INDIA CHINA AND INDIA’S POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS RISING CHINA

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Abstract
A rising China will not tolerate a rising India as its competitor. Even if a rising India does not have any intention of becoming a regional hegemonic, China will try its best to constrain India as its has already done to a large extent, and it is that containment that India has to guard against. This reality should be accepted by Indian policy makers who should initiate a serious attempt to manage these frictions by expanding the zone of cooperation with China even as they try to stead fastly pursue their national interests. They need to display the confidence to craft a foreign policies that best serves their national interests. India can learn a lot by examining how China has managed its relationship with the U S in the last two decades. The joint vision of the leaderships in India and China could ensure a global order in which simultaneous development will have a positive impact upon their own peoples and economies as also on the rest of the world.

KEY TERMS
Strategic Vision, International Economic Organisation, Power structure, Power- transition, Structural realist

Introduction
China’s engagements with the world market and multilateral international economic organizations are accompanied by its involvement in international and regional security institutions and all of these actions make anyone very cautious while arguing about the threat of China in the new century. India China relations in all its details. Rather it is an attempt to examine the reasons for the lack of a long term strategic vision in India’s policy towards China.

EMERGING CHINA AS A THREATS TO SECURITY
China will be a threat to the security of Asia, particularly the eastern region in the new century, choose to use the power structure transformation analysis to support their point. The power structure perspective is one of the hallmarks of the neo-realist paradigm. According to this paradigm, when any state becomes wealthier and more powerful. It will inevitably seek greater regional and global political influence, which will lead to a change in the power structure caused by the burgeoning of a newly rising regional and world power usually poses a long term danger for the security of the region and even for the stability of the world.

The “established power versus rising power” pattern. China ia a threat to the security of East Asia region and to the United States and its main ally in the East Asia- Japan. Based on their analysis, some Western International Relations Scholars have predicted with pessimism that Asia is likely to see more international conflicts in the new future. The historical pattern is that a rising power dissatisfied with secondary status might try to enhance its power position by confronting the dominant but declining power.

According to one realist study in the West, war is most likely when the power of rising dissatisfied country becomes equal to that of a dominant state. Then ‘power parity provides the opportunity to act for those who are committed to changing the status quo. The logic has been applied to China as a rising power which is seeking to change the status quo in the East Asian region. Some Western scholars even argue that besides the fact of China being a rising power, Chinese assertiveness is also caused by its history and its domestic affairs, which makes China a threat to its neighbours and even to the United States.

Sino-centric world order as a means of regulating political and economic structure of super-ordination and subordination; its belief that China’s external security in the past was primarily assured by a strong state able to dominate or at the very least neutralize the strategic periphery. The power transition theory and the institutionalist theory, offer sharply contrasting views about the implications of China’s rise. Power- transition theory expects this rise to be implications of China’s rise. Power transition theory expects this rise to be dangerous because it poses a challenge to the international order underpinned by American Power. Institutionalist theory interprets China’s rise as an opportunity for building co-operation, rather than intensifying conflict. Goldstein explains the logic of these two theoretical perspectives in the context of China rise and sets forth their different implications for three flash points in East Asia (the South China sea, Korea and the Taiwan strait).
When Western neo-realist International Relations scholars try to apply the power-structure theory to analyze the ‘China threat’, they seem to neglect the fundamental structural changes in the International system. It is quite clear that the power structure theory emphasizes the strength of the states and treats the states as the dominant actors in the international system.

Power structure analysis, without noticing or mentioning the fundamental changes in the structure and in the current international system, the arguments about the threat from China as a rising power appear less persuasive. Actually it is against the background of the systemic changes in the international relations influenced by the quickening pace of globalization since the end of the Cold War that China’s economic and to some extent its military power is growing. Chinese economic power has been increasing almost simultaneously with the rapid development of Globalization from the late 20th century.

The present system is also directly or indirectly shaping domestic politics, economic policies, and foreign relations of virtually every country. The United States an established power, and China, a rising power. No doubt, globalization has led to the integration and the Interdependence of all the actors in the international system to an unprecedented degree and the cooperative attitude of states still the main actors in the international system. China as a rising power seems to be orienting itself much more than the established power towards cooperation, because it perceives that political authority of states in the contemporary international system is declining. China’s admission into the World Trade Organization in April 1999 when the NATO led by the United States was conducting air strikes against Yugoslavia, which China did not support and during which the Chinese Embassy was hit by U.S missilies.

China as a rising power prefers to merge into international cooperative regimes like the WTO and tries its best to cooperate with the established powers and follow international norms and rules. The behavioural change of the rising power is caused by the changes in the international system. In December 2001, the Chinese government proudly declared to the world that China had become the member of the WTO after long negotiations with the United States and the European Union. All these actions exhibit clearly the willingness of the Chinese government to integrate China into the world market system and catch up with the quick pace of globalization.

China’s participation in security institutions (Johnson, Ross 1999:238) shows that in the globalized international system, self-interested actors prefer to construct institutions to enhance cooperation on security issues. Perhaps the adjustment of China’s behaviour came from its anticipation of other states preferences for cooperation within international security institutions, or from the institutions monitoring and sanctioning provisions. But the fact remains that China is experiencing a kind of socialization under these international security institutions.

INDIA’S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

A rising China has caused strong reactions from around the globe. As the sole superpower the US is concerned about the policies that are to be followed towards the East Asian Giant, so is the case with India its closest neighbour. One of the most important foreign policy priorities for India, since its Independence, has been to secure a global environment that is conducive, and if possible supportive of Indian aspirations. Improving the wellbeing of the Indian people and modernizing India’s economy were our highest national policy priorities. Jawaharlal Nehru told the Constituent Assembly in December 1947, Talking about foreign policies.

The Indian political establishment is fond of arguing that there is a district continuity that defines Indian foreign policy. One can relate this easily to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realist theory of international politics according to which states fashion their foreign policies in response to the systemic constraints imposed by the international system where domestic politics is not an important variable in the process.

India China policy is concerned there is visible continuity in the official position of India. There is a consensus across the Indian political spectrum for improving bilateral ties with China and for resolving Sino-Indian differences through dialogue. However, this official policy hides a boarder debate in India about how to deal with China. it has been pointed out that there are three broad views in India on how to deal with China and they have been classified as the pragmatists view China as a long term threat and as a competitor but argue that this competition can be managed by engaging China economically and balancing against China by emerging as a major power in the international system. The hyperrealists view China as a clear and present danger and would like India to contain China by forging alliances around China’s periphery and by strengthening its military capabilities.

Indian perceptual positions on China (Frankel, Harding 2004:33-69). He has outlined three ideal types which he classifies as the Mainstream position. China- Is-Not-Hostile position and the China – Is- Hostile position. Three ideal types closely correlate with the pragmatists, the appeasers, and the hyperrealists of the above mentioned typology (Pant 2006) The mainstream Indian perspective on China.
The Communists caution against an alliance with any power which limits India’s ability to foster mutual trust and forge amicable relations with its neighbours while the Congress has drawn attention to the emergence of a global market and a globalizing polity that makes a policy of universal global engagement most appropriate.

China was stymied by India joining the East Asia Summit at the request of some of the smaller members who did not want China to overwhelm the group. China’s ‘string of pearls’ policy that focuses on areas of strategic importance to India, such as Burma and Pakistan, will ensure that India remains wary of China and tries to build its avenues of leverage within the region. Given these inherent pressures and yet the importance to both countries of a stable and secure environment in which to grow the two nations will continue to maintain a dual policy of ‘hedging and engaging’ (similar to that the U.S with China) in order to walk the narrow path between remaining friendly but protecting against the eventuality if the other does not.

CONCLUSION

In relation to the analysis presented above we could conclude by saying that China’s rise has created daunting theoretical and policy challenges for India. Although the structure of the international system compels states to maximize their relative power positions, neighbouring countries try to maintain peace and stability in the region. India and China are the two major powers in Asia with global aspirations and some significant conflicting interests. As a result, some amount of friction in their bilateral relationship is inevitable. The geopolitical reality of Asia make sure that it will be extremely difficult if not impossible for Hindi-Chini to be bhai-bhai (brothers) in the foreseeable future. A rising China will not tolerate a rising India as its competitor. Even if a rising India does not have any intention of becoming a regional hegemonic, China will try its best to constrain India as its has already done to a large extent, and it is that containment that India has to guard against.

This reality should be accepted by Indian policy makers who should initiate a serious attempt to manage these frictions by expanding the zone of cooperation with China even as they try to steadfastly pursue their national interests. They need to display the confidence to craft a foreign policies that best serves their national interests. India can learn a lot by examining how China has managed its relationship with the U.S in the last two decades. The joint vision of the leaderships in India and China could ensure a global order in which simultaneous development will have a positive impact upon their own peoples and economies as also on the rest of the world.

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