



# Indian Politics has seen the most of Nepotism in its History - A Study

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## Abstract

Right from Motilal Nehru to Rahul Gandhi (Congress Party), India has been ruled by a dynasty, which is still trying to perpetuate its rule. But apart from this party, that of course is on the top when it comes to nepotism in Indian politics, there are various other parties, mainly regional, like the Samajvadi Party (governed and formed by Mulayam Yadav and later taken over by his son Akhilesh Yadav) which have been working on the principles of nepotism. In Maharashtra, the Thackeray's have maintained their domination from Balasaheb to Uddhav Thackeray. In Kashmir, the Abdulla's and the Muftis' have been in power for years. These are few yet major examples of nepotism being followed in India. There are various factors that contribute towards such political nepotism, especially in a country like India, the first being its citizens. Some might strongly agree, while the others may not but the people of India are used to being dominated. They are used to hierarchical rule in the olden days, to the kingship in these modern times. It is mainly because of the notion, brought up by the 'Varna System', which states that only the son of a priest becomes. This still prevails because most of the Indian population is still illiterate and therefore, this becomes the best and the easiest way to choose their representatives. Nepotism is based on favoritism granted to relatives instead of giving a fair chance to others in a particular field, be it business, politics, sports, entertainment or any. Nepotism is generally defined as "the bestowal of patronage by public officers in appointing others to positions because of blood or marital relationship". It exists almost all over the world, but in India it is found to be a bit too much. As stated by Rahul Gandhi, "Nepotism is a culture in India". In addition to this, we can say that Nepotism is a product of nepotists; means- powerful or well-established people giving preferential treatment to their relatives and friends in employment irrespective of their qualifications, whereas showing intolerance to outsiders. It creates stress in the workplace and increases dissatisfaction among the staff about their organizations which indirectly leads to self-criticism, self-doubt and retardation.

*Key words: Nepotism, political competition, employment, economic opportunity.*

## Introduction

Nepotism in the Entertainment Industry: It is normal to see the struggling actors and youngsters who don't bear a tag of being relative or associated with big names ruling over the entertainment industry. As it can clearly be seen, Bollywood for years has always been dominated by 'some' celebrities bearing a particular surname, coming from particular families and starkids from within the circle. Youngsters and newcomers to the industry, often more talented than most 'star kids',

hardly get a fair chance. It is more clear by seeing the current situation of Nepotism and favoritism excessively prevailing in Bollywood after the sudden demise of Sushant Singh Rajput, a talented actor who didn't get what he deserved. Several actors like Kangana Ranaut, Dharmendra, Raveena Tandon and Payal Rohatgi have opened the issue that has been going on in the film industry and also reveals the dark side of Bollywood. We see how the undeserving ones receive plenty of awards while the deserving ones are not even nominated. This shows how this Nepotism is functioning in Bollywood. This can be stopped only if we raise our voices against nepotism like how Kangana Ranaut and several other actors have done and continue to do, otherwise, one day the whole world will get destroyed and there will be no humanity left over. If this political nepotism goes on, corruption in the country would rise once again, like it had in the past decade. Everyone has the right to stand a fair chance in all professional fields and any possible hurdle in the way of achieving this right should be removed. It will only be when the hurdles are removed that we get talented and smart politicians who take the country to new heights. Nepotism is unfair. It causes a severe negative impact on the common people who are often treated as outsiders at their workplace, and face adverse effects and decline in morale also. Nepotism means promoting inequality which kills the positive attitude and confidence of people involved in as victims. It also creates insecurities among the ordinary employees or artists. And, if they dare go against the norms, they have to face consequences as there are high chances that the person raising his voice would get banned from the industry/company whereas the product of nepotism, on the other hand, enjoys the attention and luxurious life. It's high time that we need to call this trend out. It's difficult to raise our voices against this when our political parties are already engaged in this toxic culture. We live in a time where everybody strives to protest against a system of hierarchical inheritance but seizes to protest against such an open exertion of dominance. But, we must stop it!

### **Objective:**

This paper intends to explore Indian politics is the motherland of nepotism and this has been the case right from the time of independence. Despite being a democratic country, Nepotism has always existed in politics in India

It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues. This definition is both simple and sufficiently broad to cover most of the corruption that the Bank encounters, and it is widely used in the literature. Bribery occurs in the private sector, but bribery in the public sector, offered or extracted, should be the Bank's main concern, since the Bank lends primarily to governments and supports government policies, programs, and projects.

- Government contracts. Bribes can influence the government's choice of firms to supply goods, services, and works, as well as the terms of their contracts. Firms may bribe to win a contract or to ensure that contractual breaches are tolerated.
- Government benefits. Bribes can influence the allocation of government benefits, whether monetary benefits (such as subsidies to enterprises or individuals or access to pensions or unemployment insurance) or in-kind benefits (such as access to certain schools, medical care, or stakes in enterprises being privatized).

- Lower taxes. Bribes can be used to reduce the amount of taxes or other fees collected by the government from private parties. Such bribes may be proposed by the tax collector or the taxpayer. In many countries the tax bill is negotiable.
- Licenses. Bribes may be demanded or offered for the issuance of a license that conveys an exclusive right, such as a land development concession or the exploitation of a natural resource. Sometimes politicians and bureaucrats deliberately put in place policies that create control rights which they profit from by selling.

The nepotism discourse, then, is another salvo in a battle between two elites: the Nehruvian ‘ancien regime’ with its pluralistic instincts, and the brash new aspirational faction that wants its share of the spoils of power. This is a share it feels entitled to on the basis of its political commitment to Hindutva. But given the heavy competition and the small size of the pie, a great many feel deprived and resentful as they see the old liberal elites continuing in their privileged perches, as they always have. It remains to be seen whether deepening this social antagonism through polarising rhetoric offers enough fuel for a propaganda campaign capable of insulating the ruling party from the political costs of governance failures and economic headwinds. In much the same way, nepotistic privilege affects the overall quality of many parts of the Indian economy. Our newsrooms are full of children of journalists and even politicians. A well-known journalist’s son or daughter gets an internship with a phone call whereas those without such access keep emailing their CVs with no one bothering to even open their emails. The unfairness does not stop there. The other day, I saw a prominent academic promote a senior journalist’s daughter on Twitter, praising her with superlatives for an ordinary cub reporter’s work. Nepotistic privilege is thus a life-long privilege. You get a free pass because you are the son or daughter or relative of XYZ. It’s bad enough that she has the advantage of getting story ideas, leads and contacts at home while an ‘outsider’ in the same newsroom will have to struggle much harder to be at the same level. But for your father’s powerful friends to be promoting you on Twitter blindly is absolutely distasteful. To flip it, we need to start seeing nepotistic privilege as a matter of shame. India’s woke millennials, Gen Z and Gen Alpha tend to learn political correctness from American shores. But nepotism is not such a big social issue in the US. We need some originality in our woke politics to start shaming nepotistic privilege. When woke millennials say ‘check your privilege’, they don’t include nepotism because American news sites haven’t yet written about it yet.

## Conclusion

In India politics is not a vocation, but a family business. If father is an MP, then his darling son or daughter regard the constituency as their heirloom. When the time for choosing a candidate for the general election comes round - as it has now with the impending general election in May - parties hand out tickets to the relatives of MPs as though they are a family inheritance. Whichever party you look at, in every part of India, nepotism is rampant. Merit, a record in public life, knowledge, skills, character, are all irrelevant. If you have the right surname, you will get a ticket. Of course, the ruling Congress Party, run by the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty for more than six decades, is responsible for turning dynasty into a governing principle of Indian politics, but all the other parties have also proved pretty adept too at treating politics like family fiefdoms so the disease is now deeply rooted in the body politic. Three years ago, author Patrick French, in a study of the Indian Parliament, unearthed some troubling data. He found that 100 per cent of MPs in the current lower

house of Parliament under the age of 30 are from families with a political background, a fact that would be astounding anywhere else in the world. French dubbed them "hereditary" MPs. Of the MPs who were aged 40 and above, two-thirds were hereditary MPs. "If the trend continued," wrote French, "it was possible that most members of the Indian Parliament would be there by heredity alone, and the nation would be back to ... rule by a hereditary monarch and assorted Indian princelings." Judging by the names chosen for the next general election, India is moving towards French's prediction. It was bad enough that Indian voters tended to vote, not for the person who is best for their area and best for country, but for the candidate of the same religion or caste as they.

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