

# Pakistan's Interim Constitution 1947: Role of Punjab and Centre – State Relations 1947-1955

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## Abstract

The character of centre-province relations in the early years of independence was largely governed by the operation of Pakistan's Interim Constitution of 1947. The way the articles of the Interim Constitution were implemented to retain central dominance in the legislative, administrative, and financial spheres created an imbalance in the power-sharing equation between the federation and its components.

Punjab's hegemonic influence in policy formulation and implementation is thought to be maintained through this disequilibrium. The Punjab was associated with centralization of authority, according to popular opinion. The purpose of this article is to assess the nature and functioning of components of centre-province relations and provincial autonomy from 1947 to 1955 in order to define Punjab's place in Pakistan's state structure under the Interim Constitution 1947.

## Introduction

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### Role of Punjab and Centre – State Relations 1947-1955

Punjabis, historically speaking had multiple identities. The identities merged as well as conflicted but still remained fairly localised. Thus, it did not assume any macro or trans-regional proportions. The main characteristics of Punjabi ethos were that the rural nature of the population was controlled through local intermediaries and a total reliance on agriculture alongside some soldiery. The British Raj kept a distance from the societal norms and unleashed vital economic, political and managerial forces which translated both the rural and urban cosmos. The canalisation and settlement of new colonies corresponded with the initiation of new communication networks along with a new educational system. Thus, within a generation it transformed the whole socio-political patterns in the province. The belief on Punjabis for military and police recruitment was an element of an integrated and comprehensive system that intended at creating totally new yet state-dependent intermediaries.

An uninterrupted official bias in support of rural Punjab was created by the Land Alienation Act of 1901. It led to widening the gulf between the Muslim peasants and Hindu/Khatri Sahukar. Introducing modern civic institutions such as the railways and schools only inflamed the cultural dissection among the Punjabis on

the basis of their creed and caste. By default, modernisation only worsened the divisions instead of undertaking the task of a leveller and in the progression these classifications only turned more acute.

Iftikhar H. Malik (2006) cites four major reasons for sufferings of the Punjabis during 1947. Before proceeding to the reasons he specifically mentions that '*one needs to avoid essentialising both the populist hypothesis of an enduring tradition of syncretism and coexistence or the paradigm of eternal conflicts. The truth lies somewhere between these two reductionist opinions*'. First reason mentioned by Malik is that the breakdown of pluralism in Punjab can be mapped out since the dissolution of the administration which gave the advanced date for partition, communal riot at several places, exaggerated rumours of bloodbath and the non imposition of martial law in the border regions made a free for all situation. In his second argument, he says that there was an inability to forge common strategies by Indian and Punjabi leaders on population transfer whether it was voluntary or enforced. Third, for Punjab, demand for partition was not new. Utopian ideas based on separatism were talked by Muslim and Sikh leaders which basically meant joining up with their counterparts elsewhere to form larger units. Fourth and the last point which lead to the sufferings in Punjab was because, especially in town and cities, there was a breakdown of the local networks and there was no mechanism to protect the refugee caravans. The displaced people, in their own localities, had at least some facade of protection from their friends and neighbours. But once they were away from their native regions and in the open, they considered simply as *others*.

Punjabis were accused of monopolising the new country's resource and forming of powerful administrative alliances of their own or in collaboration with the Urdu speaking *Muhajireen*. Concentration of important national institutions along with the defence establishment and the new national capital was established within Punjab. Even now, in terms of role of Punjab and its hold on civil and military positions along with large concentration of political power are often seen not just in terms of centralisation or militarization of Pakistan but are known as in Ian Talbot words '*Punjabisation of Pakistan*'.

The internal fabric of institutional imbalances and incoherence has been associated with the concept of federalism and constitutional functioning. Some scholars and political activists are of the view that the constitutional structure of the federation and its functioning has failed to develop a sense of political symmetry among the constituent units. Also, in terms of policy formulation and implementation level, the federation has been dominated by Punjab (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012). The main aim of the paper is to analyse the functioning of federal terms of the Interim Constitution and the role of Punjab in it. For that the paper focuses on the structural form of federalism in the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1947. It is then correlated with the role of Punjab along with the administrative policy. Conclusions are drawn through a comparison of its administrative functioning and constitutional terms.

### **The Federal Structure of Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1947**

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan formed the Interim Constitution of Pakistan which was an adoption of the Government of India Act 1935 with certain modifications, until the new constitution was to be enforced. Federal form of state administration was introduced under the Government of India Act 1935.

Maximum autonomy for the provinces within the context of British India was demanded by the All India Muslim League, which was not fulfilled by the adopted Act. Instead, an overpowering authority to the central administration was granted by the Act than to the provinces or elected representatives of the central government (Harun, 1970).

Four provinces were made under the federation of Pakistan that was established under the Interim Constitution. They were East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) along with that Baluchistan which was not a full province. The legislative powers were divided into federal, provincial and concurrent list by the Interim Constitution of 1947. Any other area that might want to be included will do so with the consent of the federation. Karachi was established as the capital of federation. To the competence of central government, they were exclusively given federal and provincial lists along with provincial legislature and government respectively. Governor –General of Pakistan was vested with the Residuary powers. Both centre and provinces had the authority to legislate on the subjects of concurrent list. (Chandio,2013). Federal list constituted of 59 subjects amongst which were the foreign affairs, defence, currency, foreign and inter-provincial trade, income tax, commerce, banking, census, import and export, post and telegraph, custom duties and corporation tax. Public welfare along with law and order were the provincial concerns by limited to them by the Interim Constitution. Public order , police, provincial public services, prisons, local government, public health, education, communications, administration of justice, water supply, agriculture, land and land tenures, irrigation, production, fisheries, trade and commerce within the province etc were amongst the 54 items under Provincial list. A number of financial heads such as taxes on agricultural income, land revenue, taxes on professions luxuries and entertainments, stamps on certain documents and tolls, tax on mineral rights, were given access to the provinces to cope up with the financial liabilities of law and order and public welfare. Primarily it evolved around agriculture which was not a relied upon or fixed source of income. Dependence of the provinces on the centre for fulfilment of their financial needs was clear. The provincial list contained rights of legislation regarding criminal law, criminal and civil procedures, marriages and divorce, wills and succession, transfer of property, trusts, contracts, medical and other professions, factories, news papers, labours, trade unions and electricity. No substantial source of income was given to the provinces under the Concurrent list. (Choudhury,1969). The province's constitutional status and fiscal condition made them subject to the central authority. The Interim Constitution clearly indicated that the amount of power sharing between centre and provinces was limited. Moreover, the Governor- General was empowered to amend the constitution until 1949 and thereafter, the acts of the Constituent Assembly unrelentingly tried to restrict the authority of the provincial governments. A series of amendments were undertaken in the Indian Act of 1935 to centralise the state authority. Till 1954, almost forty four amendments were made to the Interim Constitution so as to uphold the authority of the central administration in the state affairs ( Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012). The establishment of Central Police Service in 1948 under the Amendment Order 1948, the transfer of provincial subject of 'prevent detention' to the Concurrent list in 1952 and exclusive control of

centre over labour exchange and training establishment in 1953, were the amendments which weakened essentially the provincial authority in the course of decision making for the state (Ali,1996) .

The exclusive control of the provincial administration by the central authorities and minimising their ability to work efficiently in the political arena was aggravated by the emergency power of the central government. A state of emergency under Section 102 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan was declared on 27 August 1947 by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on the ground that the economy of Pakistan was threatened by the grave migration from India and also because Sind was unwilling to admit migrants. With the declaration of emergency, federal legislature was empowered to make laws in regards to the provincial list as well as eliminate any provision of the provincial list which could be in conflict with such federal laws. This centralization of authority, contrarily to the federal system of government, converted the state administration into a unitary form of government, where units became dependant to the central government. Although such federal acts were to be operative for not more than six months and were to be non-operative after the six months from the date of proclamation of emergency, practically, the period keeping such clauses operative was extended in 1948 and in 1950 respectively to keep within limits the role of provinces in the state politics (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012).

### **1947 to 1955 - Functioning of Federal Structure and Punjab**

The role of Punjab in the constitutional structure of Pakistan and whether it was exploitative to the centre and other provinces of the federation or not could be examined by studying the functioning of the federal structure under Interim Constitution of 1947. Some good example to conclude the place of Punjab was focus of the key administrative issues in relation to the functioning of the Interim Constitution before One Unit was established. Such issues supply us with ample evidence of the relationship between constitutional framework of centre-province relations and its functioning. Issues such as refugees and rehabilitation problem, political administration of the province and management of provincial finances are of considerable importance.

### **Literature Review**

In this section, a brief overview will be provided of existing literature that is relevant in understanding the centre-state relation especially between the federal government and Punjab. Much of this literature tends to focus exclusively on the provisions of the Interim Constitution of 1947 along with events and processes that took place between centre and Punjab. The review will begin by outlining relevant work on history of Punjab and their economic development. It will then review existing literature on the tragedies that Punjab faced during the partition. Further, literature on Interim Constitution is reviewed along with domestic situation within Punjab and effects of the centre's provisions on Punjab.

The colonial literature on the economy of Punjab tends to show a depiction of province inhabited by a satisfied peasantry benefitting from enlightened policies and decades of economic growth. Recent scholars have, however, gradually questioned this account. Mishra (1982), Nazir (2000) and Mukherjee (2005)

highlight the unsettling outcome of colonial economic policy, placing stress on how indebtedness, rising inequality, and declining productivity characterised this period. Ali (1987; 2004) traces out the impact of colonial agricultural policy on growth in the post-colonial period, arguing that institutional structure bequeathed by colonialism acted as a serious impediment to economic development in Punjab. Alavi (1976), Hussain (1988) and Niazi (2004) examine Punjab's Green Revolution which helped the rural elite to endow in capitalist agriculture, deepening their economic power eventually in the post colonial phase.

The ghastly tragedies of the Partition has been a major theme with fiction writers in Indio-  
Anglian writing. Though the writers may differ in the treatment of their subject matter and in their choice of gory incidents, they all seem to insist that the division of the Punjab was done arbitrarily that the Hindus and Muslims could have lived in a united India as they had done for a century and half under British rule. They assign the blame for the Partition to power- hungry politicians who inflamed hatred among a simple people to serve their own selfish ends. "Tamas" (1974) (darkness), by Bhisham Sahani also portrays the tragic period of the Partition of the country. He attempts to depict the communal frenzy that gripped the west Punjab in Pre- Partition days. The novel "Ice- Candy- Man" (1988) by Bapsi Sidhwa is also a poignant tale of Partition. The novel is set in Lahore in the 1940s in the period when Independence and Partition were brewing and it culminates in the ultimate horrors of the holocaust, seen through the eyes of a young Parsi child, Lenny.

Harun (1970) and Chandio (2013) present us with detailed information on the working of parliamentary government of Pakistan. Harun, while surveying the period 1947-1958 has aimed at giving a panoramic view of Pakistan's political aspects, and taken recourse to a broad socio-psychological approach towards political development. This has necessarily entailed the amassing of a considerable amount of detail. It also has analysed the working of the government of Pakistan, the main emphasis of which is laid on the gradual emergence of 'national consensus'. Chandio analysis weaves together an original explanation for the break-up of Pakistan, asserting that the issue of provincial autonomy was one of the key motivating factors in Muslim-majority provinces seeking independence. This view stands in contrast to the widely accepted notion that religious differences and communalism drove these provinces out of the new Indian federation. Once partition is completed, however, the initial promises of autonomy and devolution of power go unfulfilled by Pakistan's ruling elite. Critical decisions taken by the centre concerning the ratification of constitutions and governing documents, the elevation of the Urdu language, and the amalgamation of the provinces of West Pakistan into the One-Unit scheme in 1955, deprived the provinces of the authority and position in the federation they expected upon joining the union. Federalism was bankrupted purposively, culminating in the 'liberation' of East Pakistan and the subjugation of the smaller provinces to the ruling Punjab-Urdu speaking nexus.

Moving further, Friedman (1961), al-Mujahid (1965), Maniruzzaman (1966) and Weinbaum (1977) provides a vivid overview of the local, provincial and national level elections that took place in the years immediately following partition. Focusing specifically on Punjab, Wilder (1999) provides a complete view of the province's electoral history, identifying the existence of completely different rural and urban electoral dynamics in Punjab. While the work on elections provides valuable empirical data on the political process in Pakistan, little account is offered for the fundamental processes of political continuity and transformation that have fashioned the country's politics.

Rich as they are in historical narrative, the works cited above nonetheless fail to offer much in the way of contributory description for the political conclusion they document, remaining largely descriptive in their analyses of political events. In contrast with this, Nations (1971), Alavi (1974), Ahmad (1978), Ahmad (1981), and Gardezi (1983) attempt to delineate the class structure of Pakistan, and offer accounts of the political roles played by the different classes they identify. However, it is Hamza Alavi's (1972a) article on the overdeveloped post-colonial state that remains the most significant work in this category, arguing that the structure of Pakistani politics must essentially be understood in terms of the institutional legacy bestowed by the colonial government. Alavi claims that the state in Pakistan is 'overdeveloped' because of the autonomous power enjoyed by the bureaucracy and military relative to the propertied classes within the country, thus explaining the persistence of authoritarianism in Pakistan.

More recent institutionalist investigation of Pakistan's politics has attempted to focus more specifically on the processes that underpinned the continuity which characterised the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial epoch and beyond. Stern (2001), Adeney and Wyatt (2004) and Subrahmanyam (2006) argue that the Muslim's League reliance on Punjabi landlords and short of popular support, attached with ethnic conflict, posed fundamental challenges to the consolidation of democracy in an area that lacked integrative political institutions that could have supported consensus. He also elaborates on how during the initial years of independence centre-state relations were constrained due to above reasons.

Despite changes in the character of society and state in the post-colonial era, politics in Punjab remains resolute not only by concerns of control at the local level, but also by the crisis of legitimacy that prompt an authoritarian state to support its rule through the exploitation of social networks dominated by traditionally powerful elites. The model of local politics that existed under colonialism continues to exist not just due to local level factional competition, but also because of the deep rooted historical institutional continuities between the post-colonial state and the regimes that preceded it.

Cheema, Mohmand and Patnam (2009) claim that the framework of institution in colonial politics and extraction of revenue in Punjab allowed the elites to maintain their political and economic dominance despite the *de jure* institutional conversion that marked the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial regime. However, the exact mechanisms are not outlined through which adaptation took place or

institutional reproduction over the decades between the introduction of colonial government in Punjab till this day. The results can be generalised to the provincial and national level politics.

The brief review given above of existing literature on politics in Punjab and Pakistan highlights the diversity of approaches taken to analysing political dynamics within the province. It also identifies conceptual categories and key variables employed by other researchers in their attempts to explain the blueprint of politics in Punjab. As has been shown, scholarship in this area is rich in narrative detail about the events and processes that have characterised political outcomes.

### **Punjab and the Refugee and Rehabilitation Problem**

An important clause of the partition of British India plan 1947 was division of Punjab. Nonetheless, it never dictated any notion of mass-scale displacement of population, migration or demographic shift. The beginning of one of the largest migration in human history was led by outbreak of communal riots. It was followed by the miseries and murder of billions of people. In this process approximately 7.25 million refugees migrated from India in between 1947-1951 and contributed 10 percent of the population of Pakistan. It was only the province of West Punjab who bore the burden of refugees immediately; other provinces were reluctant to provide space to refugees (Chaudhri, 1967).

As much as 50 to 70 million rupees per annum was spent by the government of Punjab on food for refugees which envisaged a vital role in the policy-formation and implementation process for the settlement and rehabilitation of the refugees (Sayeed, 2001). One of the leading government newspaper, *Pakistan Times* analysed the role of Punjab in its editorial on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 1949: (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012)

*When Liberation came it was the Punjab that collapsed to its bosom the gigantic mass of destitute and miserable humanity represented by refugees. It was the Punjab again along with N-WFP that was called upon to share with the Azad Warriors the dire and prolonged travail of the Kashmir struggle. And our bill of national duties is as full and crowded today as it was yesterday. In the rehabilitation of the refugees, in the defence and food and commerce and organizational task that await us in the coming days to win Kashmir the role ordained for the West Punjab continues to be vital and overwhelmingly pregnant. In view of all, the people rightly expected that their national leadership in the province, their national leadership and party would conduct themselves in a manner merited by our past and demanded by our present.*

On the contrary, the whole process of refugees' rehabilitation process was led by the centre through the use of federal authority in the province. A new ministry was formed at the centre as well as Punjab in September 1947 called Refugees and Rehabilitation to deal with the refugee problem. In order to coordinate between the activities of the federal government and the provincial government, Pakistan Refugee Commission was setup at the centre and Punjab Refugee Council at the province. Nevertheless, the incharge of administration and allotment of evacuee property was Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot (Chief Minister of Punjab) but the actual task of evacuation, providing food and settlement of refugees was under the control of two British officers, E.D.V Moss (Chief of Pakistan Refugee Commission) and

Brigadier F.F Stevens (representative of central government) (Sayeed, 2001). In such a scenario when the federal government expected best possible cooperation from Punjab, it was restricted in crucial matters of refugees which led to lack of coordination and trust between the centre and the province.

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Federal Minister for Refugees addressed the Legislative Assembly on March 1948 which became the first major expression of distrust between the centre and Punjab. Khan was of the opinion that '*If the West Punjab had the vision and courage to introduce the radical changes in the existing economic set up of the province ,the refugee problem would have been satisfactorily resolved*'. The statement had a tone that suggested sacrifice from Punjab to accomplish the duty of rehabilitation of refugees without providing any space in the decision making process. It showed a level of hostility and suspicion between centre and Punjab on the issues concerning refugees at a policy making level. (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012)

As minister of Refugees and Rehabilitation in Punjab, Mian Iftikharuddin proposed a plan of rehabilitating the refugees. He proposed a major cut in the landlords' share of the agricultural products, heavy taxation on private income above a reasonable level, nationalization of all major industries and a generally more equitable dispensation of national wealth. This plan of his was not accepted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan which was dominated by the landlords. Mian Iftikharuddin was accused being communist and his plan of land reforms was considered against the Islamic believes. In this craftsmanship, feeling himself unable to implement any policy for the rehabilitation of refugees, Mian Iftikharuddin resigned as the Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation of Punjab just two months after the appointment (Harun 1970).

The government of Punjab was not consulted even on the issues that were constitutionally under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government as the Pakistan Refugee Council was under direct control of the federal government. Six times increase in the tax on the transfer of land, collection of *Quaid -i-Azam* Relief Fund for Refugees through civil bureaucracy, extension of period of the *Muhajir Fund Cess* and appointment of the old Unionist in the Advisory Committee of the Council were the example of the supremacy of centre on the government of Punjab (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012). The role of Punjab especially in the decision making process was restricted through these administrative tactics and same was done in the process of implementation of decisions of the federal government.

Further, the federal government did not consult or take into account the Provincial Ministers of Punjab before making important decisions regarding the settlement of the refugees. An Indian Civil Service Office who was serving as the Secretary to the Chief Minister Ahsanuddin was proposed to be appointed by Sirdar Shaukhat Hyat Khan (Revenue Minister of Punjab) to Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) District to accelerate the process of rehabilitation. The Governor of Punjab, Sir Francis Mundie strongly opposed the proposal. Federal government, especially Liaquat Ali Khan supported the Governor in this conflict and the status of representative institution was weakened in Punjab. As a result, in order to develop an exclusive control on the administration of the refugees in the province, the Financial Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner who had an important place in the process were appointed amongst the migrant officers or from the British

officials. This again led to restricted domain of the provincial government (Harun, 1970). In this perspective, the statement of Raja Said Akbar Khan, in the Legislative Assembly reflects what the place was assigned to the Punjab in this process. He stated that '*Punjabi could not be blamed by the member of the Assembly and any class of the world for the extended difficulties in the process of rehabilitations of the refugees*' (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012).

### **Political Administration of Punjab**

In order to understand the position and place of Punjab in the Federation of Pakistan, political administration is an important variable. The authority of the federal government in the administration of the provinces was guaranteed by several provisions made by the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1947. Few of the examples are, under Section 122, administrative machinery was to function in a manner as to ensure respect by federal laws. In the same way, Section 124 increased the scope of the centre in the administrative structure that 'the federal government might confer powers and impose duties on provinces or their officers, though it relates to subject matter of the legislations, might be beyond the provincial control'. Under Section 126(2) the centre was authorized to issue directions to provinces regarding the administration of federal laws, with respect to subjects specified in the concurrent list. The political role of provinces in the state apparatus was totally restricted with these provisions.

In matters of maintenance of law and order which was a provincial subject, the central government remained quite aggressive through civil administration in the province. On the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Court of Inquiry submitted a report on *Anti-Ahmediya Movemet* which clearly indicated the direct central link with civil administration of West Punjab. The civil administration of West Punjab used to send fortnightly reports to the central government regarding law and order situation and about the activities of Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana, the Chief Minister of Punjab (Tahir, 2009).

The Governor- General was empowered by the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949 (PRODA) to debar ministers, members of central and provincial legislatures and parliamentary secretaries from public life for a maximum period of ten years, if found guilty of corruption, maladministration or any abuse of official positions. This Act was used by the centre as an instrument to marginalize those politicians from the political scene who were questioning the authority of the centre by demanding provincial autonomy. Cases were filed against Mamdot and Daultana under PRODA and were referred to tribunals established under the Act. However, Mamdot was not found guilty of any misconduct or misuse of power. On the other hand, proceedings against Daultana were never completed.

The Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1947 had Section 51 which was the most significant tool to sway the provincial politics through the Governor. As per the Section 51, Governor in his relations with the provincial cabinet, had to act as the agent of centre and had to follow the instructions of central government in respect to choosing, summoning and dismissing the provincial ministers. However, no Punjabi was appointed the Governor of Punjab until the appointment of Mushtaq Ahmed Khan Gurmani, in November 1954 (Tahir,2009).First Governor of Punjab after independence was Sir Francis Mudie (1947- 1949) who

was a British and among the Governors appointed after Mudie, Sardar Adur Rab Nishtar (1949-1951) belonged to North- West Frontier Province, Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar (1951-53) was a migrant merchant, Mian Aminuddin (1953-1954) was a migrant civil servant and H. I. Rahimtoola (1954-November 1954) was a migrant lawyer.

Emergency power was used delegated to these Governors by the centre were used frequently. Ten provincial Chief Ministers were dismissed and Governor Rule was declared in the province during the first seven years of the independence. It was done so as to fulfil the desire of the centre in the provincial politics. The first example to state central authority over provincial government was the dismissal of NWFP government on August 22, 1947 under Section 51 (5). Consequently, in order to reduce the status of the provincial government, centre boldly exercised its action in Punjab, Sind and East Bengal (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012).

The Muslim League party leader in the Punjab assembly, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot, formed the first ministry in Punjab. Since he was traditionalist in his outlook, therefore he could stand firm against the central command in Punjab affairs. Francis Mundie, the Governor had reluctance about Mamdot. In such a scenario, the finance minister, Mian Muhammad Mumtaz Khan was an apt candidate to provide the centre with its interest in the state structure. On the other hand, Mamdot and Daultana had differences long before partition and Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah tried to reconcile between them for political stability in Punjab. But his efforts did not succeed in his lifetime to do so. On May 27<sup>th</sup>, 1948, Daultana and Hyat resigned from the ministries which created a fragile environment of factional strife in the cabinet of Punjab. This was an opportunity for the centre to interfere in the selection of candidates for the new cabinet of the Chief Minister of Punjab. Mamdot was forced to include Daultana, Firoz Khan Noon, Begum Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz, Mian Nasrullah and Abdul Hamid Dasti as the new members of his cabinet in order to manoeuvre the political situation as per the centre's desire. Whereas in reality Mamdot intended to take Faiz Muhammad, Fazal Elahi and Muhammad Hussain in order to strengthen his position in the power structure (Harun, 1970).

A potent threat from Punjab to the centre was seen as the efforts put in by Mamdot for defence procurement and more equitable share of financial resources for the province. In order to weaken the political pressure of Punjab, the competing factions of the Muslim League was exploited by the centre so as to harness the energies of the politicians of Punjab (Jalal, 1991). The patronage of the Muhajir dominated Muslim League at the centre was enjoyed by Daultana which helped him to become the president of the Punjab Muslim League in November 1948. As a result, it paved way to remove Mamdot as well as to bring about a change in the party composition which was in favour of the federal government (Kanwal, Ali, Abid, 2012). There was a demand for dissolution of Mamdot Ministry in Punjab by the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Governor Francis Mundie on June 1, 1949. Mamdot had a immense support in the assembly and interfering within the cabinet would had meant turmoil, therefore Governor General Khawaja Nazimuddin intervened and suggested Mundie not to encourage Firoz Khan Noon to take Mamdot's place. On Jan 24, 1949 Mundie succeeded in dissolving the Mamdot Ministry and Punjab Assembly with the

support of Liaquat Ali Khan on charges of misuse of positions as premiere, maladministration and misappropriation of public fund. As a result, under Section 92-A of the Interim Constitution Governor Rule was established which continued till April 1951 (Aziz, 1976).

Punjab was deprived of their say in the state structure under the Governor Rule. The centre was able to assume a dominant position against the demands of provincial autonomy and self reliance with the help of competing factions within Punjab Government. In the elections of the Punjab Muslim League Party 1949, the federal government had played a manipulative role. As a result, in any of the offices of the National Assembly no Punjabi was elected. In order to fill the vacant posts of the West Punjab Legislative Assembly, Old Unionist were promoted and assigned to the offices. It also helped the central government to safeguard their interest in the Assembly.

Daultana wanted to become the leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in the Punjab Assembly during the elections of Provincial Assembly in 1951. However, he posed as a challenge to the federal government during the *Anti-Ahmediya Movement of 1953* and was forced to resign. Firoz Khan Noon was the next option for the post of Chief Minister of Punjab. Under the pressure of the central government and being a loyal ally of the centre, Noon supported the One Unit Scheme, despite his suspicions about the motives of the central leadership (Aziz, 1976). But soon, Noon started to resist the central government and Muslim league in their free will to nominate the representatives from the Punjab for the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Therefore, at the end, he lost his place as a reliable servant of the federal government and was removed from his office of the Chief Minister of Punjab 'in public interest' on May 21, 1955. A nominee of Daultana, Sardar Abdul Hamid Dasti was appointed as the Chief Minister of Punjab.

### **Management of the Provincial Finances**

In regards to the provincial resources, the central government enjoyed dominance under the Interim Constitution. The central government was to supervise and administer the collection financial resources or taxes and levies. Along with this, the management of fiscal and monetary issues, national currency, foreign exchange and international trade, all major resources were under the supervision of the federal government. Due to increased defence expenditure and mass migrations into Pakistan, the central government's decision to waive the right of revenue share of the provinces reinforced the authority of the federal government and reduced the role of the provincial government. In order to meet the necessity of the time, the central government took away Sales tax, income tax and custom duties from the provinces temporarily in 1948 for two years. It was extended in 1950 for another period of 2 years. At the end, this bargain was made permanent in favour of the federal government under the Government of India (Amended) Act 1952.

Punjab fell under the mercy of the centre to fulfil development projects of the province as the allocation of certain taxes to Punjab were under the supervision of the central government. As a result, there was a centralised financial setup which made the federal capital Karachi as the hub of big business and industrial activity. This deprived Punjab of its share in the industrial and commercial development. Punjab as a province had faced the burden of refugees as well as territorial conflict and the policy to concentrate wealth and industry in Karachi was taken as a sacrifice on the part of Punjab. Punjab was the major contributor to resources and its share to economy was doubled against its ratio of population as compared to other provinces (Callard, 1968).

There was a constant resentment from the provinces over the federal authority of allocation of financial resources to them. As a result, Raisman Award in 1951 recommended 50 percent of income tax revenue for the provinces. Sales tax was not returned to the provinces and was left under the jurisdiction of the federal government. Punjab and Sind also had demanded for a share on the export duty on collection as equal to the jute which the central government restrained from giving.

### **Conclusion**

The Interim Constitution and its functioning can be carefully measured in the terms of the significance it had in the foundation and development of the centre-province relations in Pakistan. During this time, the importance and interest of the federal government was guarded and defended at the cost of the provincial autonomy. It did set an example for the future function of the central government in motion. After independence, it was imperative for Pakistan to identify the realities of social, cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the provinces which was a prerequisite of a federation. But due its constant authoritarianism over the provinces, the provincial government could not function properly and were either prorogued or dissolved by the centre. Looking at the dominance of the centre in Punjab and curtailing its development in the early years of formation of Pakistan, clearly states why Punjab eventually came up with a strong foothold. The centre was not able to provide the provinces with a sense of independence which subsequently led to a severe distrust between the centre-province relations.

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