



Empowerment of Women and Minority Independence in India.

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Abstract: Legal rights for groups in deeply divided countries are essential, but their negative impact on civil rights, particularly women's rights, impacts many nations' politics and policies. This article covers Muslim women and minority autonomy in India. India's minority population and subgroups' political and legal opinions on religious autonomy are also examined. Beyond the Muslim Personal Law debate, this essay offers policy improvements to empower minority women in India. The complex formation of rights in a communalized polity and measures to empower minority women are examined. India is a good microcosm for analyzing and comparing these conflicts, and its lessons may be applied to other countries.

Keywords: Women's Rights, Gender Policy, Minority Rights, India, Muslim, Communalism, Deeply Divided Societies, Judicial Politics India, Muslim Personal Law, Religious Autonomy, Comparative Politics.

Introduction:

The quality of democracy is influenced by institutional design and social group interaction. Gender matters in a democratic society. In the absence of women in politics, male-dominated democracies become ineffective and discriminatory. Minority rights are debated by social scientists, feminists, and lawyers. The complicated debate has numerous strands, including whether technique is more moral and ethical for restoring social stability in strongly divided societies, and if community rights, appreciation, and cultural preservation should take precedence over liberal egalitarianism and individual equality. Minority rights are critical in deeply divided societies, but civil and women's rights suffer single-case studies that are comparable and comprehensive are required.

Changes in family law may strike a balance between religion, democracy, and women's

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rights the quality of democracy is influenced by institutional design and social group interaction gender matters in democracy because the lack of women in politics renders male-dominated democracies inadequate and discriminatory minority rights are debated by social scientists, feminists, and lawyers there are several strands in this intricate debate. Third, which strategy is more moral and ethical for restoring social stability in strongly split nations? Fourth, should community rights, appreciation, and cultural preservation take precedence above liberal equality and individual equality? Finally, how can the state legally protect advocates for gender and group rights in severely divided cultures when minority rights are critical but civil and women's rights suffer? Comparable and comprehensive single-case investigations are required. Changes in family law may strike a balance between religion, democracy, and women's rights. Despite their importance, comparative value, and impact on 80 million women, leading Western scholars ignore Islamic personal law and Muslim women in India. Personal law analysis in India is delicate and political.

The topic includes islam, democracy, minority rights, especially for non-liberal communities, and the complexities of widely divided civilizations with distinct faiths, races, and nations. Liberal group rights rhetoric sometimes inhibits indian muslim women's liberalisation and democratisation and overlooks feminism beyond women's rights. The present negotiations must handle the Hindu-Muslim conflict as well as the constitutional issues of Indian democracy and citizenship, such as secularism, equality, and minority rights. The difficult subject of muslim women in india and minority rights should be investigated because it empowers muslim women in india and women overall due to the various muslim interests ignored, this paper advocates reviewing quotas, education, and the minimum marriage age in democratic nations and india, as well as instituting muslim personal law. The Indian example may be utilised to investigate these concerns and show other countries with different legal systems how the sociopolitics and attitudes of the Indian Muslim minority impact government and court policy.

Religious Groups and State

The compatibility of religion and democracy has been extensively researched. Most Muslims, even the most pious, experts believe, prefer democracy to autocratic regimes (e.g., egypt, jordan, algeria, morocco, turkey, pakistan, bangladesh, and saudi arabia) Muslims seem to be unconcerned with democracy. Pakistan increased the minimum marriage age for women and revised its muslim personal law to accommodate muslim minority; explore muslim opinions on women's rights. Bangladesh, a Muslim majority country, altered Muslim family law to favour Muslim women. Using this method, democratic states with Muslim minorities may investigate state-minority relations and potential conflicts between group, civil, and women's rights. Attorneys and social scientists investigate collective rights. The communitarian paradigm encourages religious autonomy and government respect of minority needs and identities. Liberals think that the state can compel communities to adopt its identities, even if they have no prior experience with them. Civic rights and liberalism, according to liberal theorists, protect everyone. A well-known feminist professor correctly said that when working for group rights, within-group imbalances must be investigated.

“Policies aimed at responding to the demands and claims of cultural minority groups must take the requirement for effective representation of less powerful members

of such groups seriously," she argues. For a variety of reasons, highly divided civilizations with disparate homelands need crucial communitarian ideology. Critical communitarianism asserts that community and minority rights should be consistent with democratic gender justice goals. Giving a community family law authority promotes religious autonomy, according to critical communitarian literature. Specific community members are subjected to systematic sanctioned in-group rights violations this method to family law may reveal state, minority, weak community, and individual problems.

The state and society and analyse public policies to understand government attitudes toward diverse groups of society, according to the theoretical and methodological approach to Muslim women's rights in India, and examine the state at judicial, legislative, national, and municipal levels, and apply this to the community to distinguish moderate and conservative perspectives of men and women.

Muslim Women in India: Political, Judicial, and Public Perspectives

As a result, tracing the growth of political institutions' perspectives on the civil freedoms of racial, sexual, and gender minorities is enlightening. Advocates for personal law reform from all areas of life should have their motives recognised. Given that muslims have a common understanding of sharia, to what extent should its precepts inform the practise of family law in india? Secular parties that support women's rights and the hindutva movement have both spoken out against muslim personal law. Hindutva's assaults on Muslim personal law have not always been motivated by a desire to empower women. Most of the time, anti-muslim hindutva sentiment was to blame; however, secular organisations also expressed their opposition, claiming that the current version of muslim personal law is biased in favour of males in India's splintered democracy. Women's organisations and others in society care deeply about promoting gender parity and equitable treatment of all people.

Women are one of society's marginalised groups due to the many barriers they face in joining the political and public arenas. Because of the country's intense religious tensions between hindus and muslims, muslim women in India confront a particularly perilous predicament. Some Hindutva advocates would prefer that India become a Hindu state rather than a secular democracy. Hindutva is a political and social movement in India that supports hindu nationalism and hindu cultural hegemony. In times of strife, the state takes sides in political disputes, often siding with the hindu people it controls. The constitution includes provisions for Muslim women amid a time of conflict between the hindu majority and the Muslim minority. India was forcibly partitioned between Hindu and Muslim territories more than 60 years ago. Minority political participation and quotas increased tensions between India and Pakistan.

Colonial India's elite Hindu families rejected the idea of bipartite government. Pakistan was created by Muslims, while India is a secular democracy that guarantees civil liberties to all residents regardless of faith, gender, or ethnicity. India respects religious minorities' rights to preserve their identities and institutions without government interference.

The Indian idea of secularism is complex and contentious. it also affects Indian gender power relations." various citizenship benefits the early Indian constituent assembly suggested "uniform personal laws" for all citizens in keeping with secularism and the country's self-definition as a civic nation. religious minority have had advantages that sometimes conflict with the state's liberal laws and gender equality concerns Article 44 Of The 2011 Indian Constitution States: "consistent civil code for citizens: the state should try to acquire for citizens a consistent civil code (ucc) across the territory of india." since its publication, this article has not been updated. similar to article 44, article 372 stipulates that current family laws will stay in effect until parliament approves new legislation (see constitution of india 2011). religious organisations' personal laws often collide with the indian constitution's civil rights and equality. article 13 provides that pre-independence legislation is legal if it does not infringe constitutional rights (constitution of india 2011) discrepancies should nullify the priority of previous laws since the constitution is ultimate, the new government faced problems when personal laws contradicted with its principles, particularly in human rights.

When India became independence, the supreme court ruled in state of **Bombay v. Narasu Appa (1952)** that states may have their own legal systems unless international law intervenes (harel-shalev 2010, 2013; mahmood 198this verdict allowed courts and government agencies to avoid religious issues for decades parliament democratised Hindu personal law in the 1950s. Hindu civil and marital law was changed once the state nationalised Hinduism. With each publication, orthodox hindus criticised these regulations as government interference in religion.

Most caste connotations were eliminated by Hindu civil laws, and women were granted divorce and other rights. The government ignored various Hindu organisations concerns about changing Hindu personal law. Muslims were opposed to government attempts in this area since they would not change their personal law. The Hindu Civil Code Act grants parliament complete authority over Hindu personal law at home and in the community, which Hindu nationalists considered as an assault on Hinduism. Because state legal and political institutions respect their responsibilities and politicians want stability, they have not interfered with Muslim marriage and religious standards.

Because traditional Hinduism is so rigid on issues of social hierarchy and the caste system, its teachings may contradict those of the United States Constitution. Despite the risk of violence, the Indian government was able to effectively change the statute to reflect modern conditions. In effect, the Hindu Code Act of 1954-1956 applies to all Hindus in India, regardless of caste. The Hindu Code Act, which was enacted between 1955 and 1966, controls Hindu personal matters. This series of legislation includes the Hindu Marriage Act (1955), the Hindu Succession Act (1956), the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956), and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (1956). Furthermore, any kind of discrimination against Untouchables (Dalits) was declared illegal by the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, and the still-fresh trauma of partition compelled them to postpone legislative reform of the Muslim minority's religious customs until a later date.

This refusal to intervene in minority civic laws resulted in a convoluted and inequitable social reality in which the same state sanctioned polygamy for Muslims but not for Hindus. As I will explain later, Muslim women seem to have paid the price. Liberal Hindus and Muslims have claimed that this is a violation of Article 15 of India's (2011) Constitution, which out-laws religious discrimination. In 1952, the Bombay High Court considered a petition to reverse a provincial court decision convicting several Hindus of polygamy (**State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa**).

The court upheld the polygamists' punitive punishments, holding that they were justified since the alleged discrimination was not religious. The Supreme Court of Uttar Pradesh (UP) ruled in *Ram Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh* 1957 that polygamy is not a "mandatory practise" of Hinduism. Polygamy was illegal under state law. The court determined that the state might gradually change personal laws, beginning with Hinduism (see *State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa* 1952). The court intended to use this legal statement to encourage state ratification of the UCC and the early agreements to maintain Muslim personal law and reconstruct Hindu civil law. The Supreme Court held in these cases that India's criminal law allowed women to get alimony after three months under Muslim Sharia (the iddat). Muslims did not object to the conclusions since Krishna Iyer did not break Sharia law in general; he restricted his options to girls who requested more money. **Shah Bano Begum v. Mohd. Ahmed Kahn, decided in 1985**, established a contentious precedent.

The first court to rule that Sharia-compliant alimony for divorced women was unreasonable violated Muslim Personal Law. Notably, the court favoured Indian civil law over Sharia. Shah Bano requested the court in the historic case to order her husband to pay alimony after 46 years of marriage. Under Article 125 of India's Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC 1973), which she filed, the estranged husband is required to pay his ex-wife a monthly minimum payment. Shah Bano said that her ex-husband failed to pay her. The husband contended that since Sharia obliged him to transmit just a fixed amount (the mahr) during the three-month idatt supported by Islamic law, he had completed his marital responsibilities and his ex-wife was not entitled to extra assistance.

The madhya pradesh (mp) high court ordered the husband to pay his ex-wife monthly crpc-mandated alimony in addition to the mahr paid at the iddat. The husband appealed to India's Supreme Court, which upheld the 1985 mp high court verdict. Civic law trumped community religious law, hence the husband had to observe crpc regulations, the top court said. Appeal is constitutionally immaterial, the court said (*shah bano begum v. mohd. ahmed kahn* 1985, 844).

The judges may have believed that their judgement, like those in the other two cases, touched on common conventional areas of the law, but they were obviously aware of the potentially explosive consequences and phrased their decision carefully to minimise public outrage. Theoretical research suggests that democratic high courts seldom overturn public opinion, reflecting wider tendencies. The Supreme Court of India ruled that the previous court's refusal to participate in muslim personal law was unconstitutional since the Shah Bano case permitted courts to remark on India's progress toward universal and uniform personal law. In the sake of "justice," the Supreme Court ruled that Indian state law, which promotes equality, is superior to Muslim personal law, even if it does not violate fundamental rights. If judges accepted this logic, the constitution may have been amended to erase Muslim personal law. Instead, parliament was unable to alter Muslim

personal law due to the court's refusal to invalidate it. Conservative Muslims and organisations condemned the decision, calling it a "red flag" for Islam and India's Muslims. They also determined that the constitution requires consistent personal law rather than common law. Despite its importance to Indian and Muslim women, conservative Muslim forces utilised the Shah Bano ruling to undermine Muslim identity and self-esteem in India (Hasan 1993).

Rajiv Gandhi, India's prime minister, first backed the court but eventually reversed his position due to Muslim party pressure (The Congress Party). Demonstrations and rioting by Indian Muslims altered politics. To quell the uproar, Gandhi directed Muslim cabinet member Z. R. Ansari to conduct an investigation. He obtained the necessary support to introduce legislation declaring Sharia superior to civil law in divorce and personal law.

By prohibiting Muslim women from exercising their rights under article 125 of the federal CrPC and passing responsibility for a divorced woman to her husband, the Muslim Women's Protection of Rights in Divorce Bill 1986 effectively reduced Muslim women to second-class citizens. The matter was thoroughly debated in Parliament. Sharia mahr decisions under Section 125 of the CrPC limited Muslim women's lifetime postdivorce support to modest sums (1973).

The new bill passed by parliament to overturn the Shah Bano verdict encapsulated the government's views on Muslim Personal Law and Muslim orthodoxy, as well as the barriers to UCC implementation. The act mirrors the government's basic views regarding Muslims and women. It also rejected Rajiv Gandhi's Congress vision of including women in state development. The government's delay in passing Muslim Personal Law undermined Indian democracy and secularism, while simultaneously promoting conservative Muslims as the community's exclusive spokespersons. According to a famous Muslim political scientist, overturning the court verdict was unethical. Muslims, especially Muslim women, were denied justice and equality under the law. The "What Muslims Want" campaign was successful in passing the ironically called "Muslim Women's Protection of Rights in Divorce Bill." Reformists and Muslims who thought Shah Bano had no negative impact on Islam Former Supreme Court Justice Iyer wrote to Rajiv Gandhi, claiming that the new law was unjust and illegitimate (Iyer 1986).

Despite the substantial parliamentary power, moderate legislators supported Rajiv Gandhi due to its enhancement of communal autonomy (Lok Sabha Debates 1986, 317, 390). As per Baxi (1994) and Hasan (1993), liberal political scholars opine that parliament lacks the authority to discriminate against Muslim women or undermine their civil liberties under the Constitution. Parliament's actions were in violation of several constitutional provisions, thereby challenging the Supreme Court's jurisdiction (Baxi 1994).

Muslim women were become second-class citizens by the 1986 Muslim Women's Protection of Rights in Divorce Bill, which prevented them from exercising their rights under article 125 of the federal CrPC and placed the husband in control of a divorced lady. Sharia mahr reduced Muslim women's CrPC Section 125 postdivorce lifelong support. State UCC implementation issues in repealed law and government policy on Muslim

Personal Law and Muslim orthodoxy were evaluated by the legislature. Describes Shah Bano's view on Muslim women. The government's delay in implementing Muslim personal law hurt Indian democracy and secularism, preventing Gandhi's congress goal of women's statehood.

A prominent Muslim political scientist termed the court's appeal unfair the law would deny Muslims, especially women, justice and equality. Strangely, "muslim women's rights in divorce law" followed "what Muslims Want". Muslim reformers and non-Shah Banos disagreed. Justice Iyer publicly told Rajiv Gandhi that the new law was unjust and unconstitutional, but moderate politicians supported him because the amendment sought to strengthen communal autonomy in the face of overwhelming parliamentary control and the right wing's intensity and growing popularity (agnes 2012), which has complicated women's the Maharshi Avdhesh lawsuit was one of several challenging the modification (**MAHARSHI AVADHESH V. UNION OF INDIA 1994**). The supreme court refused these petitions since it had addressed the shah bano problem and awaited legislative action. 1995 saw the Supreme Court breach nonintervention again. Sara Mudgal (1995) petitioned the supreme court for Muslim-Hindu personal law discrepancies. The Supreme Court of India should review its position on unique personal laws in this instance since the 1950s, Hindu Personal Law underwent consensual liberalizations and democratization, while Muslim Personal Law did not they noted in their judgement that other Muslim states, such as Syria, have changed their personal regulations and that only a minority of Indian Muslims are reluctant to do so a 1997 Ahmedabad Women's Action Group petition returned the Supreme Court to nonintervention. The petition sought to end "triple talaq," which allowed Muslim males to declare divorce by saying, "you are divorced" three times. The "Supreme Court circumvention law" on Muslim divorce was also questioned. In a lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated its prior recommendation to eliminate discrimination and create a UCC, but sent the matter to the legislature.

The court did not want "dual proceedings," arguing that Article 44 had been imposed on UCC development, but it only proposed "a suggestion to Parliament" (see Constitution of India 2011). Many Hindu and Muslim women's organizations supported the court's ruling, but conservative Muslims were unprepared (Harel-Shalev 2009) the case included Hindu Meena Mathur, whose husband had converted to Islam and taken a Muslim woman as a second wife no personal law statute protected her.

This case's constitutional concern was whether a Hindu civil code-married Muslim may marry another woman as Hindus couldn't commit bigamy the state said the Supreme Court's July 2003 approval of a single civil law for all religious groups showed the judiciary's intent. Family law has improved in many countries to protect women in marriage and family issues (Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2011). Muslim men have demanded polygamy restrictions in India for a decade, but only "triple talaq" has been abolished. The MPLB eliminated triple divorce but did not make other significant changes, taking one small step toward democratizing Muslim Personal Law in India (Engineer 2004).

This issue on Muslim religious liberty in India shows the enormous discrepancy between a democratic state's assertions and its treatment of a nonruling minority. The Indian regime's democratic efforts to improve Hindu human rights haven't altered much Shamim Ara v. State of UP (2002) held that a unilateral divorce by the husband without

justification or reconciliation is illegal. The Bombay High Court again pronounced triple talaq illegal Triple Talaq Not Good Enough for Divorce” 2007) **Indian Union v. Vallamattam (2003)** among Muslims state Muslim personal law board policy has not yet been impacted by women's movement groups or the new Shia board (Jones 2010). In its 2005 Misra committee report on Indian minorities, “[human rights and women's organisations have advocated personal law reforms. No government has handled this challenging issue successfully (Misra Report [2005] 2007, 44). The Indian state believed nonintervention in communal cultural issues supported political stability. The multicultural Indian state failed to provide all its citizens equal civic and political rights, hurting Muslim women most the sluggish Indian court procedure, as evidenced in the **Sarla mudgal, president, kalyani and others v. union of india and others (1995)** case, prohibits muslim women from being empowered, particularly when state kas are not providing equivalent efforts. More Indian Muslims are actively seeking personal law reform.

Education, marriage, affirmative action, and Indian representation Islamic women's rights and resources under Indian family law challenge community, feminist, and state roles. Muslim women's importance may be overdetermined by family law while other problems recede due to historical and political factors, family law is overemphasized while a gender-just personal law is necessary, the nonegalitarian personal law creates additional obstacles for Muslim women. Thus, Muslim personal law conflicts should not be considered without considering other issues impacting Muslim women. Most social scientists believe that democracy's virtues such as fair representation and accountability emerge over time through the slow building of new social ties, but in deeply divided societies, inclusive formal citizenship does not guarantee equal citizenship rights for the nonruling even after many years of democracy.

Muslims Indian women politicians and public servants 60 years after independence (Shahabuddin 1991), India's branches have overlooked this problem despite robust affirmative action programmes that examine Indian Muslim women's liberal rights in light of their culture. The Sachar Committee (2006) found various Indian Muslims. Comprehensive research demonstrates Muslims are underrepresented and disadvantaged, which makes Indian Muslim women twice as underrepresented in public and political life as other women. status goes beyond religion and personal law for Indian Muslim women Public opinion and education impact women Indian and other political reserves for women should be increased swiftly to promote policymaking.

Analysis of quotas and women's quotas suggests that the right reservation strategy may help governments achieve equitable representation faster. Women had better electoral prospects when quotas were eliminated in 2014, women-only wards had five times the chance to elect women to the Mumbai municipal legislature. Democrats worldwide have reduced legislative barriers to women and minorities' political participation for 150 years. Encourage countries to expand representation the Hindu civil code, which applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists, was democratised by politicians, and affirmative action strengthened women Indian state governments have to organise local elections, provide them autonomy and spending, and allow one-third of women to vote and run in women-only wards under the 1992 73rd and 74th constitutional

amendments and comprise up over one-third of Indian municipal bodies, up from 3–9% in state and national legislatures, however most candidates are **Hindu women (bhavnani 2009)**

The Indian rajya sabha passed a women's empowerment bill in March 2010. Amendment 108 of the constitution reserves one-third of lok sabha and state legislative assembly seats for women, as well as one-third of scheduled caste and tribal seat despite being introduced in the lok sabha, the amendment has not been enacted and does not include muslim women even national reserve for women may not help a considerable number of muslim women unless a particular provision is introduced to accommodate minority women. Indeed, evidence shows that minority women seldom benefit from general women's reluctance the participation of muslim women in indian public and political life demands examining another problem, muslim representation muslims are excluded from affirmative action since they are weak and underrepresented.

Lower caste hindus qualify. Muslims would be considered “backward” like reserved castes or tribes, but the 1980 mandal committee rejected it. Official policy was based on class social and educational backwardness, defined by religion, castes, and a time-tested government criterion. Backward Muslims are underrepresented in the central services, indicating that federal and state class lists don't help. Backward Muslim employment would rise 27%. inferior classes quota Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu measure backwardness by economic and social status rather than castes and have adopted muslim reservations.

While not all Muslim women are underrepresented recently, some quota systems have increased legislative representation for minority women, while others leave them behind. Before analysing the fascinating empirical method to political quota classification, where women are valued and promoted, more clarity is required. Before discussing Muslim women's misgivings, note that two demographic factors substantially influence their ability to work or vote:

- (1) age at marriage, and
- (2) level of education.

Many aspects of life, including family planning, are directly affected by education, and there is a common belief that a strong education opens new doors (bandukwala 2006) early marriage is often seen as a barrier to a girl's education, and it is slowly being recognised as both the reason and the cause of the low status of certain segments of the female indian population (sanyukta and malhotra 2003; unicef 2005). several parallel laws address the legal age of marriage. many regions allow weddings at varying ages (law commission of india 2008).

Despite inconsistencies and jurisdictional problems, the child marriage restraint act of 1978, hindu marriage act of 1955, and special marriage act of 1954 prohibit under-18 females from marrying (law commission of india 2008) the average age of marriage for indian women is 18.3 years (unicef 2008), although many married before that (law commission of india 2008) muslim Indian women marry at 15.9 years, far younger than the inclusive national average, which greatly affects their lives (Desai 2010; Morgan et al. 2002). Only 16% of Muslim women work (compared with 31 percent of Hindu women). Indian Muslims are the most fertile. Given these circumstances, Muslim women's political involvement and representation are low, and Muslims have large academic inequalities—their educational scores are equivalent to India's least educated Hindu Backward Classes.

Despite the large gap between Muslim male literacy rate and the rest of society, the Department of Women and Child Development's "Education of Muslim Women and Girls in India" report (Nayar 2009) and the Misra Report ([2005] 2007) found that Muslim women's average literacy rate is 50 percent, compared to 53.7 percent for all communities.

One of the main reasons for the educational shortfalls among female literates with 7+ years of education, among those who have education up to graduation and above percent, is poverty, as children of poorer families are often forced to stop their education, often before completing primary school, to help their families. Muslim education rates are lower for numerous reasons: Muslim public security perceptions, which are somewhat linked to rising communal violence, are connected to other aspects of life. The 2006 Sachar report found that Muslim parents in India fear for their daughters' safety and don't take them to far-flung schools, forcing them to use public transit.

Muslim girls drop out of school at high rates in India, where the Muslim community has the lowest literacy rate and Muslim women are less educated than boys. Hindus value education more than Muslims, and underrepresentation in administrative jobs harms Muslim women. The Indian Constitution guarantees free state-supported education for all children aged 6-14, and Article 30 allows religious minorities to build and administer educational institutions with government subsidies without discrimination.

However, half of Indian Muslim women are illiterate. A comprehensive and creative study by Hasan and Menon (2005b) found notable differences in Muslim women's education: still, just 40.6% of Muslim females attend school. At the local level, just 13.5% of Muslim girls attend school in rural North India, but 23.1 percent in urban North India and over 70 percent in rural and urban South India, which surpasses the inclusive national average for females. Poor females are less likely to attend school (16.1 percent of Muslim girls from poor families attend school compared with 70 percent of Muslim girls from economically better-off families). Lower than 17% of Muslim females in the nation complete eight years of schooling, and fewer than 10% complete upper secondary. Poor educational levels of Muslim females tend to be connected to poverty and parents' choices (Hasan and Menon 2005). Government policy instructions have been suggested, but no major change has occurred.

Despite these obstacles, Muslim women's organisations have formed in India in the last decade. After the Shah Bano decision and legislation, Parliament disregarded Muslim-led women's nongovernmental organisations in the late 1980s. 15 organisations and hundreds of women protested the bill in Delhi. Most of these groups promote gender equality via religion, the Indian Constitution, liberalism, or human rights. Muslim women's rights advocates also prioritise Muslims' physical insecurity from frequent violence and its impact on women (Kirmani 2011). Since Hindutva forces co-opted the UCC into their political agenda, polygamy abolition, divorce, and maintenance reform are crucial. The women's movement has revised its UCC demand and championed Muslim women in various ways.

Conclusions

A universal law is desired in India, but society's leaders must create a supportive social climate. The government should review Article 44 and work towards a UCC. We request

an affidavit from the Ministry of Law and Justice on their efforts to secure a UCC for its people (**Sarla Mudgal, President Kalyani, and Others v. Union of India and Others 1995, 1531**).

Therefore, liberal arguments for group rights must take into account within-group inequality. gender inequality is more relevant since it is less obvious and public. cultural minority rights legislation must also represent the powerless. liberalism holds that minority cultural groups' rights must benefit their members, thus their self-proclaimed leaders, who are mostly older and male, do not represent all members.

Without sufficient representation of women, especially young women who are frequently co-opted into gender inequality, group rights discussions may hurt women. feminist intellectuals should empower minority women (okin 1999) in India, traditional community and government choices affect muslim women. Inter communal problems hide nonreligious or community difficulties, and the indian state's avoidance of non-Hindu religious matters has maintained political stability. Non ruling populations in highly split civilizations confront this political reality. In Israel, another deeply divided nation, the political elite and judicial system have constrained religious organization self-jurisdiction by limiting their ability to enforce religious laws, but state institutions are unlikely to meddle in Palestinian-Arab religious matters to modify them. No religion counts in Israel's minimum marriage age, yet only Jewish divorced women may use assistance in 1953 owing to minority religious liberty. In fiercely divided countries, Muslim and Christian women obtained equal rights in 2001 after a legal fight.

Though it aspires to democratize "the core country," the state priorities political stability and co-opting the minority's dominant sector above civic liberty. Leaders of India and other divided societies must commit to and maintain broad visions that encompass majority and minority progress. In the early 21st century, family law exists along an imaginary continuum from family law that fully encodes male dominance over women to relatively equitable family law that encodes a meaningful degree of parity between men and women. Democratic states should implement personal laws that respect religious traditions.

The legal marriage age for all Indians might be disastrous. Good family planning and education help all Indian women, particularly young Muslim women. Maintaining rights and outlawing polygamy may follow. Indian courts endorsed majority-group women's rights though they comprehend muslim personal law, women need gender-just policy change. The Indian government views Muslim personal law differently governments resist unpredictable changes muslim communal inequalities uncovered by state-to-community movement Muslim-Shia personal law disputes affect women.

Most Muslim sects think secular democracy implies government nonintervention in family law scholarly family law interpretations. Some Muslims develop. Despite Islamic personal law concerns, the Indian political elite and administration have long deemed orthodox Islam, largely male, to rule all Muslim community choices.

Conservative Muslims in India overlooked religion when intercommunal peace harmed women despite liberal constitution interpretation, the government has avoided conflict with minority religious leaders to foster peace, stability, and state-minority relations. Indian Supreme Court upheld Islamic personal law the informal status quo of early independence seems to have persisted. For 20 years, Indian Hindu extremism has

attacked minority religious groups, including women, but not Muslim women, who are “doubly disadvantaged.” Female and Muslim education are promoted. State and Indian criminal law should prosecute force users and include Muslim women in women's and lower-class reserves as security is a civic right. Showing proportionality is easy Muslim women corrupted politics and personal law these activities will inspire young women to seek civic and communal rights.

New public forums and organisations for educated Muslim women to advocate women's rights are needed. Through secularism, democracy, and human rights, Muslim women's groups support women's rights and feminism. Muslims populate multireligious Germany, the UK, Canada, and China many religious minority countries must respect religious diversity and women's rights, which may clash with religion, law, and gender equality. Without considering minority concerns, Muslim-majority post-colonial Bangladesh created personal law while keeping Hindu personal law. Indian Christian women resist divorce. Address small community issues nationwide weaker and less political Women want rights Religion transcends conscience in divided communities, connects the ego to law, and gives rights (Karayanni 2006), making India's religion hard to measure: Delivering one stream of diverse group superiority to the minority may not help democracy in India or preserve its minorities in a multicultural society. Muslim women will pursue secondary and higher education for better opportunities with a minimal marriage age. Unique educational right. Freedom requires civic and political education. Women, religious minorities, and the state make up rights, which divides many factions communalized state and society demand gender equality principles.

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