



DIFFERENT ISSUES OF SAMŚAYA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

TUSHI MISTRY

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

VIVEKANANDA COLLEGE (THAKURPUKUR), KOLKATA, INDIA

Abstract :

Samśaya is one of the padartha whose nature have been considered in details in nyāya darśana. Maharṣi Goutama believes that vicāra or critical consideration constitute the method of Nyāya darśana. Samśaya constitute the precondition of vicāra . He has dealt with the nature of samśaya also. Samśaya has been mentioned in the first sūtra of Nyāya darśana. While defining samśaya maharṣi says in his nyāya sūtra :

“Samānānekadharmopapattvipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthātaś ca viśeṣapekṣo vimarśaḥ Samśayaḥ ||1/1/23||” according to Maharṣi “vimarśa” is lakṣaṇa of Samśaya which means viruddha knowledge or knowledge of two incompatible property as characterised the Same object.

Now the question is, does the definition of Samśaya any way Suggest the form of Samśaya? Every Samśaya has two parts: i) dharmi or the Subject and ii) prakāra or the property which Characterizes the Subject. In a Samśaya the number of prakāra is more than one and they are Called the koti's of Samśaya. Usually Samśaya expressed in the form of a question Such as ‘Is that a man or a tree trunk?’ or ‘Is that a man or not?’ If the koti's of Samśaya can all be positive properties or bhāva dharmas then the Samśaya would be bhāvaprakāra; but if one of the koti's is bhāva or positive and the other is its absence or abhāva then the Samśaya would be bhāvabhāvaprakāra. Navyas say that Samśaya is always bhāvabhāvaprakāra, but the pracīnas admit bhāvaprakāra Samśaya. Now the question arises that how many koti's of there in the case of doubt? are all the koti's bhāva? or bhāva and abhāva? In the Second case koti's consider as viruddha. If all the koti's are bhāva Can they be treated as viruddha? The navyas and pracīna Naiyāyikas differ in regards to the nature of koti's of Samśaya, the question remain which of the two is to be Consider as more acceptable? This some of the point I going to discuss in this paper.

Samśaya is one of the padarthas which have been considered in detail in nyāya darśana . Maharṣi Goutama Believes that vicāra or critical consideration constitutes the method of Nyāya darśana . Samśaya constitutes the Pre-condition of vicāra . He has dealt with the nature of Samśaya also . Samśaya has been mentioned as third padartha in the first sūtra of Nyāya darśana . While defining Samśaya Maharṣi says in his Nyāya sūtra – samānānekadharmopapattvipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthātaś ca viśeṣapekṣo vimarśaḥ Samśayaḥ ||1/1/23|| .

From this lakṣaṇa its follows that , doubt is that wavering judgement in which the defining cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises either -a) From the cognition of the characters common to the object concerned , or b) From the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects, or c) From the presence of contradictory opinions ; - and the appearing of such wavering judgements is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non perceptions .

According to Maharṣi “vimarśaḥ” is the lakṣaṇa of Samśaya . It means viruddha knowledge or knowledge of two incompatible properties as characterizing the self same object. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara also admitted this lakṣaṇa of Samśaya. But in his bhāṣya Vātsyāyana says – “bastuvimarśaḥmatryamanabdhāranam Samśaya”. Pracīna Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña says in his Nyāyasāra “Tadanabadharaṇa jñanam Samśaya”. Its suggests that Samśaya is an indeterminate knowledge. Vṛttikara Viswanātha says in his Vṛtti “Ekadharmika viruddha bhāvabhāvaprakāra jñanam Samśaya”. This indicates that, the knowledge of the self same object as viśeṣya having bhāva and abhāva as prakāra is considered as Samśaya .

On the basis of the above mentioned lakṣaṇas it can be said that, Samśaya is an uncertain or indeterminate cognition of same object. In case of Samśaya or doubtful cognition, there is really no doubt regarding the subject, in the sense that the cognizer is sure of its existence, but there is uncertainty regarding its characterization. If we expressed our Samśaya in the form of logic then it looks like $K \{ \{S\} (P) \cdot \{S\} (\sim P) \}$ but never $K \{ (P) \cdot (\sim P) \}$ like that. K = Knowledge, S =Subject of knowledge, P =Bhāva koti or positive properties, $\sim P$ =Abhāva koti or negative properties.

When one has a Saṁśaya or doubtful cognition about an object, the object is apprehended but not fully and clearly, and whatever is known about it suggests a number of incompatible properties as possible predicates of it. But those properties being incompatible, all of them cannot be predicate to the thing perceived; and in the absence of the knowledge of any characteristic. Which show the presence of one of the incompatible properties in the thing, the cognizer is not in a position to affirm one of the said properties in particular. Thus he is in a state of doubt, that is, he cannot make up his mind in favour of any of the alternatives. Therefore, the uncertain or indeterminate character of Saṁśaya or doubt pertains to the koti's or alternative properties which appear to be possible predicates of the thing perceived.

Usually Saṁśaya expressed in the form of a question Such as 'Is that a man or a tree trunk?' or 'Is that a man or not?' from the explanation we see that every Saṁśaya has two parts: i) dharmi or the Subject and ii) prakāra or the property which Characterizes the Subject. In a Saṁśaya the number of prakāra is more than one and they are Called the koti's of Saṁśaya. If the koti's of Saṁśaya can all be positive properties or bhāva dharmas then the Saṁśaya would be bhāvaprakāra; but if one of the koti's is bhāva or positive and the other is its absence or abhāva then the Saṁśaya would be bhāvabhāvaprakāra. Navya Naiyāyikas says that Saṁśaya is always bhāvabhāvaprakāra, but the praçīna Naiyāyikas admit bhāvaprakāra Saṁśaya also.

This controversy over the form of Saṁśaya is actually a controversy regarding the nature of the koti's of Saṁśaya. In order to settle this issue we need to analyse first the sense in which koti's of Saṁśaya are said to be viruddha or incompatible. Because, both the schools of Nyāya agree that the koti's of a Saṁśaya must be incompatible, and follows from the very definition of Saṁśaya. About the lakṣaṇa of virodha Viswanātha says in his Ramarudri "Virodho'sca Tadadhikaraṇa Vṛttittvam". According to him two properties can be said to be viruddha if each co-exist with the absence of the other. Ballabhācāriya says in 'Nyāya lilāvatī' virodha of the koti's of Saṁśaya are bhāvabhāvaprakāra or contradictory by their nature. Both the schools of Nyāya agree that, the koti's of Saṁśaya must be incompatible, for that follows from the very definition of Saṁśaya as has been said earlier. Incompatibility, from the point of view of western logic, may mean both contrariety and contradiction. Naiyāyika also have two senses of viruddha which are similar to the senses used in western logic. These are i) svarūpata viruddha and ii) tadabhāvavyapyatvarūpa viruddha. The first one I think equated with contradiction and the second one with contrariety. Praçīna Naiyāyikas believe in tadabhāvavyapyatvarūpa viruddha, holding between two positive properties like manhood and treeness. As whenever manhood is present, absence of treeness also present. In this virodha if each exists in the same locus with the absence of other. And Navyas believe in svarūpata virodha, they say if one of the koti's is a positive property and the other is its absence, then their incompatibility is evident.

Udayanacārya says in his 'Nyāya kusumānjali'
'Parsparavirodhe hi na prakārantarasthitiḥ |
Naikatapi viruddhānām uktimātravirodhataḥ || 3/8||

This indicates that, in the case of mutual contradiction there is no third alternative. There is also no identity of the contradictories, for the contradiction is apparent on the very face of assertions. According to Gadādhara svarūpata virodha means "paraspārabhāvavyāpyatvāviśeṣaṭaḥparasparajñana pratibandhakibhūtajñanaviśayatvam" fire and water are incompatible by their nature, and they are svarūpata virodhi. This type of virodha is not logical in nature but a practical one.

Naiyāyikas believe that in case of Saṁśaya one of the koti's must be true of the subject or dharma though it is not certain which one. This will obviously be the case if the navya view is accepted. For, of the contradictories, one of which is bhāva and the other its abhāva, one must hold true of the subject. But if the koti's are all positive then unless koti's are enumerated exhaustively, none of the koti's might be true. For example, when seeing a figure with a certain height etc, we doubt whether it is a man or a tree, we do not have in mind other possible predicates like pillariness, etc. And it may very well be the case that the perceived thing may turn out to be neither a man nor a tree, but a pillar. So in our example, none of the two koti's. i.e. manhood and treeness may be true of the subject. One of the positive alternatives will surely hold true of the subject only if the enumeration of koti's is exhaustive. That means, in our example, any and every property with which that particular height, etc., can co-exists should be included in the koti's.

Though Navya view can accommodate easily the thesis that one of the alternative predicates in a Saṁśaya must be true of the subject. So we say that in this case navyas views more acceptable than Praçīna. And what would be the nature of koti's depends on the nature of virodha.

REFERENCES

1. Mahanti J.N., 'Eassay on Indian Philosophy', purusottam Bilimoriya (ed), Delhi, oxford university press, 1933.
2. Raghunatha siromani, *Padartha tattva nirupana*, Madhusudana Bhattachariya (ed), Calcutta-12, Sanskrit college, 1976.
3. Viswanatha, *Siddhanta Muktaavali*, (with Dinakari, Ramarudri, Prabha Manjusa Tika), Chowkhamba, Varanasi.
4. Ballabhacariya, *Nyaya lilavati*, Shankar Mishra, Chowkhamba, Varanasi.
5. Dutta, Srilekha, 'On the nature of koti of Saṁśaya', Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy, 3.2, Kolkata-32, Jadavpur University, 1991.
6. Udayanacariya, *Nyaya Kusumanjali*, Translated by srimohan Bhattachariya, Kolkata-13, paschim banga Rajya pustak parshad, 1995.

7. Bandopadhyaya, Nandita, '*The concept of Contradiction in Indian logic and Epistemology*', Journal of Indian Philosophy, Kluwer academic publishers, London, 16 , 1988.
8. Goutama, Nyaya sutra, '*Nyaya Darsanam*', Taranatha Tarkatirtha & Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha (ed), Delhi, Munsiram monoharlal publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1985.
9. Yogindrananda, '*Nyaya bhusanam*', Varanasi, Saradarsana prakashana pratisthanam, 1368.
10. Dutta Sharma, Ratna, '*Nyaya Darsane Nigraha Sthana*', Kolkata-32, Jadavpur University in collaboration with Mohabodhi book agency, 2011.
11. Ganganath Jha, '*The Nyaya Sutra of Goutama*', Delhi, Motilal Vanarsidas, 1984.
12. Fanibhusana Tarkabagish, '*Nyaya darsana*', First & 2nd Part, Kolkata-06, Paschimbanga Rajya Pustaka Parshada, 1984.

