



Employing Sartre's Conceptions of Being, Non-being and Becoming: A Critical Study

Dr. Sankhang Basumatary

M.A., MPhil. & PhD in Philosophy

Contact No. 9971692115

Email. Sankhangb3@gmail.com

The paper registration id: 321632 and the transaction id: 4e4bb55356768e5d6dad

Abstract

The study is aim to highlight the aspects of Sartre's conceptions of 'being', 'non-being' and 'becoming' in ontologically the work "Being and Nothingness". In the beginning, the research will analyse classical Greek philosophers' understanding of 'Being', 'non-Being' and 'Becoming'. Here the study will focused on Parmenides and Heraclitus. A further analysis deals with Heidegger's understanding of 'Being' and 'Becoming' and the influence of classical Greek philosophy on him. An analysis will basically be based on Sartre's own description of 'being', 'non-being' and 'becoming' by first pointing out the limits or shortfalls as perceived to be found in the account given by Parmenides, Heraclitus and Heidegger. After this, I shall move onto Sartre's own detailed analysis of the problem of the concept of 'being', 'non-being' and 'becoming' in a critical way.

Keywords Being, Non-being, becoming, Logos, Dasein, Dasman, Authentic, consciousness, Human reality

1 Introduction

Sartre's conceptions of Being and Freedom are analyzed in his well-known work *Being and Nothingness*(1943) and *Existentialism is a Humanism*(1962). Basically, this study will attempt to firstly look at the nature of 'being' and 'non-being'. Philosophers have interpreted the notion of 'being' from various perspectives. Sartre's philosophical system also begins mainly with his doctrine of being and non-being. He describes his concepts of being and non-being by taking ideas from Heidegger's metaphysics. In his work *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger has put forward his thesis that 'Being' is always in a process of becoming.¹ This view of Being turns out to be break from the philosophical tradition hitherto. As point of fact, Heidegger developed his metaphysical theory from pre-Socratic philosophers, in

¹Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p.101

particular, Parmenides and Heraclitus. These two Greek philosophers had given controversial views and remarks on the concepts of 'Being' and 'non-being'.² In his poem *On Nature*, Parmenides presents controversy between Being and non-being. On the other hand, the philosophical thoughts of Heraclitus could be gathered from his writings which survived in parts. The collection of those bits and pieces of his writings comes to be known as *Fragments*. This becomes the only authentic source of his ontological views, not to mention his prolific thinking in different fields of human endeavors. Heraclitus' perspective and interpretation of reality will be contrasted against Parmenides' conception of Being and non-being.

Heidegger's notion of Being will be traced back to the pre-Socratic thinkers, in particular, to Parmenides' and Heraclitus' perceptions of Being and non-being. Martin Heidegger, the German metaphysician, in his first book *Being and Time*(1927) sketched and presented a different picture of Being and beings (entities). Heidegger was primarily interested in the question of the meaning of Being.³ He is recognized as one of the greatest philosophers from Germany in the twentieth century. Before publishing his second book *An Introduction to Metaphysics*(1935), he used to deliver class room lectures, which were later collected and published as *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. From these works, the present study will attempt to articulate the distinctive features of Heideggerean metaphysics.

Finally, the study will initially focus on Sartre's assimilation of Martin Heidegger's notion of Being in his own theorization of 'being'. It will proceed further to aim at comprehending Sartre's metaphysics of 'being', 'non-being' and 'becoming'. Having done this, it is hoped that Sartre's conception of being, non-being and becoming will be adequately clear and distinct. The basic conceptions of the metaphysics of the above-mentioned thinkers will be discussed and contrasted in this study.

The purpose of this research is to draw up a satisfactory historical perspective of the ideational development in metaphysics or the theory of being, non-being and becoming from pre-Socratic days till the time of modern western thinkers, in particular, Sartre. In doing so, one will be able to trace the connections of ideas and concepts in metaphysics across the philosophers of different times. Thus, it is envisaged that Sartre's concept of 'being', 'non-being' and 'becoming' will be justifiably situated in a historical perspective of western philosophical tradition.

2 Being, Non-Being and Becoming in Classical Greek Philosophy

The classical Greek philosophy attempts to find out the nature and universal explanations of 'Being', 'non-being' and 'becoming' which could be involved with social necessity of time. The function of philosophy is to critically evaluate our beliefs, to clarify the concepts, and at once it also involves expounding existing ideas, creating new imaginative ideas, and critically assessing the soundness of the arguments put forward in support of views claimed to be true. It explores and redefines the well-established norms during the times of Greek orthodox systems, and critically analyses the foundation of human endeavors, such as science, politics, religion or ethics. In this regard, philosophers most often find themselves debating on fundamental issues of existence: what is ultimate reality in our life-experience? How do we know that reality? What constitutes good life? What is the meaning of life? These questions are involved and raised in

²Here I use 'non-being' which as the same sense of 'not-being'.

³Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. p.4

the process of evaluating the social reality and in understanding the world in order to lead a good life by proving or establishing what are good and bad, real and unreal, in the world for human being.

To discuss this reality the classical Greek thinkers have tried to express human nature through the term 'Being'. In general, it is impossible for one to give a clear picture of 'Being'. The complexity of the problem of the meaning of Being opens up in the way of elucidating the question (what is Being?) in its various dimensions. Being is that because of which anything possible is possible, anything that can exist, exists. In other word, Being is the ground of possibility and existence. Certainly therefore, Being is not the world. Instead, Being is the reason for the world. Being is the ground of the world.

The analytical review submitted below will be limited to some definitions and some descriptions of the relationship between Being and non-being from historically and traditional approach to ontology. The study will thereafter examine the same in the light of conflict generation and conflict resolution. The research shall also look for a new issue on a critical examination of the question of Being and non-being in the light of historical and practical relevance and will also involve its implications in the social domain. It is desirably hoped that the paper will make important contributions towards understanding the ground of conflicts in the world, and will thereby equip us better to bring about the desired state of affairs. This study, I shall try to highlight or present the relevance of the nature of Being and non-being and their related aspects, with a view to make this particular area of philosophy, to wit, ontology, an engaging and fruitful pursuit of knowledge.

Parmenides' View on Being, Non-being and Becoming

Pre-Socratic philosophers like Parmenides and Heraclitus raised the problem of Being and non-being. The issue of Being and non-being are dealt and expounded by Parmenides ontologically. This Greek philosopher held the view that Being is the ground and source of all that apparently exist. Whereas non-being, according to him (Parmenides), is something continually engaged in a specified activity in an individual mind. Although for Parmenides, Being also could be understood as

Thus, in one sense, Being is something absent from mortal common sense, just as the goddess is absent from Parmenides as kouros seeking, but not holding, the light of day. In another sense, Being is something immediately present to the mind in the here and now, just as the goddess is immediately present to Parmenides as kouros basking in the light of day.⁴

So, Being is something absent from our practical sense but absent permeated by a present in our individuals mind.

Historically, the concepts of Being and non-being and the issue of distinguishing their essence and difference developed in the times of Parmenides. Parmenides shows the antithesis between Being and non-being. He gives the metaphysical assertion that Being *is* and non-being *is not*. For him, Being is absolutely real and permanent, and is that which alone exists (is-ness). Parmenides calls in his poem *On Nature*, the method of inquiry on the nature of being as "the way of truth", or "the way of reason". The same may be equates with axiomatic-deductive method.

⁴M. J. Henn, *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretive Essays and Commentary to the Text*, p.33

On the contrary, non-being is wholly unreal and illusory which does not have an existence of its own (is not). In his poem *On Nature* Parmenides calls his treatment or study of the nature of non-being as “the way of opinion or senses”. Indeed, non-being would be conceptualized as nothing. It is identified with Becoming.⁵ For him, non-being is in total contradiction with Being. In other word, non-being (what is not?) is the antithesis of Being (what is?). According to Parmenides, anything Becoming is unstable, imperfect. It is not at all constant or unchanging. Non-being is always in a process of becoming. Thus, non-being (entity) is identifiable with Becoming. It is identifiable with the world of changing things. On the other hand, in contrast to non-being, his (Parmenides) understanding of Being can be posited in these expressions: there is in it no change; it is absolutely “unbecome” and “imperishable” i.e. permanent; Being has neither beginning nor end; it has neither arising nor passing away. He holds that the same “contains neither a starting point (B 8.27), nor a determinate end (B 8.27)”.⁶ So, Being cannot be said as “it was” (past); “it is” (present) or “it will be” (future). There is no past, present and future within Being. It is eternal and timeless, which is undivided and indivisible. In the positive sense, it can be said of Being that its sole character is simply its being. Its only quality is “is-ness” or existence.⁷ Therefore, he makes clear an obvious layout, that non-being is nothing, illusory and false; whilst in contrast, Being is what is, and anything that exists must come out of it—but if it does not come out of Being, then it is a non-being, nothing and what is not.

For Parmenides, non-being is appearance or illusion. The world of senses is illusory—mere appearances. Yet the outer appearances or pluralities are to be touched or felt by human sense organs. Therefore, “manyness” or plurality is unreal and non-being which is perceived by the senses.⁸ However, Being is real and one (unity). This one and real Being is not boundless but a huge indivisible sphere. He (Parmenides) affirms that the nature of Being can be comprehended through thought or reason (intuitive logic), which he calls “the way of truth”.

It was Parmenides who first developed the idea of Being and thought in the history of Greek philosophy. According to him, Being and thought are basically the principle of idealism. Being is a general idea. It is a concept and also a thought, but not a thing. Being or reality is a thought. In this regard, he means in the same sense what Being and thought are.

Parmenides holds that Being and thought are the same (B3); i.e., that which is is thoroughly intelligible. Perfection is commensurate with thinkability, imperfection with sensibility. He explicitly recognizes a perfect cosmic sphericity (cf. B8-49). He anticipates this drive toward the universal and the intelligible by calling us to use our minds, not our senses, to contemplate the perfection of the cosmos by reminding us of things that cannot be grasped except in thought. The perfect sphericity is one of many access routes to Being. So, the term he uses technically to express the cosmic permanence of Being, i.e. the instantaneous fact of eternal presence everywhere at once in the now.⁹

⁵W.T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, p.44

⁶M.J. Henn, *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretive Essays and Commentary to the Text*, p.33

⁷W.T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, pp.44-5

⁸ibid., p.44

⁹M.J. Henn, *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretive Essays and Commentary to the Text*, p.33

On the other hand, Parmenides holds that thought considers a word, statement which is an utterance or description of Being. Thought articulates personal expression or one's own opinion. He uses the utterance (expression) and thought in the same sense. Here Parmenides analyses Being and thought in linguistic term. He holds Being as an abstraction which is absolutely real. Being is a truth which can be perceived only through reason, and this view constitutes the fundamental position of idealism.¹⁰

Parmenides resolves the problem that arises from the difference between Being and thought, in the following statements: there is no thought without Being; thought arises from Being; if there is no Being, then there will be no thought.¹¹ Thus Being makes thought possible; and thought necessitates the being of Being. With regard to non-being which Parmenides terms as what is not or non-existence, he consequently rules it out of thinking, for the reason that a thing which does not exist *can not* be an object of thinking or content of thought. Hence a non-being, in contrast to Being, is neither an abstraction nor a thought.

Heraclitus' understanding of Being, non-being and Becoming

Heraclitus holds that Being and non-being are both real and identical. He considers that entities do exist in any given moment of time, and yet the same are ever in a process of change. According to him, everything is in a perpetual state or process of change which he identifies as state of flux or Becoming. Thus, for him, Becoming or flux alone is permanently existent. Becoming takes the place of Being and non-being.¹²

Heraclitus asserts that change is the order of world. In his view, the world was not created, nor would be destroyed. "This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made. But it always was and will be; an ever-living fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out."¹³ Heraclitus introduces fire as the most fundamental element or essential substance which gives rise to other elements and thus to all entities. That involves, according to him, two processes in opposition to each other. He calls that "strife" or "the upward-downward path". The direction of becoming is determined by the course the "strife" takes. In other words, what becomes depends on which one of the oppositional processes dominates the other.

As mentioned above from fire comes air, water and earth. Heraclitus claims that when fire dies or goes out air is "born". When air "dies" then water is "born" or formed. Likewise, water is transformed into earth. This process of becoming follows the principle of "strife", as given above. Two processes, namely, death (destruction) and birth (creation) are in operation simultaneously and instantaneously in the transformation of one element into another.

By this principle, he also explains how an object or entity can maintain a stable existence. By his first premise "everything flows", a given object is expected to change from moment to moment, so that it should not remain the same thing the next moment. But if the two opposing processes (present in the "upward-downward path") are of equal proportion, equilibrium is arrived at, and the entity or object in question appears to be in a stable state of existence, which Heraclitus terms as "justice", where "strife" is in a state of harmony.

¹⁰W.T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, p.45

¹¹M. J. Henn, *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretive Essays and Commentary to the Text*, p.33

¹²Ibid., p.75

¹³Daniel W. Graham, "Heraclitus" *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Moreover, Heraclitus avers that things or entities (realities) may appear to be stable, but actually they are constantly changing. To prove this, Heraclitus wrote, “one cannot step twice into the same river.”¹⁴ The river which we have stepped into is already gone. Now water has replaced the past; and as a result, the past river is no longer there. In order to signify the nature of universal flux, Heraclitus takes the example of fire, as the ultimate “world stuff”. The fire of Heraclitus is not the ultimate indwelling substratum. It is that which is constantly being transformed into other things. He thought that everything changes its qualities or properties. Therefore, according to him, everything is a union of opposite qualities. He sometimes expounds the universal opposite qualities as—

Sea is the purest and most polluted water: for fish drinkable and healthy, for men undrinkable and harmful. (B61) As the same thing in us are living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things having changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these. (B88) Contrary qualities are found in us “as the same thing”. But they are the same by virtue of one thing changing around to another. We are asleep and we wake up; we are awake and we go to sleep. Thus sleep and waking are both found in us, but not at the same time or in the same respect. Indeed, if sleeping and waking were identical, there would be no change as required by the second sentence. Contraries are the same by virtue of constituting a system of connections: alivedead, waking-sleeping, young-old. Subjects do not possess incompatible properties at the same time, but at different times.¹⁵

All things come into being by conflict of opposites and the sum of things flows like a stream.

Heraclitus introduces “Logos” (which may mean word, principle, account, plan, formula, proportion, measure, and reckoning) in order to explain the world order (the world as appears) and the way things happen within. He says all things come to pass in accordance with this *Logos*. By this, he conveys that everything that is or that becomes have been pre-determined according to *Logos*. Though he claims that *Logos* is common to all or is present everywhere, which “has been there all along” (i.e. *Logos* is universal), he laments that nobody perceives it or understands the same when it is presented or set forth.¹⁶ Everything that exists is governed by *Logos*. Further, he maintains that though mortals cannot comprehend *Logos*, they must live or act in accordance as *Logos* would require of them. Heraclitus further submits that if and when man truly apprehends *Logos*, that will change his *phusis*. In Greek, *phusis* means “genuine nature or structure of a thing”.¹⁷ Therefore, his claim would imply that *Logos* is the only means by which man’s nature would become authentic or genuine.

Thus, for Heraclitus, “only Becoming is (exist), whereas Being, permanence, identity, are nothing but illusion. All things sublunary are perpetually changing, passing over into new forms and new shapes. Nothing stands, nothing holds fast, nothing remains what it is.”¹⁸ In this connection, Becoming or flux only exists whereas Being and non-being do not exist. They are not stable always and is in a process one after another. But this view of Heraclitus has contradicted Parmenides’ standpoint, stating that reality must be permanent. The latter denied the very possibility of change or becoming. For him, the concept of change is

¹⁴M.J. Henn, *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretive Essays and Commentary to the Text*, p.74

¹⁵Daniel W. Graham, “Heraclitus” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

¹⁶H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: A Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary*, p.98

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p.99

¹⁸W.T. W.T. *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, pp.73-4

rendered as illusory, whilst Being alone stands permanently existent. The differences between the thoughts of Parmenides and Heraclitus give rise to the problem of Being and non-being.

Heidegger on Being and Becoming

The nature of Being has been the central subject or perennial topic of philosophical contemplation from pre-Socratic Greek philosophers down to the modern philosophers, such as Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre et al. At the turn of the 20th century, Martin Heidegger also took up the study of Being, phenomenologically and existentially. Heidegger was a German philosopher who goes back to pre-Socratic Greek philosophies in his works *Being and Time* and *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. He develops his understanding of Being through his study of the traditional schools of thought belonging to the classical Greek philosophers. Departing from Parmenides and Heraclitus, Heidegger enunciates the difference between “Being” and “being”. For him, “Being” could be understood as the source of existence, fullness of existence, whilst “being” represents entity.¹⁹ Heidegger is a philosopher of one-point-programme, and that programme is study of Being. For instance, water, trees, man, animals, thought, God etc. are entities. These entities are a revelation and a show or manifestation of Being. Entities are beings. In this connection, Being is the source of existence of beings or entities. He also identifies Being as the proper and very subject of metaphysical investigations. Heidegger’s concept of metaphysics as fundamental ontology is an interrelation among Being, nothing, *Dasein* and entity. The concept of metaphysics which Heidegger expresses is in the following ways: firstly, he deals with metaphysics as the elucidation of question of the meaning of Being; secondly, it is an inquiry concerning ‘nothing’. But while doing these two things, he enquires into *Dasein* and entities to complete the sphere of enquiries.²⁰

Heidegger wants to change the history of metaphysics, which has hitherto engaged with beings or entities, leaving behind Being with Parmenides. He declares the need for metaphysics to return to the Parmenidean path. With traditional western metaphysics, Heidegger questions, “Where do we find such a notion of Being?” Heidegger did not find his kind of understanding of Being in Plato, Aristotle and their successors. Therefore, Heidegger goes farther back to pre-Socratic philosophers like Parmenides, Heraclitus, where he finds the impression that “Being essentially unfolds as *phusis*”. The term *phusis* would mean, “emerging, manifesting and arising”. When Heidegger uses the word Being, it is in the sense of emerging, manifesting and arising.²¹ He identifies the pre-Socratic Greek understanding of *phusis* as “the emerging sway” with his own understanding of Being.²² So, according to Heidegger, *phusis* is the form of “unconcealment” of Being. The manifest or comprehensible dimension of Being as such is the whole realm of *phusis*. Heidegger’s intention is to explicate the original pre-Socratic evaluation of the concept or idea of *phusis*.²³ On the other hand, he speaks about the process of Being. We can take an example- clay. We have a statue, cutlery, pot, toy, etc. which are produced from clay. These different things produced from clay are entities. In this example, clay is metaphorically depicted as Being. In the similar way, Being manifests itself, indirectly as it where, as entities. Entities are some kinds of things or

¹⁹M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.4

²⁰Ibid., p.31

²¹Ibid., pp.25-6

²²M. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p.15

²³Ibid., p.180

beings; but compared to them (entities), Being is not the things in themselves. Virtually, Being is therefore absent in the entities which have come into existence through the process of Being. This is not an “absence” nor a “negation”; rather, it is absence permeated by a presence.²⁴

The traditional form of definition cannot convey anything with regard to the nature of Being, for the reason that Being cannot be brought under a ‘genus’. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by definitions, nor can it be presented through lower ones. On the contrary, Being is not a concept having universal characteristics, because the universality of Being transcends any universality of genus. In fact, the so-called genus is only an entity. And as stated before, Being is not an entity. That means “to be” (*Sein*), the meaning of which is enquired about, can never be a thing or being. For the question is not directed to any particular thing. The question of the meaning of Being, which is ontological in nature cannot be answered satisfactorily in an ontical procedure. It is a fact that Being is that which determines entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood. At the same time, Being is always the Being of an entity. From the above assertions, we can draw two conclusions: firstly, Being is related to beings; secondly, Being cannot ever be a being. The Being of entities is not itself an entity. This explanation of Being is based on the “orientation” of Being, that it is always identifiable with the processes of the coming into being of entities.

In his book *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger also deals with the limitations or “restrictions” of Being. His “restriction of Being” is in relation to becoming, appearance, thought and ought.²⁵ Firstly, from the perspective of limitation of becoming, Being is understood as *phusis* itself, “by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable”.²⁶ Secondly, the perspective of limitation of appearance, Being is understood as the “appearing” (source). Thirdly, the perspective of the limitation of thinking, Being is understood as the “already there”. Fourthly, the perspective of the limitation of ought, Being is understood as “the given”.

Moreover, these four limitations are not accidental, but they are as the inner necessity and direct product of the Being-process. They arise in connection with the development of our understanding of Being. These limitations dominate our knowledge, our thinking and our action, i.e. these limitations dominate our entire relation to Being.²⁷

Being and Becoming: According to Heidegger, anything becoming is incomplete, imperfect, not yet full. The becomings are the entities. In contrast to this, there is Being which is complete, perfect, full.³⁰ Here Heidegger proposes that Heraclitus’ “doctrine of becoming” (*panta rhei*) compliments with Parmenides’ concept of Being. He attempts to reconcile these two philosophers, one saying that Being is permanent, and the other saying that becoming or flux alone is unchanging—these two positions seemingly contradictory to each other—by looking at Being as the principle of becoming or *phusis* as elucidated already. This gives the unequivocal picture that one quality or attribute of Heidegger’s Being is its permanence or changelessness. The entities become something else to attain their perfection, completion,

²⁴R. David Cerbone, *Understanding Phenomenology*, p.45

²⁵M. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p.98

²⁶Ibid., p.15

²⁷Ibid., p.99

fullness through the limitations of ends or goals etc. But because they are entities, they will never be able to attain the status of Being, just as Heidegger has shown the difference between Being and becoming.

Being and Appearance: For Heidegger, Being is the appearing. Entities are the appearance. Appearing is the real, appearing is the fullness. The appearances (entities) are the changing, and the unstable. They are apparent, they are vanishing or ephemeral. It is changing moment by moment or day by day.²⁸ The three points emerge here—a) the essence of the appearance is the appearing. There can be no appearance without the appearing.²⁹ b) The appearing is not subsequent to appearance. And, c) Being is the appearing, and in the appearance, Being is withdrawn.

Being and Thought: Heidegger holds that thinking is a limitation of Being. Yet, thinking is different from other limitations because we need to think on the limitation of Being—in other words, thinking on thinking itself. This is the limitation, i.e. thinking on the limitation of Being. Thinking is a means, and so also, thinking is an end. Heidegger holds thinking is the work of a thinker. To think means “to aim at”, “to remember”, “to intend”.³⁰ For him, such a logic was developed to answer some questions regarding entities. These entities are studied in “ontology”. Heidegger quotes Parmenides and Heraclitus to show that the original meaning of “logos” was not logic.³¹ But the original meaning of “logos” was the gathering, i.e. Being gathers entities to itself to manifest them.³² Heidegger combines ontology, theology and logic to coin the word “onto-theology”. Onto-theology is the wrong way of thinking on Being. Against onto-theology, he points out that “apprehension” is the right way of thinking on Being. “Apprehension” has two different sides: a) Apprehension by Being. And, b) Apprehension encapsulates Being. Apprehension is the process by means of which man enters into the domain of Being. Apprehension enables man to come face to face with Being.³³ There are three points that emerge here—i) Apprehension is a decision of Being i.e. apprehension shows that man is not rooted in Being.³⁴ ii) Apprehension is to recapture oneself from confusion. iii) Apprehension is to realize that “logos” is the foundation of language.

Being and Ought: According to Heidegger, over against ought, Being is the datum.³⁵ He points out that Kant developed the notion of ought, whilst Hegel discussed a moral ought, and Marx’s is an economic ought. Whereas, in Nietzsche, the ought becomes “revaluation” (representation) of value. In this regard, due to the predominance of beings, the ought is endangered and challenged in its role as standard for social morality. The ought must confidently and forcefully state an imperative or a belief-claim about personal lacks. (For example, peace must be restored first for harmonious coexistence or I should grow into a mature person.) It must assert itself and also ground itself in itself. Whatever announces as an ought-claim in itself must prove to be valid in doing so on its own merit. Something like an ought can issue or emanate, only from something that raises such a claim on its own, something that in itself has a value, and itself is a value. Thus values as such now develop as the ground of the ought. But values stand opposed to the Being

²⁸Ibid., p.105

²⁹Ibid., p.105

³⁰Ibid., p.125

³¹Ibid., p.127

³²Ibid., p.132

³³Ibid., p.148

³⁴Ibid., p.149

³⁵Ibid., p.210

of beings, in the sense of factual entities, as they (values) themselves are not yet present or existent. So, in a proper way, one says that they are valid. Values make available for use or supply the measure or judgment for all domains of beings—that is, of what is present at hand. History is nothing but a series of realization of ought or what-should-be. The present is the actualization of values.³⁶

Heidegger's new mode of thinking begins with an attack on the Cartesian image of man, or the modern man of reason, and all such anthropocentric tendencies that failed to reach the essence of man. The essence of man, creating the occurrence of Being, and it is to this participatory engagement in Being that the term *Dasein* refers. Heidegger employs term "existence" in a technical sense, drawing heavily from its etymological meaning. The term "existence" refers to *Dasein*'s capacities for transcendence. *Dasein* alone has a world and is capable of uncovering entities. For Heidegger, *Dasein* has been thrown into the world. Though choosing and acting are integral to its existence, *Dasein* is derived of freedom to choose itself. *Dasein* has no option for not choosing to be the ground of presence. *Dasein* finds itself in such a way that it is always and necessarily related to something, i.e. an entity and also to Being.

The word *Dasein* is derived from German word "Da" and "Sein". "Da" means "there" and "Sein" means "Being" which means "there-Being".³⁷ *Dasein* is there where Being reveals itself most appropriately. *Dasein* is inherently to or essentially related to Being. Basically, it is concerned with the investigation of human existence. According to Heidegger, *Dasein* is the domain for the revelation of Being (*Sein*). Heidegger does not agree that *Dasein* is identical with man and he says man is *Dasein* in so far as Being approaches man to itself i.e. man is *Dasein* only in relation to Being, i.e. *Dasein* is that in which the essence of man is rooted. *Dasein* is a mode of Being or way of Being. Man's orientation towards Being makes man a *Dasein*. *Dasein* has a double relation a relation to man and a relation to Being. Man's having an orientation to Being makes man *Dasein*.

For Heidegger, *Dasein* has two characteristics. No philosopher in the past made a distinction between the characteristics applicable to man and things. Heidegger was the first philosopher to make that distinction. They are "existence" and "mineness". The characteristics applicable to men are called "existentials". The characteristics applicable to things called "existentiells".

Existence etymologically originates from the Latin word "Ex-Sister" which means "to stands out" or "out standing" i.e. *Dasein* stands out from everything else.³⁸ This standing out is expressed by way of questioning itself, observing itself, reflecting itself, examining itself, analyzing itself. This is how a man becomes *Dasein*. Man only has this kind of power. Animals or things do not have this power. *Dasein* stands out from the realm of entities by the unique capacity it possesses it is the domain for the manifestation of Being. It means that the presenting of being takes through *Dasein*, which alone exists. The second existential is called "mineness". According to Heidegger, "mineness" refers to "decision". When I take my own decisions, they are owned decisions. When I take decision based on others' recommendations, they are "un-owned" decisions and through them. I become inauthentic. Heidegger holds that *Dasein* comes into existence by "thrownness" i.e. I am given an existence without any consent. By thrown means

³⁶Ibid., p.212

³⁷R. David Cerbone, *Understanding Phenomenology*, p.42

³⁸M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*. p.7

that human existence is contingent, i.e. there is no necessarily for it to come into existence, i.e. it has no built in purpose or meaning.

Ordinarily, *Dasein* has an average every day existence. Average existence is the kind of existence where nothing extra-ordinary happens.³⁹ I forget myself, i.e. I forget the source of my existence and when I forget myself and source of my existence, I become an “inauthentic”, man, i.e. I am no more a *Dasein*, I go away from Being, I become an “inauthentic”, man, i.e. *Dasman*. I mean what Heidegger wants to highlight that *Dasein* is authentic man and *Dasman* as a man is inauthentic.

3 Sartre on Being, Non-Being and Becoming

Sartre was a 20th century's French philosopher who consistently follows Heidegger's notion of Being and becoming. His conceptions of being, non-being and becoming are rooted in the heart of ontology as dealt in modern western contemporary philosophy (basically the modern western philosophy on ontology reviews and re-examines being, existence and entities). Akin to Parmenides' view, Sartre also holds being is; non-being is not. In this regard, Sartre shows that being is undifferentiated, pure self-identity. But in Sartre's treatment of the subject, there is no relation between being and reason; neither does he see being as necessity, in contrast to Parmenides' understanding of Being. At this juncture of departure from Parmenides, Sartre turns to Heidegger's notions of Being. Subsequently, he expresses being as: Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is *what it is*.⁴⁰ As we gather from above, Sartre also describes being ontologically. He presents being in terms of the expression of the nature of human reality.

The pre-Socratic Greek philosophers were the first to contemplate on Being, during the times of classical Greek philosophy. German philosopher Heidegger follows their (Parmenides, Heraclitus et al) ideas in 20th century. And, for his concepts of being, Sartre also draws from Heidegger's understanding of Being. Sartre's ontological study on being arrives upon the nature of human reality. Heidegger calls *Dasein* or “there-being” as human reality. Similar to Heidegger's view, Sartre also does not say that human reality(authentic) is synonymous with all human beings, or the rest of being; he distinguishes true human nature in terms of the nature of questioning about himself, and about others or about the world in general. He contrasts his position with that of idealism which rejects any idea of a noumenal world behind the phenomenon, and explains his own idea of the “transphenomenality of being”. His (Sartre) probe of being starts from reducing existence to its series of appearances. These appearances, as phenomena, require a being that is in itself no longer an appearance. Since all phenomena are appearances perceived by human consciousness, the pursuit of the being of appearances leads Sartre to study the being of consciousness. Sartre's notion of being is radically dual in nature, not in the sense of their existence or appearance, but with regard to their nature of conscious being and non-conscious being. He then proceeds to present his distinction between unconscious being (being-in-itself) and conscious being (being-for-itself).⁴¹

Sartre, in his major work *Being and Nothingness* which explores the realities of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, employs his terminology from Hegel's.⁴² Sartre also expounds the metaphysical distinction

³⁹R. David Carbone, *Understanding Phenomenology*, p.57

⁴⁰Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p.80

⁴¹Ibid., p.23

⁴²Hurbert, *A Commentary to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, p.236

between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Sartre presents being-in-itself as existing without justification, independent of for-itself. The basic distinction discovered is that of between material objects (being-in-itself) and conscious being (being-for-itself). Material objects are complete, self-sufficient, full and inert; they need not sustain themselves to remain what they are; they simply are what they are.⁴³ He affirms that there is a world of objects which exists independently of consciousness. The inert objects like books, tables, trees etc. are non-conscious beings and have their independent existence. They neither have consciousness nor are dependent on consciousness for their existence. The term “being-in-itself” can be applied to all which are the objects without consciousness. Being-in-itself is complete in itself. They are through and through whatever it is that they are, which have essences, and which are solid. At this point, “being-for-itself” differs from being-in-itself. Being-for-itself lacks completeness—completeness of existence which belongs to being-in-itself.

According to Sartre, being-in-itself has no ‘within’ which is opposed to a ‘without’, and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a consciousness of its own. The in-itself has nothing secret; it is a monolith. Sartre tries to convey here that we can understand that in-itself is what it is. The researcher here thinks that it is accurate to say that being-in-itself is non-conscious being, and that being-for-itself is a conscious being. This means that being-in-itself can neither be derived from the possible, nor reduced to the necessary, contrary to the deductions of Parmenides’ axioms for Being. Again, Sartre posits that an existing phenomenon can never be derived from another being. This is what Sartre calls the contingency of being-in-itself.⁴⁴ Sartre in his work *Being and Nothingness* defines being-in-itself (*en-sui*) as:

Being-in-itself is non-conscious being. It is the being of the phenomenon and overflows the knowledge which we have of it. It is plenitude, and strictly speaking, we can say of it only that it is.⁴⁵

Sartre distinguishes being-in-itself as unconscious being and being-for-itself as self-conscious being. We have seen that in-itself doesn’t lack anything, it is complete in itself. He enunciates that lack finds its foundation in consciousness, which is peculiarly human kind of reality. Through the classification of the for-itself and in-itself, Sartre builds his ontological foundation of philosophy.

Plainly, being-for-itself is not in-itself, even as their categories are based on the distinction of conscious being and non-conscious being. Also, in the case of being-in-itself, this meant it was not metaphysically caused by anything, it did not depend causally on anything else, as mentioned before. Thus, to say that being-for-itself is not in-itself means to Sartre that the former is caused, it does depend on something else, on the in-itself. Sartre describes the for-itself as “arising” out of the in-itself, it “surges up” in the world. Sartre describes being-for-itself as embodied consciousness, which is the source of nothingness or non-being.

Corresponding with Heidegger’s line of thinking, Sartre also holds the difference as well as interrelation between being and non-being. He refuses Cartesian concepts of mind-body dualism and also Kantian analysis of the difference between noumena and phenomena. So then, Sartre’s concept of being follows Heidegger’s understanding of Being. For Sartre, “being” is the cause of existence, whereas “non-

⁴³Schroeder, *Continental Philosophy*. p.174

⁴⁴Ibid., p.28

⁴⁵Ibid., p.80

being” represents as: when one has an immediate awareness of something, then one’s awareness of lack (nonbeing) directly comes upon that object. In such an experience, there can be a perception of absence—and this is what Sartre tries to analyse in his description of ‘non-being’. ‘Non-being’ is a specific form of human conduct, that is, the attitude of questioning or inquiry that can reveal the nature of experiences. It is in this act of questioning, one can witness the origin of real non-being—and not mere abstraction—within being. So, being negates non-being, which reflects an essential value of human life-experience, even as we can understand and explain the same (the action of negation). Thus, negation is a conscious act or intentional course of action performed or undertaken by a being toward the non-being in question.⁴⁶ In this connection, an individual can change one’s own state or structure to quench one’s own requirement through an appropriate action. In this light, non-being is revelation of being: it is absent practically, but an absence permeated by a presence (consciousness of the non-being in question in one’s conscious being). This presence can at once be both external (literally) and internal—existing in the individual mind. These non-beings or lacks are hidden within being.

Moreover, non-being has to do with the questioning human attitude, an act of consciousness, filled with meaning. Every question presupposes simultaneously a being that questions, and a being which is being questioned. So, in this act of inquiry, there is a conduct that reveals man’s relation with the world. The same is also an attitude, more than a mere sum of words or any psychological state, an attitude through which we expect a reply, a yes or no, a revelation of something or nothing—even nothing would be a reply.⁴⁷ And this admission to the possibility of a negative reply is admitting to the fact of beyond-possibility or non-existence of the fulfillment of the lack or non-being. This act of questioning, in expectation of a reply: a yes or no—a presence or absence—shows how both presence and absence are external to consciousness, but essentially related to itself. If we consider non-being as only external to consciousness, and not related to latter, concept of absence will be limited to negative judgments or statements existing only in our mind. Such a conception smacks ignorance of a proper understanding of negations, as Sartre points out that many negations reveal a truth that could be justified by recognizing non-being as an element of the real.⁴⁸ At this juncture, Sartre recognizes two kinds of non-beings in every attitude of questioning, viz. a) the expectation of the questioner which presupposes a certain nothing within the nature of knowledge, and b) possibility of a real non-being within being. A question then bridges the gap between these two non-beings by declaring the subject’s expectation of a reply from non-being or being.⁴⁹ Sartre is basically inquiring into whether negative judgments are the foundation of our awareness of non-being or whether the non-being provide the foundation of both negative judgments and the notion of non-being—a) He affirms that non-being does come into reality only through man. b) He denies non-being as a mere subjective abstraction, for the reason that the same is a real experience.

For Sartre, all human attitudes of expectations and all true expectations are about some disclosure or non-disclosure of being. The expectation is due to an absence, but this expectation is real and the

⁴⁶Ibid., p.30

⁴⁷Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p.4

⁴⁸Ibid., p.5

⁴⁹Ibid., p.5

relation it establishes with being is real. So, an agent's expectation is not a mere void. For example, when I went to meet Pierre at café (expectation), he was not at café (absence). In this regard, non-being arises within being only through the upsurge of consciousness. But it is important to note that this non-being, while always being related essentially to man's consciousness, continues within being, independently of man's awareness of it. Non-being arises within being prior to and independent of man's knowledge of it—there is transphenomenality of non-being as well as being i.e. non-being as well as being is not reducible to our awareness of non-being or being.⁵⁰ Non-being then haunts the being in the sense that it is never there, that there is a void, but which constantly eludes being. And it is the attitude or act of questioning, which is an act of expectation, that non-being gets revealed in the structure of being.

Sartre considers Heidegger's approach of being (entity)—in a way to show distinctiveness of his own position with respect to being and non-being within the world and within human reality (Heidegger's *Dasein*). Sartre agrees with Heidegger that human reality experiences non-being as anxiety. Through the notion of non-being, Sartre seeks to explain the relation and experience of being with and in this world. Being-for-itself, which is human existence, in contrast to being-in-itself (objects and other entities in the world) questions its own being as consciousness of a pre-reflective cogito. Consciousness can question being because it has a certain distance from being, and every question is an attitude towards being. Human reality's non-being is then consciousness which could not be pictured but understood if we ask the question: who am I? This ability to question oneself is the sign of lack of identity with oneself.

Moreover, this understanding of non-being results from the questioning of the nature of being. As the foundation for inquiry and negations, non-being must always be in question, for otherwise it would have the stability and self-identity of a being-in-itself.⁵¹ In questioning, the questioner negates its continuity with itself from its being, nihilating being in relation to other aspects of being. It would be seen how presence of "non-being" within being is not a logical construction, but an existential necessity which defines the nature of being in this world. This nihilation⁵² within one's being represents the upsurge of non-being within one's consciousness. The being-for-itself is a region of being wherein everything is in question, even the very fact of its own non-being. Man is a unique being which is never sufficient or satisfied with itself. It is only in human being, that real non-being comes into existence. Being-for-itself can nihilate because its brute existence or factual necessity is already nihilated, whereas a being-in-itself cannot nihilate because it is what it is. Non-being is thus not to be understood as an independent void or emptiness within, but rather it is brought to be by the being-for-itself, which is in search of its identity. So, the relation between being and non-being is not on the level of meaning, but on the level of existence. It is the existing being that gives non-being its efficacy.⁵³ This phenomenon thus resonates how existence precedes essence, and this is how precisely non-being can be seen as becoming the site for human reality.

Basically in general philosophical point of view, 'Becoming' is related with two things, namely, evolution and movement which assume a 'changing to' and a 'moving towards' respectively. So,

⁵⁰Catalano, *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*, p.57

⁵¹Ibid., p.65

⁵²Sartre uses the term nihilation to emphasize the negation is more than a mere psychology state.

⁵³Catalano, *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*, p.57

Becoming is seen as the process or state of coming into being in time and space. Sartre however goes to Heidegger's notion of Being, and holds that being and non-being is always in the process of becoming, thereby negating individual goals. For him, becoming or changing is identity of being and non-being. In this regard, Sartre defines being as the nihilation of non-being, which is the lack of being conceived in the consciousness—a desire for being, a relation to being—thus bringing non-being into the world. So, non-being is always in a process of becoming which is meaningful only when consciousness is directed towards object outside of itself. Non-being arises from being which is goal-directedness.⁵⁴ So, being is always in a process of becoming. In this connection, being is the source of non-being. For Sartre, individual action which originates from a person reveals one's own distinctive characteristics. It is in the act of questioning, reflecting and searching that man tries to realize through a casual series the possibilities of becoming, thus negating absences or non-beings which reveal what he is not. Being and non-being as parts of one's nature is most fundamental but least apparent.

Sartre thus insist that being, non-being and consciousness must themselves constantly become an opaque, thick, fixed in-itself. We never face non-being as a thing. It is rather in the nature of consciousness that allows for change or becoming through the limitation of ends or goals. There is an ontological change in the being wherein nonbeing is generated and actualized by human reality. As it has been seen from the earlier description of consciousness in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, that "consciousness is always consciousness of something", we can infer that consciousness is nothing more than a relation between subject and object.⁵⁵ Sartre distinguishes between subject (consciousness) and object. He accepts the being of objects and affirms consciousness has essential intentional relation to them. Yet he insists on the special features of consciousness that can never be traced to fixed objective states. For example, the objective being of a mountain is a given; but human responses to it, such as seeing it as majestic scene or as a challenge to climb, or a natural resource to exploit, exhibit consciousness' free and open project of meaning-making that never resolves itself into something that simply is there hitherto.

4 Conclusion

The study has conducted a multi-faceted inquiry of Sartre's conceptions of "Being", 'non-being' and becoming. A wide range of approaches such as ontological, historical, phenomenological, epistemological and ethical considerations have guided this research. Basically, Sartre developed his concept of being, non-being and 'becoming from Heidegger's notion of Being and becoming. Heidegger's analysis of Being and becoming brought out a scheme of ontology that broke away from the traditional western philosophy. The study confirmed the well-established fact that Heidegger developed his ontology of Being and becoming from pre-Socratic philosophical ideas. As per the history of western philosophy, the nature of Being, non-being and becoming were contemplated for the first time by Parmenides and Heraclitus during the pre-Socratic philosophical era.

Parmenides presents Being as absolutely real and permanent. Further, he states that non-being is wholly unreal and illusory, which is identified with Becoming. In Parmenides' view, there are two methods

⁵⁴Here I use non-being in the sense of consciousness

⁵⁵Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p.196

of inquiry: *the way of truth* and *the way of opinion*. “The way of truth” corresponds to the means of reason by which man can apprehend the knowledge of the ultimate reality or nature. By implication, the knowledge of Being can be attained or acquired only through “the way of truth”. In other words, man by only resorting to his reason can launch out in his quest for the knowledge of Being. “The way of opinion”, according to Parmenides, is deceptive and unreliable and therefore should be avoided or abandoned. The second method roughly corresponds to reliance on the physical sensory organs. In corollary, all sense-perceptions are illusory and false or unreal in Parmenidean view. Furthermore, in contrast to the concept of Being, Parmenides looks at non-being as a non-existent or nothingness, and to attempt to understand it will not only prove to be fruitless, but will also lead to deception or falsehood. “The way of opinion” would incidentally yield the same outcome as that of attempting to enquire into non-being. Predictably, he would forbid any attempt to enquire into the nature of non-being, just as much as one ought to avoid or leave “the way opinion”. This only goes to show definitely by implication that basically all sensory objects (objects of sensory perception) and non-being are one and the same. Likewise, in the breath, “the way of opinion” would correspond to the method of sensory perception.

In contrast to Parmenides’ conception of *reality*, Heraclitus maintains that Being and non-being both are equally real and in fact identical. For him, becoming or flux is the characteristic identity of reality. Being or reality is always in a state of flux, i.e. one can observe that “everything flows” and changes with the passage of time. Change only therefore is permanent. In Greek philosophy, Heraclitus was the original thinker who introduced the idea of *Logos*. By employing the concept of *Logos*, Heraclitus sought to bring meaning and order to the seemingly inexorable process of change as seen everywhere. Beautifully he theorizes that every event in the world follows in harmony with a preordained plan or pattern he identifies or names as *Logos*. The underlying principle that governs the universal flux or process of change is none other than *Logos*. For Heraclitus, therefore, *Logos* is synonymous with an invariable truth which can and ought to be seen or noticed everywhere. Yet, in his observation and to his astonishment, hardly anyone seems to be able to perceive it.

Martin Heidegger puts forward that Being is the source of existence. Everything is generated from Being. He affirms that Being is the fullness of existence. Nothing outside of Being exists. Whereas ‘beings’ are the entities, a manifestation of Being. Being determines entities as entities. In this way, Being reveals entities. But compared to entities, Being is not an entity. Being is a kind of hidden or an absent aspect of the entity, an absence permeated with a presence.

Heidegger talks about the inner necessity and direct product of the Being-process. So, in this process, Being is permanent, appearing, already there as the given. It is complete, perfect, full—which is the meaning of “Being is”. Appearing (Being) is the real, appearing is the fullness. It is the datum. On the contrary, anything becoming is incomplete, imperfect, not yet full. The becoming is the entities. Entities never attain the status of Being. Every thing other than Being is unstable, changing. They are vanishing or ephemeral. On the other hand, Heidegger makes a special case with human being as a being that seeks to apprehend Being. We think on the limitation of Being i.e. thinking on thinking itself. Thinking is the work

of a thinker. To think means to aim at, to remember, to intend and to apprehend. Apprehension of Being is a goal or end of thinking.

Heidegger attempts to deal with modes of human existence as well in relation to Being. Man's existence is related to Being and the world. There is no phenomena like subject and object. Man is a Being-in-the-world, as there is no man without a world. Man is no more defined in terms of traditional terms. Man's passion, feeling, etc. secured a place in Heidegger's thought. For Heidegger, man is no more ontic but he is ontological. Heidegger expounds the new orientation towards Being makes man a *Dasein*. *Dasein* refers to man's "there-Being". Being is concerned with the investigation of human existence. Man's existence is characterized by his relation to Being. *Dasein* is the domain for the revelation of Being. *Dasein* has a double relation between man and Being. So, man having an orientation to Being becomes *Dasein*.

Sartre's conception of 'being' can be concisely presented as follows. Being is a combination of two types or kinds of beings: "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself"—the generic terms as Sartre coined to name the two fundamentally different classes or categories of beings. Being-in-itself is characterized by three features or aspects. Firstly, being is in itself, meaning it is self-contained or self-existent, implying such type of beings is neither caused nor created. Secondly, being-in-itself *is*, which means its existence has no explanation or purpose. Thirdly, being is *what it is*, i.e. it is solid, opaque and positive or affirmative. In other words, it is what it is and nothing else. In a similar manner, Sartre characterizes being-for-itself with three features in contrast to those of being-in-itself. Firstly, being-for-itself is *not* in itself: it arises or surges up out of being-in-itself. Secondly, the being-for-itself depends on the being-in-itself. For-itself's being is contingent upon and limited by being-in-itself. Thirdly, being-for-itself *is not what it is* and *is what it is not*. It comes to clarity that Sartre's being-for-itself refers to consciousness, and not the consciousness of any kind of beings, but specifically the consciousness of human being.

As the picture becomes clear in the course of the study, 'being' is the cause of existence. Just as consciousness depends on being-in-itself for its upsurge, 'non-being' or *nothingness* arises within consciousness. In the act of questioning or inquiry, and in the awareness of the absence of a being, a certain non-being or lack is felt or reckoned within the conscious being. This peculiar form of human conduct or attitude of the mind engages in a nihilation or negation that in effect brings an awareness of a non-being or lack or nothingness. Thus, non-being can possibly be found only in the human mind, so concludes Sartre. Furthermore, the conscious human being or human reality (Sartre imported the idea of this term basically from Heidegger's *Dasein*) experiences non-being as anxiety. For example, the awareness of a lack of identity of oneself causes that kind of experience.

With this experience of the lack or nothingness, human reality according to Sartre seeks to negate the same. The being-for-itself strives to become a being-in-itself. The result is a process of becoming. But Sartre says it is an ideal which is never attained. Even so, consciousness is always in a process of becoming. Becoming is seen in two ways, namely, evolution and movement which assume a "changing to" and a "moving towards" respectively. Sartre posits that being and non-being are always in the process of becoming when a human reality endeavors to towards its individual goals. In this connection, he affirms that being is the outcome of the nihilation of non-being. Originally, it is the for-itself's "desire for being" or

“desire to be”, as Sartre puts it, that ushers in the lack or non-being within itself and initiates the process of becoming.

References

- Sartre, J.P. (1933). *The Transcendence of the Ego*. translated by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York: hill and wang.
- (1943). *Being and Nothingness*. trans. by Hazel E. Barnes. Indian Edition: Chennai Micro Print Pvt., Ltd.
- (1963). *Search for Method*. trans. by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Alfred, A. Knopf.
- Catalano, Joseph S. (1985). *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- David, Cerbone R. (2006). *Understanding Phenomenology*. UK: Acumen Publishing Limited.
- Churchill, Steven & Reynold, Jack. (2013). *Jean-Paul Sartre Key Concepts*. Durhan: Acumen Publishing Limited.
- Heidegger, M. (1927). *Being and Time*. trans. by Joan Stambaugh. State University of New York Press, Albany.
- (1935). *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. trans. by Raph Manhein. London: Yale University Press.
- (1956). *The Question of Being*. Trans. by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. London: Vision Press Ltd.
- Henn, Martin J. (2003) *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative Essays and Commentary to the Text*. London: Praeger Publishers, Inc.
- Meszaros, Istvan. (2013). *The Work of Sartre*. India: Delhi Aakar Books Ltd.
- Morris, Katherine j. (2008). *Sartre*. United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Stace, W.T. (1920). *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*. India: Macmillan India Ltd.
- Spade, Paul Vincent. (1995). *Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*. Class lecture note.
- Schroeder, William R. (2005). *Continental Philosophy*. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Warnock, Mary. (1965). *The Philosophy of Sartre*. London: Hutchinson.
- Heraclitus. *Fragments*. translated by Brooks Haxton (2001). New York Penguin Group.