



BUDDHIST MORAL EDUCATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THE FIVE PRECEPTS (PAÑCASĪLA) IN THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM

¹YEN SOKNE

¹Ph.D. Research Scholar

¹Department of Philosophy

¹University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India

Abstract : This article examines how the Five Precepts can ground moral education directed toward social responsibility in contemporary society. Through philosophical analysis of selected Theravāda discourses and engagement with scholarship on Buddhist ethics and education, it distinguishes undertaking a training rule from developing the judgment needed to apply it. Readings of AN 8.39 and SN 55.7 identify protection from harm and reciprocal consideration as reasons for restraint; MN 61 provides a model of reflection before, during, and after action. The analysis applies these resources to communication, shared resources, sexual responsibility, and the conditions of attentive conduct. It argues that responsible education should connect personal practice with answerability to affected people and institutions. Contemporary applications are presented as reasoned extensions rather than direct canonical prescriptions or proven interventions. The article offers criteria for evaluating an inclusive educational approach while acknowledging historical differences, religious commitments, and the limits of a textual philosophical study.

IndexTerms - Five Precepts, Pañcasāla, Theravāda Buddhism, moral education, social responsibility, reflective judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Five Precepts are commonly presented as basic ethical commitments in Theravāda lay practice. Their educational significance, however, cannot be explained by listing prohibitions alone. A learner may remember a rule while failing to recognise whom an action affects, how a decision should be justified, or what correction is appropriate after harm occurs. This article asks how the precepts can support an education in social responsibility that develops these capacities. Its central claim is that personal restraint becomes educationally adequate when learners can explain its reasons, examine their conduct, and respond to the people who bear its consequences.

The precepts concern abstention from killing, taking what has not been given, sexual misconduct, false speech, and intoxicants associated with heedlessness. Bodhi (1981, "Taking the Precepts," sections I–II) presents them as practices of moral training within a Buddhist path. They are distinct from the more extensive rules governing ordained monastic life. In particular, the third lay precept concerns sexual misconduct rather than the complete sexual abstinence required in monastic discipline. Keeping this distinction clear allows the present study to address households, educational settings, and ordinary public relationships without treating all learners as monastic practitioners.

"Moral education" here means the cultivation of practical judgment and conduct concerning one's treatment of others. "Social responsibility" means answerability for reasonably foreseeable effects on other people, together with attention to shared conditions under which harm can be prevented or corrected. These are working philosophical definitions. They do not imply that all Buddhists understand education identically or that canonical instruction already contains a contemporary theory of citizenship. "Contemporary society" identifies the setting of the illustrative dilemmas considered below, rather than a population whose behaviour has been surveyed.

The inquiry therefore moves from textual interpretation to a defended educational proposal. It first establishes the selected literature and method, then considers why restraint matters socially, examines each precept, and develops an approach to reflection and institutional responsibility. The resulting argument is conditional: Buddhist ethical resources can contribute to social responsibility when their application is reasoned, open to correction, and attentive to unequal power. Whether a particular programme actually produces such capacities requires evidence beyond philosophical analysis.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH PROBLEM

Bodhi (1981, "Taking the Precepts," section I) connects rules, bodily and verbal conduct, and inward virtue within religious training. His account situates ethical formation in a path directed toward liberation. The present article asks which reasons for restraint can enter discussion among people with different commitments. This question requires acknowledging the religious context of the source while defending each proposed educational use on its own terms.

Keown (1992) argues for the central place of ethics in Buddhist life and challenges readings that subordinate ethical ideals to knowledge. His comparison with Aristotelian ethics makes moral formation a relevant philosophical question, although this article does not assume that Buddhist ethics and Aristotelian virtue theory are identical. Harvey (2000) provides a broader account of ethical foundations and contemporary issues across Buddhist traditions, drawing on both texts and accounts of practice. Together, these works support attention to ethical ideals while encouraging care about the difference between a textual standard and actual behaviour.

Scholarship on education adds a further distinction. Wang's (2020) account relates Buddhist ethical cultivation to educational concerns including compassion, peace, and equality; its discussion includes Mahāyāna perspectives. It is useful for framing the educational question, but its claims should not be transferred wholesale into a specifically Theravāda analysis. Lau, K., & Tse, H. (2024). *Transformation in Hong Kong Buddhist Schools: Documentary Analysis and Interviews*. They examine changes in curricula and educational goals, including character and life education, and deal with issues of instructional time, teacher training and a religiously varied school population. This is a context-specific study of Chinese Buddhist education, not proof that a Theravāda Five Precepts curriculum is beneficial.

McMahan's (2008) analysis of Buddhist modernism shows how exposure to ideas and practices beyond inherited traditions can lead to modern interpretations. This warns against the tendency to read any contemporary application as if the meaning were already openly evident in an ancient source. A precept may provide a defensible starting point for discussing digital communication or institutional accountability, while the resulting proposal still involves new interpretive choices. Naming those choices makes the argument assessable instead of concealing adaptation beneath an appeal to tradition.

The research problem pursued here is the connection between ethical restraint and educational responsibility. The selected literature supplies accounts of moral formation, modern adaptation, and educational practice; the present contribution is to distinguish the reasons for undertaking restraint, the judgment required in particular situations, and the institutional conditions that make correction possible. This is a focused philosophical problem within an existing field, rather than a claim that previous scholarship has neglected Buddhist moral education altogether. The article asks what an adequate educational use of the precepts would need to demonstrate before any claim about effectiveness could be made.

III. RESEARCH METHOD AND TEXTUAL SCOPE

The study uses conceptual analysis and close reading of a purposively selected set of translated Pāli discourses. AN 8.39 addresses the social significance of abstention; SN 55.7 develops reciprocal reasoning; AN 4.99 distinguishes personal practice from encouraging others; AN 6.63 concerns intention; AN 10.176 explains bodily and verbal conduct; MN 58 considers responsible speech; MN 61 describes reflection on action; and DN 31 sets out duties within social relationships. Selection follows the research question rather than an attempt to represent every canonical treatment of morality. AN, DN, MN, and SN denote the *Anguttara*, *Dīgha*, *Majjhima*, and *Saṃyutta Nikāyas* respectively.

The procedure has three stages. First, a passage is interpreted within its immediate discussion, with attention to its audience and stated purpose. Second, the relevant concepts are distinguished, including intention, restraint, harm, and responsibility. Third, the passage is brought into a contemporary dilemma, and the additional assumptions required for that application are stated. Canonical references identify discourses; the accompanying author-date citations identify the translations used. DN 31 is also cited by the numbered divisions in the Kelly, Sawyer, and Yareham translation. Bodhi's explanations are treated as modern interpretation drawing on commentarial traditions, rather than as passages spoken within the discourses themselves.

The article works primarily through English translations and does not claim to establish a new philological interpretation of the Pāli manuscripts. Selected Pāli terms identify the subject matter, while the argument rests on the cited passages and explicitly defended inferences. The secondary literature is used selectively, not as an exhaustive or systematic review. All contemporary examples are hypothetical analytical cases. No interviews, observations, questionnaires, participant data, or measures of educational outcomes were collected for this study. Its conclusions concern the defensibility of an educational approach, not its demonstrated causal effects.

IV. THE FIVE PRECEPTS AS MORAL TRAINING

4.1 Restraint as protection for others

AN 8.39 presents abstention under each of the five precepts as a gift of protection to beings who might otherwise encounter danger, hostility, or oppression. The discussion places these gifts within an account of merit and desirable results (AN 8.39; Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, 1997b). The passage establishes a textual connection between personal conduct and others' vulnerability. Its social significance is that an agent's restraint changes what others may have reason to fear from that agent.

This reading makes restraint more than an achievement measured privately by the practitioner. A commitment has an outward object: another person's life, belongings, relationships, or access to truthful information. Educational discussion can therefore ask whose security a rule is intended to protect. The canonical presentation remains a religious account of merit; it should not be converted into a claim that contemporary communities necessarily trust anyone who recites the precepts. Such trust would require evidence of conduct, opportunities for scrutiny, and the ability to respond when commitments are broken.

4.2 Reciprocal consideration and its limits

In SN 55.7, householders are taught to reflect on their own dislike of being killed, deprived of possessions, or subjected to particular injuries in relationships and speech. The reflection supports abstention, encouragement of others, and approval of restraint. The discourse concerns several forms of bodily and verbal conduct; it is not simply an enumeration of all five precepts (SN 55.7; Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, n.d.). Its philosophical importance is the movement from one's own vulnerability to recognition of vulnerability in another.

Reciprocal reasoning can help a learner recognise that personal convenience does not cancel another person's interests. It nevertheless needs correction through listening. Assuming that someone wants exactly what I want can erase differences in experience, dependence, or ability. A contemporary educational extension should therefore combine imaginative reversal with inquiry into the affected person's circumstances. A learner who dislikes public embarrassment might recognise why humiliating another is objectionable, but should also investigate effects that personal imagination does not reveal. Reciprocity supplies a reason to attend to others; it does not provide complete knowledge of them.

4.3 *Intention and practical answerability*

AN 6.63 identifies intention as central to kamma and connects intended action with body, speech, and mind (AN 6.63; Thānissaro Bhikkhu, 1997d). This supports distinguishing deliberate deception from an honest error and planned injury from an unintended accident. It does not establish that claiming a benevolent motive settles every ethical question. An educational judgment also needs to consider what the actor understood and what could reasonably have been anticipated.

This article accordingly distinguishes the interpretation of karmic intention from its proposed criterion of practical answerability. A person may mean to help but ignore available evidence that a plan could harm its intended beneficiaries. The educational question then concerns inadequate attention as well as motivation. Conversely, an unfortunate outcome alone does not prove malicious intent. Responsible assessment should examine reasons, knowledge, action, and subsequent response together. This is a philosophical extension for evaluating conduct; it is not an attempt to calculate karmic results from observable behaviour.

V. ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE PRECEPTS

5.1 *Taking life and the cultivation of care*

The first precept concerns abstention from taking life. AN 10.176 describes the corresponding wholesome bodily conduct through relinquishing violence and showing compassion toward living beings (AN 10.176; Thānissaro Bhikkhu, 1997c). This provides a basis for considering care alongside restraint. The present day educational implication suggested here is to look into how the suffering of another being might be trivialized by rage, group allegiance or indifference. Learning can include attention to vulnerability and discussion of ways to intervene when someone is threatened.

The literal prohibition of killing should remain distinct from the wider argument for preventing injury. For example, a hypothetical classroom discussion of bullying concerns intimidation and suffering even when no killing occurs. Its relevance rests on a defended extension of concern for life and welfare, not on identifying every instance of bullying with the completed act prohibited by the first precept. Similarly, environmental education requires further reasoning about ecological relationships and competing interests. A brief precept cannot by itself settle every dispute concerning conservation, disease control, or the treatment of animals.

5.2 *Taking what is not given and shared resources*

The second precept addresses taking what has not been given. Its educational force begins with recognising limits on one's access to another's possessions. A contemporary application can ask how permission is established and why access to a resource does not automatically authorise its use. In a hypothetical student association, a treasurer's ability to withdraw money does not mean that the money is available for personal expenses. The ethical issue concerns the purpose for which control was entrusted and the interests of those entitled to benefit.

This example leads to an institutional proposal: responsibility for shared resources should include intelligible records, agreed authorisation, and ways to challenge misuse. These arrangements are additional judgments about accountability, rather than procedures prescribed by the second precept itself. They also reveal why personal honesty is insufficient as an institutional guarantee. Even conscientious people can misunderstand an allocation or fail to notice an error. Moral education should therefore consider arrangements that make trustworthy conduct easier to establish and mistakes easier to correct, while avoiding the assumption that possession or official status establishes legitimate entitlement in every case.

5.3 *Sexual misconduct and unequal power*

The third precept concerns sexual misconduct within lay life. AN 10.176 explains this through categories shaped by marriage, guardianship, and recognised social restrictions (AN 10.176; Thānissaro Bhikkhu, 1997c). Such categories reflect a historical social order; they do not amount to a complete contemporary account of consent or gender equality. The present article proposes that educational application should explicitly examine coercion, dependence, deception, and abuse of authority. These are modern interpretive priorities requiring argument rather than being silently attributed to the canonical wording.

Consider a hypothetical relationship in which an educator controls a learner's assessment or access to opportunities. A statement of readiness might not answer the questions of pressure or reprisal. In moral conversation one should ask whether refusal can be communicated without disadvantage and whether authority has been utilized to get personal access. Respect for affected people also requires secure routes for raising concerns. Public shaming or compulsory disclosure of intimate experience would undermine that aim. The precept can frame responsibility in sexual conduct, while a contemporary institution still needs independently justified safeguards and procedures suited to its setting.

5.4 *False speech and responsibility for knowledge*

The fourth precept concerns false speech. AN 10.176 gives the example of testimony in which a person accurately represents what is known or witnessed; it also distinguishes falsehood from other unwholesome forms of speech (AN 10.176; Thānissaro Bhikkhu, 1997c). MN 58 supplies a further standard: the Buddha's speech is assessed in relation to truth, benefit, and appropriate timing, including occasions when a beneficial truth may be unwelcome (MN 58; Thānissaro Bhikkhu, 1997a). These passages give moral education a reason to examine both accuracy and the responsible use of information.

In a contemporary hypothetical case, a learner forwards an allegation without checking its source. If the learner thinks it to be true then the act should not be labeled as deliberate lying by default. Yet the decision may still be careless when verification was possible and harm was foreseeable. A proposed educational response should examine the evidence available, distinguish inference from observation, and require an appropriate correction when an error is established. This develops a responsibility for claims that extends beyond the literal prohibition of intentional falsehood.

Truthfulness also does not require indiscriminate publication of everything one knows. Information about another person's private circumstances may call for discretion, while a serious concern may require communication through a suitable channel. MN 58 concerns the Buddha's manner of speaking; it does not directly prescribe present-day confidentiality procedures. The contemporary inference is that accuracy must be joined to judgment about purpose, audience, and consequences. Making an uncomfortable but justified criticism can be responsible; silencing criticism merely to preserve institutional prestige cannot be defended as kindness.

5.5 *Intoxicants, heedlessness, and attentive conduct*

The fifth precept concerns abstention from intoxicants associated with heedlessness. In the standard account discussed by Bodhi (1981, "Taking the Precepts," section II), the formulation refers to fermented and distilled intoxicants. Its educational relevance concerns conditions under which a person can attend to conduct and exercise restraint. Application to other intoxicating substances involves interpretation; it should not be presented as a verbatim canonical catalogue of contemporary drugs or as a blanket prohibition of prescribed treatment.

The philosophical issue is that responsible agency depends partly on how people prepare to act. A hypothetical learner who takes on a role requiring reliable attention should consider choices that predictably impair that attention. The analysis can also consider peer pressure and expectations surrounding group activities. This does not mean that every lapse of attention is a violation of the fifth precept, or that moral exhortation constitutes an adequate response to addiction. An educational proposal should avoid humiliation and discuss sources of appropriate support. Claims about treatment, prevention, or improved health would require relevant professional and empirical evidence.

VI. REFLECTIVE PEDAGOGY AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION

6.1 *Reflection before during and after action*

MN 61 offers an important sequence for moral learning. Rāhula is instructed to examine bodily, verbal, and mental action before undertaking it, while performing it, and after it has occurred, considering harm to oneself, others, or both. The discourse also calls for disclosure of harmful completed bodily or verbal action to the teacher or a knowledgeable companion and for future restraint (MN 61; Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, 2006). Its pedagogical significance lies in combining anticipation, attention, and retrospective correction. It is teaching within the framework of religious education, not a modern classroom.

The sequence can then be used in a reasoned adaption to frame ethical conversation. Learners identify persons affected and evidence of important foreseeable outcomes before to acting. They deal with unforeseen consequences in action and rethink the decision when conditions change. Afterwards, they distinguish what was intended from what occurred and consider correction or repair. Such an exercise would assess the quality of reasons and responsiveness to evidence. It would not establish virtue merely by requiring a learner to repeat a morally approved conclusion.

The adaptation must also preserve boundaries. The canonical narrative does not warrant the compulsory public confession in the mixed environment of schooling. A teacher cannot want full authority over the private moral life of the learner. Contemporary reflection can be done through hypothetical instances, voluntary discussion or confidential methods where appropriate. Repair also differs from confession: acknowledging a wrong does not necessarily restore what was lost or protect the person harmed. These additional considerations are part of the educational argument developed here, not quotations from the discourse.

6.2 *The responsibilities of educators and institutions*

DN 31, section 29, describes duties in both directions between students and teachers. In contrast, the instructor should nurture the student's strengths, guide and protect him/her. Section 32 also provides duties on employers toward their workers such as providing appropriate work, materials, care when ill and time off (DN 31; Kelly, Sawyer and Yareham, 2005). These reciprocal arrangements place responsibilities on those who occupy positions of authority. At the same time, the language of social directions retains historical hierarchy and should be interpreted critically.

For contemporary education, the proposed implication is that adults and institutions must be assessed by the standards they teach. A school cannot realistically promote truthfulness when it intentionally hides wrongdoing, nor can it promote caring when it dismisses a student's valid concern. Answerability presupposes ways of calling decisions into question without every dissent becoming a sign of moral failure. A teacher's position may justify responsibility for instruction, but it does not make every ethical judgment beyond challenge. This institutional application extends the text's reciprocal orientation rather than reproducing its ancient social arrangements.

6.3 *Encouraging others without coercion*

AN 4.99 distinguishes those who practise for their own benefit, for others' benefit, for neither, or for both. The distinction is explained through personal abstention under the five precepts and encouraging others to undertake abstention (AN 4.99; Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, 2013). The passage supports the claim that ethical practice can have a social dimension beyond private compliance. It does not specify a contemporary system of educational assessment or authorise coercion as the method of encouragement.

The approach proposed here uses invitation, explanation, example, and opportunities to reconsider conduct. In a Buddhist community, undertaking precepts can be taught within refuge and religious practice. In a mixed classroom, learning about the precepts and evaluating their reasons can be separated from personal religious assent. Students should be able to accurately explain a Buddhist argument while disagreeing with one of the premises. Assessment might focus on their understanding, their reasoning and their respectful involvement not on whether they are Buddhist or if they take part in a religious observance. This distinction is a contemporary educational requirement defended by the concern to avoid coercion; it is not asserted as an explicit ancient policy.

6.4 *A hypothetical exercise in social responsibility*

Imagine a fictional community learning initiative in which students handle donated materials and report on their distribution. One participant allocates materials to friends without an agreed basis and reports that all intended recipients have been served. Another participant notices that the report exceeds what the records establish. The example combines questions of entitlement, truthful claims, and responsibility to people who lack influence over the project. It is an analytical vignette, not an observed case or a report of student behaviour.

An educational discussion would first establish what happened and distinguish evidence from suspicion. The learners would then assess the goal of the gift, the participant's authority, the claim made in the update and the people excluded from distribution. A response might include correcting the report, revisiting the allocation, and improving the process by which decisions are recorded and questioned. The exercise illustrates why moral learning needs more than a judgment about one individual's character. It requires attention to arrangements that enabled the problem and to whether the proposed repair reaches the people affected. No claim is made here that this exercise has been tested or that participation would reliably improve behaviour.

VII. DISCUSSION OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The argument yields a distinction between understanding a commitment and demonstrating that it has been fulfilled. A learner may be able to explain the second precept and still misuse shared resources. An institution may endorse truthful speech while creating incentives to hide mistakes. Educational adequacy therefore has to concern both the reasons taught and the opportunities provided for acting on them. A proposed programme should make room for scrutiny of educators and institutional practices as well as learner conduct.

Three criteria follow from the analysis. The reasons for restraint should identify an interest or vulnerability that deserves protection. Practical judgment should attend to relevant evidence and remain open to correction. Responses to wrongdoing should consider affected people and the conditions that enabled harm. These are evaluative criteria proposed by this article, not a newly discovered canonical list. They allow a philosophical assessment of an educational design before investigators ask whether its implementation produces particular outcomes.

The criteria also address the objection that abstention is too limited to support social responsibility. Refusing to deceive or appropriate another's possessions can protect a person from a specific wrong, but it does not discharge every obligation of care. Someone can refrain from direct wrongdoing while benefiting from an arrangement that excludes others. The contemporary educational proposal therefore supplements precept discussion with questions about access, power, and fair procedures. The justification for those additions must be made explicit. Their value cannot rest solely on assigning a religious label to them.

An opposite objection is that these additions dilute the religious tradition into familiar civic morality. This concern has force if liberation, kamma, or refuge are omitted from an account presented as a complete description of Theravāda practice. The present analysis does not offer that complete description. It identifies selected ethical resources and proposes a limited educational use, while retaining the distinction between participation in a Buddhist path and public discussion of reasons. McMahan's (2008) analysis of modern reinterpretation supports the need to recognise such adaptation as adaptation.

A further question concerns authority. If encouraging others becomes moral supervision, the project can undermine the very responsibility it seeks to cultivate. Learners may give approved answers to avoid punishment, and affected people may remain silent because questioning a respected educator carries a cost. The proposed approach treats religious or professional authority as a reason for greater answerability, rather than as sufficient evidence of ethical reliability. Opportunities to challenge a decision and explain an alternative are consequently part of the moral environment of learning.

Educational adequacy remains distinct from educational effectiveness. Lau and Tse's (2024) context-specific study helps to determine how curricula, teaching environments, and religious diversity important for implementation. It does not test the proposition of this article. Future research would need to describe the learners and the situation, look at what was really taught and explore whether thinking and conduct changed. It should also include unintended impacts, such as pressures to conform or unwillingness to disclose injury. Philosophical plausibility is a starting point for that inquiry, rather than its conclusion.

VIII. LIMITATIONS

The argument is limited by its selected corpus and its reliance on English translations. A philological study could examine wording and commentarial interpretation in greater detail, while a historical study could investigate how precept teaching has differed across Theravāda communities. The article makes no claim to describe the practice of every Buddhist institution. The educational scholarship discussed includes traditions and locations outside Theravāda; it frames questions about adaptation and implementation rather than supplying direct evidence about this proposal.

The contemporary applications depend on additional judgments about consent, fair procedures, confidentiality, and pluralism. These judgments have been identified as extensions, but further work should examine competing interpretations and difficult cases. The Five Precepts do not by themselves provide a complete theory of distributive justice, environmental policy, or education. Finally, the study contains no participant data and cannot establish improvements in moral behaviour, trust, wellbeing, or social cooperation. Those claims would require appropriately designed empirical inquiry and attention to the experiences of affected learners and communities.

IX. CONCLUSION

The Five Precepts can contribute to moral education by directing attention to identifiable forms of harm and to the agent's responsibility for conduct. The selected discourses also provide resources for reciprocal consideration, reflection on action, and duties within relationships. Read together, these resources support an educational approach in which learners explain why restraint matters, evaluate particular decisions, and consider correction when harm occurs. The paper's contribution is to make the movement from canonical interpretation to contemporary educational proposal explicit and open to assessment.

Social responsibility nevertheless requires more than the ability to recite commitments. It involves attention to affected people and to the institutional conditions under which conduct can be examined and corrected. An inclusive use of Buddhist ethical ideas should distinguish understanding the tradition from compulsory religious assent and should hold educators answerable to the standards they teach. These are conditions proposed for an adequate educational approach. Establishing whether a particular implementation meets them, or changes behaviour, remains a task for further research.

REFERENCES

- [1] Bodhi, Bhikkhu. 1981. *Going for Refuge and Taking the Precepts*. The Wheel Publication No. 282/284. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Online edition: <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/wheel282.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [2] Harvey, P. 2000. *An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Issues*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800801>.
- [3] Kelly, J., Sawyer, S., and Yareham, V., trans. 2005. *Sigalovada Sutta: The Buddha's Advice to Sigalaka* (DN 31). Access to Insight, revised 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.31.0.ksw0.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [4] Keown, D. 1992. *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*. London: Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22092-2>.
- [5] Lau, N.-S., and Tse, T. K. C. 2024. Education for Buddhist Modernism: Buddhicised education and reform in Hong Kong schools. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 46(4): 471–484 <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2024.2344176>.
- [6] McMahan, D. L. 2008. *The Making of Buddhist Modernism*. New York: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183276.001.0001>.
- [7] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. 1997a. *Abhaya Sutta: To Prince Abhaya* (MN 58). Access to Insight, revised 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.058.than.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [8] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. 1997b. *Abhisanda Sutta: Rewards* (AN 8.39). Access to Insight, revised 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an08/an08.039.than.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [9] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. 1997c. *Cunda Kammaraputta Sutta: To Cunda the Silversmith* (AN 10.176). Access to Insight, revised 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an10/an10.176.than.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [10] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. 1997d. *Nibbedhika Sutta: Penetrative* (AN 6.63). Access to Insight, revised 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an06/an06.063.than.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [11] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. 2006. *Ambalatthika-rahulovada Sutta: Instructions to Rahula at Mango Stone* (MN 61). Access to Insight, revised 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.061.than.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [12] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. 2013. *Sikkha Sutta: Trainings* (AN 4.99). Access to Insight, revision dated 30 November 2013. <https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.099.than.html> (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [13] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. n.d. *Veludvāreyya Sutta: The People of Bamboo Gate* (SN 55.7). Dhammatalks.org. https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/SN/SN55_7.html (accessed 10 October 2026).
- [14] Wang, C.-L. 2020. Buddhist ethics and moral education. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.1264>.