which must be balanced against the reactionary skills that develop in society and the negative impact on military forces conventional war readiness.

These smouldering insurgencies also highlight some fundamental problems about our counter-insurgency doctrine: <sup>2</sup>

- What is our government's ability to link the use of military force to attaining desired political goals?
- What is the account insurgent campaign's strategic goal? Are we aiming for a clear-cut victory?
- Is our method sensitive to the social dynamics?

## BRIEF ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCIES IN THE NORTHEAST

Insurgency of J&K and North Eastern States of India, both have an indigenous element. British administration policies such as indirect control and partial isolation of Hill tribes' areas, which exacerbated ethnic tensions to the point where tribal loyalties took precedence over national affiliations, are at the basis of the current situation. Suspicions about planes Indian stone in the minds of simple tribal minds by British officials and missionaries were exacerbated as their leadership felt left out of the process of creating the constitution or even selecting their own administrative future. <sup>3</sup>

Due to the overstitching of communication lines, partition wreaked havoc on the flooring industry. Remoteness and a lack of engagement with the region by the power centers hampered balanced economic development. Economic inequities are linked to ethnic differences, and ethnic groups seek redress through political identities. The demand for red clothing stems from a desire for a fair share of political, administrative, and economic authority. Issues were aggravated by intransigence on the part of majority groups, who were unable to accept the demands of minority groups. Vegetation became aggressive and belligerent in nature. Insurgency has evolved into a confrontational strategy.

In Assam and Tripura, refugees and illegal migrants from Bangladesh have been at the heart of the insurgency. Imports of labour into Islam began with the expansion of the railway network and the rise of the Guardians. The need for more workers to cultivate food for the labour population, as well as the British war effort, increased migration. With demands for religious partition, the process took on political undertones. The Naga and major tribes choosing for unification with India, as well as Gopinath Bordoloi's efforts, submitted a petition to include Assam in East Pakistan for all of its mineral riches (coal, petroleum, and extensive forest). The length of the partition adds a new dimension to this population movement. Unlike the Western frontier, where the refugee exodus lasted only a few months and consisted solely of Hindus entering India, the eastern border has been a never-ending process that began with Hindus and ended with Muslims. Natural tragedies, extreme poverty, political agendas, and corruption are all elements that contribute to the high population density and growth rate. Muslims make up the majority of illegal migrants in Assam, whereas Hindus make up the majority in Tripura and West Bengal. <sup>4</sup>

Simmering insurgencies have been protected by piecemeal and ad-hoc policies. The programme appears to have centered on two primary factors: the military factor, with an emphasis on using force to restore the government's power, and the second, a flood of development funding, with the goal of a peace dividend and potentially a desire to soften resolve. Both techniques have brought peace on numerous occasions, but only for brief periods of time since they did not address the entire and complicated range of challenges.

## COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE

In reality, counter-insurgency is establishing government control in a specific area in order to eradicate the insurgent force and create a conducive environment for peaceful life. Without being a totalitarian state, if insurgency is not contained and crushed in a timely manner, it may turn into a full-scale guerrilla war. The essential theories and concepts 1998 In all scenarios, the final state is the same: the insurrection is defeated. Eliminating insurgency would imply that the insurgents, as well as the causes of insurgency, would be gone as well. Neither economic nor military resources are sufficient to achieve such a victory.<sup>5</sup>

The end state may be described as containing the crisis while the government and the insurgents work out a constitutionally acceptable compromise. This is more pragmatic since it realizes that ultimate victory is impossible and thus lowers military expectations. Political, economic, and other factors enter the picture sooner. Even the rebels have an honorable way out in pursuing a negotiated settlement in a stalemate, which is more plausible because all insurgencies in the region are motivated by valid grievances, and the moral high ground sits somewhere between the insurgents and the government's positions. The accepted application of military force should be governed by the notion of encouraging and assisting a solution one step lower in the final state. The use of military action would have two goals: first, to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table, and second, to facilitate a successful conclusion to the negotiations.<sup>6</sup>

## CURRENT REALITIES

In order to tackle insurgencies in the region, a strategy must include the following factors. Realities and their ramifications are laid bare.

All insurgent groups' leadership and hard-core elements are intact, albeit many are in exile. The power to revise and resume insurgency is retained by major groups. Military actions must be planned to avoid recurrence and assist a negotiated settlement.

The public has had enough of massacre and pain access to insurgent groups with no tangible results. However, there is still sympathy for the underlying cause. With Centre, the sensation of deprivation and estrangement persists. It is necessary to gain positive public support for the government. To counteract feelings of isolation and alienation, political and economic efforts have to be linked with an effective communication campaign.

Economic backwardness, as well as physical and psychological isolation, are caused by tense communications.<sup>7</sup>

Unabated illegal migration, the emergence of Muslim militancy, and the growing ISI network are rapidly becoming a frightening new front.

China's expanding access to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Nepal, as well as its existing alliance with Pakistan, provide a convenient point of convergence in the northeast. To wean regional neighbours away from China and Pakistan's influence, constructive engagement will be required.<sup>8</sup>

## GOALS FOR THE FUTURE

The following are some of the proposed regional strategic objectives for combatting insurgencies:

- Political
- Economic
- Military
- Diplomatic

## POLITICAL MEASURES

Taking a holistic approach, the region's primary insurgent groups are gradually integrating in order to hinder the NSCN from attempting to bring the insurgencies of various ethnic groups together. Falstaff is promoting smaller militant organizations in previously unaffected areas as part of this approach. This is done in order to divert security forces' attention and expand the area of influence. Counterinsurgency activities must also be coordinated and integrated across the region. Negotiations in connected insurgencies should take place at the same time, but not necessarily in the same place.

To prevent rebels from seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, the intensity of military operations must be balanced across the impacted areas. The North-East Council has sufficient power and may assist in coordinating regional activities. Integration would be facilitated and proper representation in Delhi will be ensured by establishing a Ministry of the North East as part of the federal home ministry.<sup>9</sup>

Even after the establishment of seven states to suit ethnic demands, insurgencies have continued. The region's heterogeneous population precludes the use of organisation as a solution. To address such various ethnic aspirations, the solution is to enhance grassroots democracy.

District councils and village panchayat must be strengthened and given more autonomy in order to promote participatory democracy. Elections that are held at the right time are vital. Rural development programmes should take advantage of strong community bonds and a legacy of volunteer community involvement. The bureaucracy should relinquish control of rural development, elementary education, primary health care, and PDS to local governments. Village councils should also be involved in loan distribution, with incentives and implicit protections in place to ensure timely payback. This will enhance transparency and accountability by allowing individuals to participate.<sup>10</sup>

The seven North-eastern states have 24 Lok Sabha seats in a house of 545, accounting for around 4% of overall representation in Parliament. Mizoram, for example, has only one MP. Because of the system, he may only be able to talk once in a year. Constitutional adjustments are required to address this situation.

## ECONOMIC MEASURES

Markets and products in the Northeast are becoming commercially unviable due to infrastructure development and shaky communications. Connectivity must be improved if the economy is to recover. This will necessitate improvements to the road and rail networks, as well as the timely construction of planned Brahmaputra

bridges and the rebirth of the inland water transport system. The electricity situation is serious, despite the abundance of water. There is sufficient potential for harnessing the force of swift-flowing rivers while simultaneously preventing calamity during floods.<sup>11</sup>

With Myanmar, some progress has already been made in cross-border trade. Smugglers will be rendered obsolete when cross-border trading becomes legalised. A common market along ancient trade routes must be resurrected, together with the required monitoring and verification mechanisms.

Taking advantage of natural resources Agriculture employs 70 to 80 percent of the people, but farming practices are outdated, and yield is hardly enough to meet subsistence needs. Compounding the problem are reoccurring flowers. New agricultural techniques, such as irrigation and drainage, new planting patterns, and flood management, can significantly increase output, while horticulture and pisciculture have enormous promise. The region's economic position can be restored by combining substantial natural resources with communication network and other logistic infrastructure.<sup>12</sup>

## MILITARY MEASURES

The role of the security forces in the current impasse and criminal degeneration in insurgencies raises the question of whether the army still has a role to play. However, as previous experience has shown. Pulling the troops out without a peace process in place will almost always end in a resurgence of the insurgency with an intensification. At this point, the army's job should be to facilitate consumer action by keeping the ability to strike decisively and precisely. This would necessitate the maintenance of an adequate intelligence base and a minimal deployment guide that allows for precise and dramatic force applications. State police and the Assam Rifles should gradually take over routine security force operations.<sup>13</sup>

Strengthening the police insurgent movement gained strength due to election of the police in the preparatory or growth stages. Reforms in police should into building up the capability to identify incipience of an insurgency and intervening effectively at the preparatory stage. This is not to suggest a general militarization of state police. Democratic policing requires. A civil character to inspire trust and confidence of the public. Some specific measures in this regard are:

- The state police should be organised for professional investigation and collection of Intelligence. The intelligence section of the state police need modernization. Traditional methods based on diary human memory and inclusive judgement have to be supported by automated system duly networked within the state and the region.
- A quick reaction force of the state on police should be disputed to each police station and other sensitive areas. The remaining part of the force should be held in reserve and training full stop this force should be equipped with modern weapons transport and Communications.

- A General technological upgrade in weapons mobility surveillance communication detection and individual protection gear is essential. Such an organisation along with proper training will make the police more professional and accountable.
- Reforms in police organisation need balancing between raising additional CPO/PMF and improving the state police.
- Improvement in state police should be viewed as an upgradation in pre-emptive capabilities whereas improvement/accretions in CPO/PMF as reactive capability against insurgent movements? Normal penal laws are inadequate to deal with insurgency and terrorism. Once the indicators of an incipient insurgency manifest special law must be invoked to give additional powers to the police.

## DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

Our regional neighbours in the north-east have a lot in common with us. The basic causes of population growth in this location, including environmental degradation, social concerns, and economic issues, can only be addressed by multilateral cooperation among regional neighbours.<sup>14</sup>

A wide network of minor dams is a pragmatic solution to both flood management and power generation, given the high costs, high seismicity of the Himalayas, and silting. As a result, flood management cooperation between Nepal, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh becomes comparable. Deductions in trading will result in a variable amount of land in flood-prone areas for cultivation and settlement, relieving migratory pressures.

AIDS, drug trafficking, and drug abuse are all linked. For insurgency groups, controlling drug trafficking and gun smuggling is a lucrative business. The Naga Kuki battles erupted in Moreh, India, as a result of efforts to curb narcotics trafficking on the Indo-Myanmar border (Manipur). On this subject, collaboration with the Myanmar government could be beneficial. The United States and the international community will back such a move.<sup>15</sup>

Due to tensions between India and Pakistan, SAARC as a forum is not taking off. An alternate platform for India's inter-neighbors can achieve significant progress without the need for search and restraint. Such a forum for regional cooperation aimed at common growth could limit Pakistan and China's ability to extend their wings in the area.<sup>16</sup>

It is critical to implement a comprehensive set of measures that cover the entire range of affected areas. Border fencing with lighting and supervision should be used as preventative measures. Towers, BSF deployments throughout manageable front lines, floating BOP all medium boats for river border guarding, multi-purpose photo identification card for the populace, and birth and death registry in impacted areas. Although detection is possible, deportation is difficult due to political squabbles. International law prohibits unilateral expulsion, and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has said that no Bangladeshi was living in India illegally. The issuance of work permits to illegal migrants will alleviate economic hardship and the issue's exploitation.<sup>17</sup>

For a long time, fear of being swept away by the Indian way of life has been properly recognised as a significant cause of insurgency in the North East. Without digging too deeply into the origins of these worries,

such as British administrative systems, political and bureaucratic intensity after independence, and a strong disdain for security force activity, it is important to consider changing reality. The current trend is the development of an individual identity that competes with the manifestation of collective identity of the clan tribe and village, regardless of whether this identity crystallization is progressive or regressive. People are becoming more aware of the need to provide life and opportunity beyond revolt, even if it means staying within the Indian framework.

## CONCLUSION

The security forces, as well as the people of the Northeast, have had enough. Peace must be given a chance to live and contribute their best. The best way forward is to take a holistic approach to the wide range of concerns. Massive natural resources, strong community bonds, and people's inherent strength, when paired with new technologies, can help the region overcome these obstacles.

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