

Urban Governance in India: A Study of Growth during the Last Two Decades

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Abstract: Ever since independence, urban governance has been a neglected topic for the architects of modern India. Among various reasons, one chief reason is the preferred conglomeration of the erstwhile colonizers within towns and cities for economic and safety oriented reasons that had garnered a despising anti-urban sentiment among the Indians most of whom were living in villages during pre-independence days. Reluctance for proper urban planning and governance is also reflected in the initial few nos. of Five-Year Planning as well. However, the situation today is starkly different while growth of urban occupancy rate is ever increasing for innumerable reasons. With increase in population count, problems related to accommodation, health, hygiene, sewerage, and above all planning and administration of urban areas emerged afresh. This article, therefore, intends to map the challenges posed in planning and administration, research into the loopholes thereby, and finally focus on the needs of reforms in civic bodies toward framing better administrative infrastructure as well as proper planning, policy making conducive to environmental sustainability, economic viability and growth.

Keywords: Urbanization, Administration, Planning, Governance, Civic Body.

Introduction

India has been among the swift- growing husbandry in the world for close to 2 decades. Faster growth has egregious counteraccusations for the pace and nature of urbanization. The combination of rising bourns and growing middle classes on the one hand and shy planning for the ineluctable increase in urbanization on the other is creating a situation that's socially, financially, and environmentally unsustainable. The challenge facing India's itineraries and policymakers is how to radically ameliorate the quality of life in metropolises so that they can continue to accommodate unborn growth while icing better living conditions for their residers and the synergetic development of the pastoral sector. This composition argues that reform in the institutions of civic governance is pivotal in addressing this challenge. There are three inviting roadblocks to more civic governance in India a civil frame that has not empowered its third league despite amending the constitution in 1992 for doing so, a missing link in the institutional frame for metropolitan planning and governance, and a political system that's heavily prejudiced toward the pastoral sector [see,e.g., Kazmin (2016) and the section "Anti-urban bias in the political governance," below]. Unless institutional reforms are put in place to address these challenges effectively, the process of urbanization cannot be taken forward to support the binary objects of perfecting the quality of life of India's fleetly growing civic population and transubstantiating Indian metropolises to play their part as machines of growth in India's current stage of development (Corbridge, Harriss, & Jeffrey, 2012).

This section presents the introductory frame of civic governance in India, pressing the challenges posed by the civil frame within which metropolises operate, including the missing institutions for metropolitan governance and the anti-urban bias of the political system. The following section documents the major features of India's growth experience from 2003 – 2016, pressing some of the fault lines and spelling out their counteraccusations for

the part of metropolises and the need for planned urbanization. The coming section presents the civic script with its extremely poor state of service delivery. It also analyzes the part of public civic operations in addressing the challenges of urbanization. The final section totalizes up the main conclusions from the analysis.

Metropolises not empowered Indian metropolises aren't empowered within the Indian civil frame to take on the challenges of urbanization with rapid-fire growth. The Constitution of India firstly placed the responsibility for civic development on state governments. In 1992, the 74th indigenous Correction formally honored civic original bodies as the third league of government and commanded that state governments transfer to original governments a set of specified functions under the 12th Schedule, assigning to them the responsibility for functions similar as civic planning, including city planning; regulation of land use and construction of structures, roads, and islands; the provision of water; public health; and sanitation and solid waste operation. As a result, responsibility now rests with the civic original bodies but it isn't backed by either acceptable finances or the capacity for planning and operation (a well-known problem; e.g., see Meloche & Vaillancourt, 2015). State governments have an important part to play not only in transferring functions, finances, and functionaries but also in furnishing an enabling terrain through legislative and institutional reform, whereas the Government of India can only give strategic leadership. A number of functions under the 12th Schedule have been regressed by numerous but not all state governments over the history 2 decades or so. still, a number of veritably important functions similar as city planning continue to be held by utmost state governments (Panagariya, 2014). Town planning is significant because it can be an important instrument for marshaling finances in a transparent manner to help meet the growing investment requirements for civic structure. In addition, some countries include a peculiar provision in their external legislation stipulating that specific functions may be assigned to the original governments by the state government from time to time, thereby preventing unequivocal assignment. There has also been little action on transferring functionaries to the original governments. External functionaries in utmost cases are workers of the state governments and are posted by the state government to individual metropolises. On backing, the 74th indigenous Correction needed that state finance commissions be set up by the state governments to spell out the principles for sharing/ declining a part of the profit of the state government to original governments (Mathur & Peterson, 2006). The anticipation was that countries will follow the illustration set by the Government of India in appointing largely reputed members and speakers to the Central Finance Commission, furnishing specialized support to the commission, and accepting its recommendations (Rangarajan, 2005). still, state finance commissions didn't meet the norms set by the Central Finance Commission. They've not challenged the state- position political resistance to devolve and civic original governments have remained hamstrung by the lack of finances and are having to serve with unfunded authorizations. The rearmost available data show deterioration in nearly all of the major fiscal pointers of commission for civic original governments in India from their formerly veritably low situations (Mohanty, 2016). Total external earnings constituted only 1.08 of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 – 2008 and declined further to 1.03 of GDP in 2012 – 2013. By comparison, this rate was 4.5 in Poland, 6 in South Africa, and 7.4 in Brazil (Mohanty, 2016). External own earnings reckoned for 53 of the aggregate external earnings in 2007 – 2008 and declined further to 51 in 2012 – 2013. Important the same is true of profit from external levies and property duty profit between 2007 – 2008 and 2012 – 2013. India also fares inadequately in icing pungency in the transfers from state governments to civic original governments. The disempowerment has reached situations similar that for several countries, staff hires of the civic original governments are being paid by the state governments. In South Africa, the transfers are determined and blazoned at the periodic budget time, and for the period from 2008 – 2009 to 2010 – 2011, original governments entered earnings in the range of 7.5 to 8.2 of the total earnings raised nationally (Mohanty, 2016). The central government also funded 40 – 50 of structure investments in large metropolises and 60 – 70 in small metropolises through subventions and loans. China allows its metropolises to retain 25 of value-added duty, which, for illustration, is original to US\$4.5 billion per time for Shanghai (Mohanty, 2016). Original governments admit 35 of value-added duty in Nigeria and in the Philippines cosmopolises admit 34 of public internal earnings (Mohanty, 2016).

In addition to the lack of fiscal degeneration, there's a lack of fiscal autonomy both in marshaling coffers and in setting stoner charges to cover costs (Panagariya, 2014). Property duty rates and immunity are generally set by the state government; this is a major source of profit for the original government, and the civic original bodies are at the mercy of the state government. There have been cases of impunity limits raised and/ or duty rates lowered before state choices; for illustration, in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. In addition to the need for reforming the property duty governance through setting up a property duty board and better styles of assessment, valuation, and collection of property duty with the help of geographic information systems and other information technology (IT) tools, there's a general need to add a external finance list in the constitution that should specify levies that are simply the sphere of original governments. Any increase in stoner charge, indeed if it's to cover costs in the delivery of public services, also generally has to be approved by the state government. The original governments don't have effective power to set stoner charges. As mentioned before, assigning city planning to external governments could be a major instrument through which civic original governments can unleash land value so that they can go about the business of land zoning and developing civic structure within a frame of tone- backing (Moonen, Moir, & Clark, 2014). In addition to generating profit, unleashing land value can potentially act as an incitement for more effective land use, which would affect in compact metropolises. But city planning function has not been transferred to civic original governments in utmost of the countries. A new occasion for fiscal degeneration was offered by the recent accommodations between the Government of India and the state governments on the preface of goods and services duty (GST) that requires an correction of the constitution; still, as the political system in India traverses the last afar to bring forth a indigenous correction for GST, there's little inclination on the part of state governments to devolve indeed a small part of the profit from GST to the third league (Ahluwalia, Kanbur, & Mohanty, 2014). Shy capacity at the original government position to respond to the challenges of civic planning and operation in a fleetly evolving civic script is the other pivotal challenge faced by Indian metropolises. Civic original bodies have come to acquire a host of functions that are new if not unknown. These include the medication of a megacity development plan, megacity mobility plan, megacity sanitation plan, e-governance, and meeting the multitudinous marks set by the Government of India for service delivery. The experience of the 2005 – 2014 period under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission(JNNURM), a public charge for civic renewal and revivification, easily stressed the lack of capacity at the civic original government position as a major constraint in planning and enforcing the systems for civic development (see, e.g., Grant Thornton (2011) and the subsection on JNNURM latterly). State governments will have to develop and strengthen their external configurations and support their training in contemporary tools of civic planning and operation, in fiscal operation through addendum- grounded, double- entry fiscal secretary and regular checkups, and in the use of e-governance tools. A major capacity- structure program involving institutional support through seminars of civic planning and operation was recommended by the High Powered Expert Committee on Urban structure and Services (HPEC, 2011), which was set up by the Government of India in 2008 under the chairmanship of the present author to determine the investment conditions over a 20-time period, 2012 – 2031. Serious sweats at structure capacity at the civic original government position will have to be made by the Government of India as well as state governments. Missing metropolitan planning and Governance A significant development in India's structural metamorphosis is that metropolitan regions are being created by dereliction and not by design. The Constitution of India provides considerable discretion to state governments in determining the executive boundaries of metropolitan regions, and these haven't generally been set keeping in mind the need to produce a unified request forging strong profitable liaison between the core megacity and the fringe of the region.

The constitution also requires that metropolitan planning panels (MPCs) and quarter planning panels (DPCs) prepare development plans for their separate areas, although there's lack of clarity on how these plans will fit into a larger picture and how they will be financed. Though MPCs and DPCs have been formed in some countries, indeed there they've not forged links with megacity planning authorities. They've also not been effective as indigenous planning agencies (Sivaramakrishnan, 2015). Anti-urban bias in the political governance The being

distribution of power in the Indian political system is similar that civic population is underrepresented in both public and state houses (Burdett, Rode, Shankar, & Vahidy, 2014; Mohanty, 2016; Rao & Bird, 2014). The last time administrative and state legislative constituencies were readressed to reflect population changes within the country was in 2008. This was done by the order of the Delimitation Commission of India (Election Commission of India, 2016), which determined the delimitation of constituencies grounded on the population as in 2001. The general choices of 2014 were thus conducted with civic and pastoral constituencies distributed on the base of the 2001 tale that showed only 28 of India's population as civic. A political agreement was also reached whereby this proportion will remain frozen until 2031 so the significant underrepresentation of civic areas will continue (Ahluwalia, 2014a). The political frugality of development in India has remained dominantly concerned with the development of pastoral areas implicitly assuming that civic areas can take care of themselves. Relatively piecemeal from the fact that the civic areas have been generally neglected in sculpturing out a development strategy for the frugality, the arising civic areas have also been denied the introductory statutory frame for demanding governance. For illustration, indeed though the Census of India declared that the number of municipalities increased by over, 750 between 2001 and 2011, municipalities with statutory original governments (which are notified by the concerned state government) increased by only 242 over the same period. The remaining 500 or so areas remain unacknowledged as municipalities when the tale declares that they fulfill the criteria to graduate from a village to a city. Not only is there political resistance at the state government position to empower these municipalities with a statutory civic original government that could articulate and deliver their demand for civic structure and services but frequently the pastoral original governments themselves are reticent to " go civic " because original politicians are alive that they would lose large quantities of finances for pastoral development schemes and they also sweat the regulations that urbanization brings with it. Political commission is also weakened by occasional choices for original governments and limited tours of mayors. More important, the administrative power by and large is vested in external officers, who are nominees of state governments. A suggestion for direct choices of mayors is frequently put forth as an instrument for better governance. Only veritably many countries similar as Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh presently have directly tagged mayors. The functioning of a directly tagged mayor in a administrative system poses a number of challenges. Where the council of locally tagged representatives is controlled by a political party negative to the party from which the directly tagged mayor comes, the decision timber can come sinuous, although the council could be a counterpoise to the mayoral position. still, similar checks and balances come pointless because in utmost countries the mayor has nearly no administrative powers. Where powers are vested in the mayor- in- council, an laterally tagged mayor may well be in a better position to insure smoother functioning. More important than the mode of taking the mayor is the issue of the powers of the megacity government relative to the state government. The enormity of these challenges of governance can be better appreciated when juxtaposed with the fast changing civic script in the fleetly growing Indian frugality. India's rapid-fire growth and the part of metropolises Rapid growth 2003 – 2016 India's growth performance during the period from 2003 – 2004 to 2015 – 2016 was among the loftiest among developing countries. An unknown average growth rate of 7.6 per annum during the period from 2003 – 2004 to 2013 – 2014 was followed by kindly slower growth rate of 7.4 in the posterior 2 times. In 1991, reversing course from a heavily defended and largely regulated policy governance, the Government of India had launched a process of wide- ranging profitable reforms with a view to give larger room to vend forces and to open the frugality to foreign trade and investment. The incremental approach to reform and the long heritage of regulation/ control and protection from foreign competition meant that it took time to establish the credibility with private investors that the new policy governance was then to stay. This meant that the private investment response to the reforms was slow to crop . A volley in private investment started only after 2001. The significant acceleration in GDP growth after 2003 – 2004 has been driven dominantly by non-agriculture sectors with the private sector playing a major part in the acceleration. Although growth had begun to falter in 2011 – 2012, the rearmost data suggest that by 2013 – 2014, the Indian frugality was on a path to recovery, and the growth of GDP in 2015 – 2016 . The fairly important faster growth of services meant

that between 2004 – 2005 and 2012 – 2013(the 2 times for which similar data are available), services increased their share from 53 to 58.7 of GDP. The global competitiveness of IT, business process outsourcing, and fiscal services was deduced from a strong knowledge base that had been developed through institutions of advanced education in numerous countries of India that had been established several decades ago. Telecommunications was another sector that grew veritably fleetly and contributed in a major way to the global competitiveness of the Indian frugality (Mukherjee, 2013). The service sector enterprises were suitable to exploit the openings of buoyant external demand because they were much lower dependent on physical structure that had been a major drag on the competitiveness of Indian assiduity. The restrictive governance of the Industrial Disputes Act(1947) was also not applicable to enterprises in the services sector. The share of husbandry in GDP declined from 19 in 2004 – 2005 to 14 in 2012 – 2013.3 This was to be anticipated as coffers moved to the advanced productivity non-agriculture sectors. But what was unusual in the Indian experience was the fact that the share of assiduity in GDP also declined kindly

from 28 in 2004 – 2005 to 27.4 in 2012 – 2013. Still, some knowledge- grounded corridor of manufacturing — for illustration, medicinal, bus factors, and automotive sectors — shared in the growth instigation but were again largely concentrated around a many civic centers in the southern and western countries of India. The manufacturing sector in India generally continued to be constrained by the inadequacy and poor quality of physical structure, restrictive artificial policy governance, and labor laws that oppressively limited the inflexibility in the hiring and blasting of labor. The many metropolises that acted as machines of growth — for illustration, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Chennai, Hyderabad, Delhi, Pune, and Ahmedabad — endured the stresses and strains of unplanned urbanization that were reflected in growing business traffic, a worsening situation with regard to water failure and its quality, and environmental declination in general. This added to the adverse investment climate, which was formerly suffering from an load of high deals cost of doing business because of restrictive regulations and the complicated procedures of carrying government concurrences (Ahluwalia et al., 2014).

ANTI-URBAN BIAS IN THE POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

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RISING URBANIZATION

Rapid growth is inescapably associated with an increase in the share of civic GDP. For India's rapid-fire growth phase, similar estimates are available for 1999 – 2000 and 2009 – 2010. They indicate that the share of civic GDP in the aggregate has increased from 52 in 1999 – 2000 to 63 in 2009 – 2010(Planning Commission, 2011). still, India's urbanization is much lower than that of utmost countries that are its natural comparators. In 2015, 33 of India's population was civic, compared to 54 in Indonesia, 56 in China, 79 in Mexico, 83 in Korea, and 87 in Brazil (United Nations, 2014). There's reason to believe that the civic population share is undervalued in India (HPEC, 2011); the absolute figures are stunning nonetheless. India is home to the alternate- largest civic population in the world. Its civic population increased from 286 million in 2001 to 377 million in 2011; it was estimated at about 420 million in 2015 and is projected to increase to close to 600 million by 2031. As investments in assiduity and services look for civic space to garner husbandry of agglomeration, both request forces and the government have to play an important part in generating these husbandry. Because there was no intertwined planning of transport and land use, investors faced traffic diseconomies and environmental declination and in the process, they contributed further to the deterioration in the norms of civic living. Planned urbanization is demanded as much for the assiduity and services sectors as it's for pastoral revivification because it fosters the community between pastoral and civic sectors. For illustration, the volume and quality of water available for husbandry are significantly affected by water use in civic areas. also, modernization of the retail sector in civic areas including foreign direct investment encourages investments in logistics and back- end structure, offering openings for high- value husbandry. Punjab in the post-1991 period easily shows that without an artificial policy and an urbanization strategy in place, a rich agrarian base can not continue to deliver rapid-fire profitable growth. Punjab failed to invest in civic structure to develop its metropolises as machines of growth, which would also have handed a fillip to agrarian modernization. The result was that artificial growth was slow and agrarian growth also stagnated (Ahluwalia, Chaudhuri, & Sidhu, 2008). From being the state with the loftiest per capita income until the late 1980s, Punjab was 15th among India's countries and union homes in 2014 – 2015 (Central Statistical Office, 2015).

SMART CITIES

Smart metropolises Mission was launched by the Hon Prime Minister on 25 June 2015. The main ideal of the Mission is to promote metropolises that give core structure, clean and sustainable terrain, and give a decent quality of life to their citizens through the operation of 'smart results'. The Mission aims to drive profitable growth and ameliorate quality of life through comprehensive work on social, profitable, physical, and institutional pillars of the megacity. The focus is on sustainable and inclusive development through the creation of replicable models which act as lighthouses to other aspiring metropolises. 100 megacities have been named to be developed as Smart metropolises through a two- stage competition. The Mission is operated as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme. Central Government will give fiscal support to the extent of over 5 times i.e. on an normal of Rs. 100 crore per megacity per time. An equal quantum on a corresponding base is to be handed by the State/ ULB. fresh coffers are to be raised through confluence, from ULBs ' enjoy finances, subventions under Finance Commission, innovative finance mechanisms similar as External Bonds, other government programs, and borrowings. Emphasis has been given to the participation of the private sector through Public Private hookups (PPP). Citizens' burns were captured in the Smart City proffers (SCPs) prepared by the named metropolises. Added up at the public position, these

proffers contained further than, worth over of which 45 percent is to be funded through Mission subventions, 21 percent through confluence, 21 percent through PPP, and the rest from other sources. The analysis above has stressed the central significance of strengthening civic governance in India, especially in its current stage of development when the frugality is going through a major structural metamorphosis. It has been argued that for India, as one of the largest and fastest growing husbandry in the world, and one in which the civic population is only 33 of the total population but gathering instigation, planned urbanization is pivotal for the sustainability of rapid-fire growth and for perfecting the quality of life of the 420 million people living in Indian metropolises and municipalities.¹⁵ Though investing in civic structure to ground the structure investment deficiency and upgrading its quality is veritably important, the analysis easily suggests that institutional reforms are pivotal both for reaching out to the private sector for participating the backing burden of structure and for icing that the expansion of structure results in advanced service delivery. The composition argues that Indian metropolises aren't empowered to take on the enormous challenges of delivering public services and planning and managing the process of urbanization, which is inescapably associated with rapid-fire profitable growth. The occasion handed by GST has not been used to insure that a small proportion of the state government's share of GST is allocated for transfer to original (pastoral and civic) governments. Guaranteed fiscal transfers, together with a degree of fiscal autonomy and structure capacity for civic planning and operation, will help the cause of commission of the metropolises. In addition, institutions of metropolitan and indigenous planning need to be strengthened to address the challenges arising from the structural metamorphosis of the frugality (Matkin & Frederickson, 2009). The constrained powers of metropolises to make opinions and the generally lesser responsiveness of the polity to pastoral interests aren't appear only in India. Other (civil) programs have been known to have analogous features (for the case of the United States, see Frug, 1999; Frug & Barron, 2008). impact can be seen in significant enhancement in service delivery (Frug & Barron, 2008). To the extent that these operations give a strategic focus on civic planning and operation and succeed in nudging the state governments into action to polarize, decline, and make capacity at the civic original government position, they will make a difference. But the heavy lifting will have to be done by the countries. The technology focus of the public operations seems to have caught the fancy of numerous. It's for this reason that the Smart metropolises charge has attracted lesser investment than Swachh Bharat. Still, the technology focus must be supplemented with a heavy emphasis on institutional reforms if Indian metropolises are to deliver a better quality of life and ameliorate the investment climate for business.

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