# An Approach for Serving the Web by Exploiting Email Tunnels

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**ABSTRACT:**

Exposed infrastructures on the Internet signify a serious threat to countries with suppressed powers, which leads them to develop and deploy review mechanisms in their networks. Unfortunately, the existing suppression system does not offer guarantees of high availability for its users because censors can use the current advanced suppression technologies to easily identify and destroy the traffic that belongs to these systems. In this article, we propose to provide services (SWEET) through the use of email tunnels, which is a highly available suppression system. SWEET works by encapsulating the traffic of users who have been reviewed in emails transported by public email services such as Gmail and Yahoo Mail. Since the SWEET operation is not restricted by any particular email provider, we trust that the acceptor should block email communications to undermine SWEET, which is unlikely because email is an important part of the Internet today. Through experiments in our system pattern, we exposed that the SWEET performance is sufficient for web surfing.

**KEYWORDS: E**mail communications; traffic encapsulation, suppression

## 1. INTRODUCTION:

We consider deep packet inspection (DPI) harmful. Whileoriginally meant to detect attack signatures in packet payload, it is ineffective in practice due to the ease of evasion. At the same time, DPI technology is increasingly usedby censoring countries to filter the free flow of information or violate network neutrality [4]. We argue that what makesDPI particularly harmful is the asymmetry of blocking effectiveness, i.e., it is hard to stop motivated and skilled networkintruders but very easy to censor

ordinary user's Internet access. DPI technology ultimately fails to protect critical targets but succeeds in filtering the information flow of entireCountries. Numerous well-documented cases illustrate how DPI technology is used by censoring countries. Amongst others, China is using it to filter HTTP [5] and rewrite DNS responses [6]. Iran is known to use DPI technology to conduct surveillance [7]. In Syria, DPI technology is used forthe same purpose [8]. Even more worrying, TLS interception proxies, an increasingly common feature of DPI boxes, are used to transparently decrypt and inspect a TLS session which effectively breaks the confidentiality provided by TLS.The rise of Internet censorship led to the creation of numerous circumvention tools which engage in a rapidly developing arms race with the maintainers of censorship systems. Of particular interest to censoring countries is the Tor network [9]. While originally designed as a low-latencyanonymity network, it turned out to be an effective tool tocircumvent censorship as well. Tor's growing success as a circumvention tool did not remain unnoticed, though. Tor is orwas documented to be blocked in many countries includingIran [10], China [11], and Ethiopia [12], just to name a few. We argue that many circumvention tools—Tor included—suffer from two shortcomings which can easily be exploitedby censors.

First and most importantly, they are vulnerable to active probingas pioneered by the Great Firewall of China (GFW) [11]: the GFW is able to block Tor by first lookingfor potential Tor connections based on the TLS client cipherlist. If such a signature is found on the wire, the GFW reconnects to the suspected Tor Bridge and tries to "speak"the Tor protocol with it. If this succeeds, the GFW black-lists the respective bridge. Active probing is not only usedto discover Tor but—as we will discuss—also VPNs [13] andobfs2 [14], which is a censorship-resistant protocol. The relevance of active probing attacks is emphasized by the work of Durumeric et al. [15]. By conducting fast Internet-widescanning, the authors were able to find approximately 80%of all active bridges at the time. From a censor's point ofview, active probing is a promising strategy which greatlyreduces collateral damage caused by inaccurate signatures.The attack is also non-trivial to defend against because censors can easily emulate real computer users.

## 2. EXISTING SYSTEM:

The Tor network functions by allowing users to connect to a set of nodes with public

IP addresses that control user traffic to the requested census destination. General knowledge of Tor's IP address, required for users around the world to use Tor, is used and used by censors to prevent citizens from accessing Tor. To improve availability, recent procurement proposals are intended to make traffic extremely valuable to censors by sharing secrets with customers. Telex and Chirruped provide this invisible communication even if secret code is secretly exchanged within network traffic so that it does not have pre-shared secret information with the client. Chirruped offers several advantages and limitations compared to Telex and Decoy routing systems using an additional client registration stage

**DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:**

Due to lack of availability, censors can interrupt or disable the service completely.

Recently, the observability of these systems has proven to be destructive. This is because a comprehensive imitation of today's complex protocols becomes sophisticated and often unfeasible

## 3. PROPOSED SYSTEM:

In this paper, we proposed and implemented SWEET, a system of bypassing of suppression that provides high availability by taking advantage of the opening of communications by email. This document makes the following main contributions: i) we propose a new infrastructure for the circumvention of censorship, SWEET, which provides high availability, a feature that is lacking in existing circumvention systems; ii) we developed two prototype implementations for SWEET (one using webmail and the other using email exchange protocols) that allow the use of almost all email providers by SWEET clients; and, iii) we show the viability of SWEET for the practical bypassing of censorship by measuring the SWEET communication inactivity for web surfing using our patternoperation.

**ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:**

The SWEET server acts as an Internet Proxy when sending out lid traffic to any critical destinations.

Our approach can be accomplished through a small application that runs on a remote proxy based on the user's final host and email, which makes this application easy.

### 4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE:

SWEET server works outside the suppression area. Clients are forced to flee

from suppression by preventing traffic congestion inactions. The design consists of four elements: Email Agent, Converter, Proxy agent and registration agent. Here is the email agent IMAP and SMTP server.




**Architecture of SWEET server**

CONCLUSION:

In this paper we presented SWEET, a deployable system for insoluble communication with web destinations. SWEET works through tunnel networktraffic through widely used public email services like Gmail, Yahoo Mail, and Hotmail. Unlike recently proposed schemes that require a collection of ISPs to support modifications to instrument router levels in support of secret communication, our approach can be deployed by a small applet used at the user's end host, and a remote mail-based proxy that simplifies implementation. Through an implementation email services like Gmail, Yahoo Mail, and Hotmail. Unlike recently proposed schemes that require a collection of ISPs to support modifications to instrument router levels in support of secret communication, our approach can be deployed by a small applet used at the user's end host, and a remote mail-based proxy that simplifies implementation. Through an implementation and evaluation in a wide area deployment, we find that while SWEET causes additional latency in communication, these overhead costs are low enough for interactive access to web services. We feel that we can work to quicken quickening of suppression-based services in the wide area, certifying high accessibility.

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